cause.

insipid canon, because it is contained in the very definition of a Besides it is a very odd and uncouth manner of speak. ing, to say, that a whetstone contains in it the sharpness of a scythe, not formally but eminently, because it can make a scythe sharp. Yet this is the case in a multitude of these metaphysical axioms; I mention this only as an instance at present and as a reason why I have past so many of them over in silence.

III. The third kind of cause is an instructive cause. This works either by way of manifestation of truth, or direction in practice, and may be called manifestative or directive.

1. In the manifestation of truth this cause sometimes operates in silence; as a book, a diagram, a picture, a map, a mariner's compass, or magnetic needle: Sometimes it is vocal; as a tutor, or a watchman in the night, or perhaps a cuckow giving notice of the spring, or a crowing cock of the morning.

2. In the direction of practice this cause is either a rule which teaches us to act whether by speech or writing; or it is a pattern or example for us to imitate and copy after. Sometimes this is a living example which by acting shews us to act the same; or it is a guide which seems to include both the former (viz,) teaching and shewing, or rule and example.

Many times the instructive causes which primarily manifest truth are in some sense directive also, as they are designed also ultimately to direct our practice; so a mariner's needle pointing where the north lies, directs the pilot to steer the ship.

Note, Active instructive causes approach toward the idea of an efficient cause; the unactive are quite distinct.

Note, All this sort of causality works its effect chiefly in intellectual agents.

Query, But may not an instructive cause sometimes be attributed to brutes? Dogs or horses will teach one another what man has taught them.

Note, The word directive may sometimes be applied to physical causality, as when a pilot or steers-man guides a ship by the rudder, or when a tube or ring guides an arrow to the mark, when a canal conveys water to a cistern, or when any hard body by repelling or reflecting, determines any moving body to a particular point. But all these are more properly ranked under efficient causes than directive, because they do it by mere mechanism, without so much as the appearance of any intellectual influence upon the thing directed, and can never be called instructive.

Query, when a sun-dial shews the hour, the sun and the style of the dial seem to be social efficient causes; the sun by giving light and the style by limiting it with shade: But what sort of cause is the dial-plane? Is it not instructive?

IV. A suasive case is properly something from without,

which being apprehended by the mind, excites or inclines a voluntary or free agent to act, and it works either by intreaty or authority, by commands or counsels, by promising or threatening, by rewards or punishments, by fear or hope, or any other motives, all which are called moral agency or influence.

Suasive causes are either personal or real. Personal are chiefly such as these (viz.) Author or persuader, commander, encourager, &c. Real suasive causes are the end or design, the object, occasion, opportunity, merit or demerit. Any being, appearance or circumstance whatsoever, that tends to influence the agent in a moral way, i. e. to affect and persuade the will, may be properly called a suasive cause.

This sort of causes belongs also chiefly if not only to intellectual and voluntary agents.

Yet it it may be queried, whether a pond inviting a horse to drink be a suasive or an efficient cause? Is the influence of this object on the animal properly natural or moral? Food inviting a hungry man to eat has certainly both a natural and a moral influence, because he has both animal nature and reasoning powers.

The end or design is one of the chief of suasive causes. This is usually called the final cause, and makes a considerable figure in the doctrine of causes. It is defined, That for the sake whereof any thing is done. An artificer labours hard; his end is to procure bread; his labour is called the means. The end is the cause, the means the effect.

Under the idea of an end all the doctrine of final causes with all their divisions should be introduced.

1. Here therefore comes in first the distinction of ultimate end or subordinate: An ultimate end is either absolutely so, such is or should be the end of all our actions, (viz.) the glory of God and our own final happiness, or it is ultimate in its own kind; so learning or knowledge is the chief end of reading. Subordinate ends are such as tend to some further end, as knowledge is sought in order to practise; practice in order to profit and pleasure in this life, or preparation for the life to come.

Note, There may be many co-ordinate ends of the same action which are not subordinated to one another. A man rides on horseback for his pleasure, for his health, and for a visit to his friend. If one of these ends be much superior in his eye to the others, that is called the primary end, others are but secondary, though not subordinate.

2. The end is considered as in the intention of the prime efficient, or in the execution. In the intention it moves or excites the efficient cause to act by a moral influence, and it is in this view it properly comes in among suasive causes. But in the execution it becomes the effect of the prime agent by a natural influence or causality.

3. Another manifest distinction of final causes is into such as are private and concealed, or such as are public and avowed.

4. There is another distinction which the schools call finis cujus, i. e. the end or design of the workman, and finis cui which is the end or design of the work. A clock-maker's desigu is gain, but the design of the clock is to shew the hour.

1. Query, Are brutes influenced by final causes? Their actions look very like it. But doth not acting for some desigu or end imply reasoning? Is this reasoning in themselves or in their Maker only? What is it then in the brutes themselves? Can mere instinct or mechanism perform all these operations?

2. Is it not an evident truth that all causes must have a being before they can act, at least in order of nature though not always in time? But may not many suasive causes act before they exist? as for instance; a thief is tempted to provide a ladder today because there will be an opportunity at night to come over the garden wall: And do not final causes always act before they exist, since the action of the efficient is designed to produce their existence as the effect? Answer. All suasive causes act by the idea of them existing in the mind, whether the things themselves exist or no.

1st Note, The end and the means are mutually cause and effect to each other. When the end is considered as a suasive cause, the means are the effect; but when the end is considered as the effect, the means are an instrumental or subordinate efficient cause under the influence of the principal efficient.

2. The end reconciles the agent to those means which may be painful and unpleasant, and it regulates and limits the use of means. A sick man who seeks health is persuaded to use blisters or bitter potions, and his use of them is regulated and limited by the view of health.

3. In the series of final causes subordinate to each other, that which is last in execution is generally first or chief in the intention; but it is not always so; for when the chief end is obtained, lesser ends may be sometimes pursued. I retire into the country chiefly for my health; but when I am well I design also to visit my friends there, and I seek my health partly with that design.

Besides these four kinds of causes which have a plain, a positive and direct influence upon the effect, there are some other principles which also have their distinct sorts of influence, though not in so positive and direct a manner: Yet they have been dignified with the title of causes for want of a fitter name. The chief of them are, a deficient cause, a permissive cause, and a condition.

I. A deficient cause is when the effect owes its existence in a great measure to the absence of something which would have

prevented it; so that this may be reckoned a negative rather than a positive cause: The negligence of a gardener, or the want of rain, are the deficient causes of the withering of plants; and the carelessness of the pilot, or the sinking of the tide is the cause of a ship's splitting on a rock: The forgetfulness of a message is the cause of a quarrel among friends or of the punishment of servants: The not bringing a reprieve in time is the cause of a criminal's being executed, and the want of education is the cause why many a child runs headlong into vice and mischief: The blindness of a man or the darkness of the night are the causes of stumbling A leak in a boat is a deficient cause why the water runs in and the boat sinks; and a hole in a vessel is called a deficient cause, why the liquor runs out and is lost. Man is the deficient cause of all his sins of omission, and many of these carry great guilt in them.

:

II. A permissive cause is that which actually removes impediments, and thus it lets the proper causes operate. Now this sort of cause is either natural or moral.

A natural permissive cause* removes natural impediments, or obstructions, and this may be called a de-obstruent cause. opening the window-shusters is the cause of light entering into a room: Cleansing the ear may be the cause of a man's hearing music who was deaf before: Breaking down a dam is the cause of the overflowing of water and drowning a town: Letting loose a rope is the cause of a ship's running a-drift: Leaving off a garment is the cause of a cold and a cough; and cutting the bridle of the tongue may be the cause of speech to the dumb.

Note, The cause which removes natural impediments may be a proper efficient cause with regard to that removal, yet it is not properly efficient, but merely permissive, with regard to the consequences of that removal.

A moral permissive cause removes moral impediments, or takes away prohibitions, and gives leave to act: So a master is the permissive cause of his scholars, going to play; a general is the same cause of his soldiers plundering a city; and a repeal of a law against foreign silks is the permissive cause why they are

worn.

Query, Was not God's permission of Satan to afflict Job rather natural than moral, since his mischievous actions did not become lawful thereby, and since it is now, become his nature to do mischief, where he has no natural restraint.

III. A condition has been usually called causa sine qua non, or a cause without which the effect is not produced. It is gene

If the word de-obstruent were always used to denote a cause removing na. tural obstruction, then we might leave the term permissive only to signify moral causes of this kind.

rally applied to something which is requisite in order to the effect, though it hath not a proper actual influence in producing that effect Day-light is a condition of ploughing, sowing and reaping: Darkness is a condition of our seeing stars and glowworms: Clearness of the stream is the condition of our spying sand and pebbles at the bottom of it: Being well drest with a head uncovered is a condition of a man's coming into the presence of the king: And paying a pepper-corn yearly is the condition of enjoying an estate. How far the perfect idea of the word condition in the civil law may differ from this representation is not my present work to determine.

Note, These three last causes may possibly be all ranked under the general name of conditions; but I think it is more proper to distinguish them into their different kinds of causality.

CHAP. XI.-Of Subject and Adjunct.

THE greatest part of what is necessary to be said on this theme may be found in Logic, where it treats of substances and modes: But in this place the word subject is more usually considered as having accidental modes relating to it than those which are essential, for so the word adjunct means here.

As a being or substance may be a subject of inhesion, adhesion or of denomination, so adjuncts may perhaps sometimes be used in a large sense to include some internal qualities which may inhere in the subject; but the word more generally stands distinguished from inherent qualities, and signifies more properly external additions or appendices, which adhere to the subject or names and denominations, by which it is called.

The most considerable adjuncts of all appearances or actions are what we call circumstances, which include time, place, light, darkness, cloathing, the surrounding situation of things, or persons, and the concomitant, antecedent, or consequent events.

When the word subject signifies a subject either of occupation, of operation, of thought or discourse, it may be properly also called an object; as a house or timber are subjects or objects on which a carpenter works, about which he is occupied, or of which he thinks or discourses.

Objects are either immediate and proxime, or mediate and remote. The pages and words of a book are the immediate ob'ject of a student's occupation; notions and opinions, arts and sciences are the remote object, because they are taught by these pages. So a displeased superior is the remote object of my addresses, but the Mediator by whom I hope for reconciliation is my more immediate object. I send letters to my friend remotely, but I deliver them immediately to the post.

Again, Objects are either common or proper. The shape, and motion, and size of bodies are common objects of two diffe