of walking, dancing, singing; in inanimate beings they are principles. Powers of moral action are called also principles or habits, as temperance, justice.

Note 1. Though we can draw no inferences from the power to the act, or that any thing is because it can be; yet inferences may be justly drawn from the act to the power, or that such a thing can be because it is.

2. Whatsoever power the agent has to act, yet the action can be received by the patient no further than the power of the patient reaches. This is exprest in scholastic language, quicquid recipitur, recipitur ad modam recipientis. A gallon may pour out its liquor into a pint bottle, but the bottle can receive but a pint: And if the neck be narrow it can receive liquor but slowly how fast soever the larger vessel may pour it. A tutor may teach a child all the rules of reading in a day, but a child cannot learn them in a month.

3. Neither the power of creatures nor of God himself extends to things which are inconsistent in nature and self-contradictory: What his infinite wisdom cannot join, his power cannot produce. Nor does this impossibility in things argue any impotence in the blessed God. Yet let it be observed, that it is a much more modest way of speaking generally, to say such things cannot be done, than that God cannot do them.

CHAP. VII.-Of relative Affections or Relations.

A RELATIVE affection is the same with a relation: This arises from the respect that one thing bears to some other thing or things in the universe, or to some part or parts, property or properties of itself. The same relation is not confined to two things, but it may belong to many. Paternity, and sonship, greatness, and smallness, are relative ideas; and so are a part and a whole; a king and his subjects; beginning, middle, and end.

In relations we consider first the subject of them, that is the thing of which we are speaking; this is called the relate; and then the term to which this thing is related, which is called the correlate. So if we speak of a father, that is the subject of the relation; and the term or correlate is the son; but if we are first speaking of the son, then the son is the relate or subject of the relation, and the father is the term or correlate.

Some relations arise from the mere existence of the two be ings, so the likeness of two eggs. Others require a foundation of the relation distinct from the mere existence of the relate and correlate; as in master and scholar, instruction is the foundation; in buyer and seller, the foundation is compact.

Relations are of several kinds.

1. They are natural or moral, accidental or voluntary. Natural relations are between root and branches, father and children, kindred by birth, &o. Moral are those relations which

the actions of men bear to a law, and thus they are good or evil, rewardable or punishable; this law is either human or divine, &c. Accidental relations are between several persons happening to become neighbours, or between a company of soldiers drawn out by lot, or between flowers springing up from the same bed of earth. Relations are instituted and voluntary, i. e. freely chosen, as between husband and wife, or two or three friends, &c. Sometimes they are chosen or voluntary only on one side, as a carter chuses what horses shall make up his team, or a man what house he will inhabit.

2. Relations may be termed reciprocal or not reciprocal. Reciprocal relations are partners, cousins, neighbours, balances, &c. Relations not-reciprocal are cause and effect, father and son, uncle and nephew, king and subjects. The first indeed are more usually called synonymous relatives, or of the same name; the others we call heteronymous or of a different naine.

3. Relations are divided into real or mental; the real relations arise evidently from the nature of things. These are the whole and part, cause and effect, truth and goodness, &c. as before recited. Mental relations are made only by the mind; these will follow in their due order.

CHAP. VIII.-Of Truth, Goodness and Perfection.

LEST the metaphysicians should take it ill to have these two affections of being (viz.) truth and goodness so much postponed, let us name them in the first rank of relative affections or relations: For real truth and goodness are plainly ranked among relative ideas, as they consist in a conformity to some things as their rule and standard. And first let us discourse of truth.

There are various senses wherein the term truth is used. 1. A being is said to be true in a metaphysical sense, when it is agreeable to the divine idea, which is the grand pattern of all created beings. 2. Things may be said to have a physical or natural truth, as, that is true gold which has all the necessary properties which are usually united in the idea signified by that word. 3. Some things are called true in representation, as when a picture well represents the original, or when an idea in our minds is really conformable to the object of it. 4. Things are said to be true in signification when the thing signified answers the sign; as when the proper words are used which commonly signify such an idea. 5. There is also logical truth when the proposition or assertion is conformable to things. And indeed this I think is the most common sense wherein this word is used. The propositions themselves are frequently called truths. Some of these are called probable, some improbable, some certain, i. e. according to our knowledge of them. Again, some truths are necessary, such as there is a God, the whole is

bigger than a part, two and two make four; these are called eternal and unchangeable; other truths are contingent, as the sun shone bright to day, Plato was a philosopher. 6. There is also ethical or moral truth, when our words or actions agree to our thoughts, and our deeds to our words, i. e. when we speak or act as we think, or when we believe and practise what we profess and promise. Sincerity is the truth of the heart, and veracity the truth of the lips.

After truth comes goodness.

Goodness is sometimes used in a sense near a-kin to truth; so the works of God are metaphysically good when they are agreeable to his will and answer his design; when God surveyed all things that he had made, behold they were very good.

Things also are physically or naturally good, when they come up to any supposed standard, or are fitted to answer their end, as good wheat, good gold, a good air.

Artificial things are also good in this sense, as good writing, a good picture, a good clock.

There is another sense of natural good which is used only with relation to sensible or to rational and intelligent beings, and that is, what is pleasant, or which tends to procure pleasure or happiness.

There is also moral good, which relates only to intelligent creatures, and that is called virtue when it regards our neighbours or ourselves; or it is called religion when it has a regard to God. Moral good in general is when the voluntary thoughts, words or actions of creatures are conformable to the reason of things, or to the law of God. Which of these two is the chief or original rule of goodness may be debated, though I rather think it is the will or law of God, gives the proper obligation to obedience.

Note, It seems most proper to call both natural and revealed religion the law or will of God, though one is manifested to us by the exercise of our reasoning powers the other by divine revelation.

The good of mankind or of rational beings is wont to be distinguished into the supreme or chief good and the subordinate good; it is either real or apparent; it is present or future; it is also divided into bonum jucundum, utile et honestum, i. e. pleasant, profitable and honourable. The two first of these come under the idea of natural good, the last is near a-kin to moral good, though perhaps not exactly the same.

Note, the word goodness is also used in somewhat a different sense when it signifies wishing or doing good to others; then it is called kindness or benevolence. This belongs either to God or creatures: It comes nearest to the idea of moral good, though

it promotes natural good, as it is that which tends to procure the pleasure or happiness of other beings.

Any thing that is excellent in its kind is vulgarly called good, whether it be natural, artificial or moral.

Note, What truth is to the mind that is good to the will, i. e. its most proper object.

According to some of these divisions of truth and goodness it may be proper also to shew what is falsehood, and what is evil, which are their contraries; and here the moral ideas of vice and sin may be introduced, which is the unconformity of our voluntary thoughts, words, or actions, to the laws of reason, or to the revealed will of God.

Here we might say, as duties and virtues consist either in action or in abstinence, so sins are distinguished into those of omission or those of commission. We might remark also con.. cerning good and evil, that of several good things the greatest is to be chosen, and of several evils the least. But these thoughts belong rather to moral science.

Let us proceed now to consider what is the true idea of perfection.

When metaphysical or physical truth and goodness are united in any being it is called perfect, i. e. it contains all the parts and properties which belong to the essence or nature of that thing, without defect or blemish; it comes up to its standard, and it is fitted to answer all its designed or proper ends. Where any of these are wanting the being is called imperfect.

A being may be called perfect absolutely in all respects; and that belongs to God alone; it may be said to be perfect in its own kind as a perfect cube or triangle, or circle; that is a perfect rainbow, which has all its colours and reaches from side to side of the horizon; or it may be called perfect comparatively; that is a perfect image, statue or picture, which has no sensible defects or unlikeness to the original, and is superior to all others; so established and knowing christians are called perfect in scripture in comparison of novices.

Again, A being is perfect either as to parts or as to degrees; an infant is a perfect man as to his parts, but his degrees of growth, or of power to stand, to walk, to reason, &c. are imperfect. Yet further, a thing may be perfect as to quantity and measure, as a horse of full grown stature; but this horse may not be perfect as to the qualities and powers of beauty, or swiftness. So fruit may be perfect as to its size, but not as to its ripeness.

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In the last place, things are yet said to be perfect with regard to all their essentials (viz.) the natural parts and properties which make the thing be what it is, as a garden just laid out 'and planted; or it may be perfect with regard to all circumstantials

also, which give that thing beauty, ornament, honour, conveniency, &c. such as well grown fruit-trees, shady walks, summer-houses, green-houses, &c. make a perfect garden.

The word perfect is sometimes used for excellent, as when we say, beasts and birds are more perfect than fishes; spirits are more perfect than bodies; and men more perfect than brutes.

CHAP. IX.-Of the Whole and Parts.

A BEING is said to be a whole when it is considered as consisting of the several parts of it united in a proper manner. And consequently parts are beings, which united, constitute the whole. There are four kinds of whole reckoned up by writers on this subject, (viz.) formal or metaphysical, essential or physical, integral or mathematical, and universal or logical. See Logic, part I. chap. sect. 7. These are the terms in which the schools have expressed these distinctions; and since most of the distinctions are useful, it is not necessary to change the terms, though some of them may be applied in a little more proper and perspicuous manner.

A formal or metaphysical whole, is the definition of a thing, whereof the genus and the difference are the two constituent parts. See Logic, part I. chap. 5. § 4. I think this is no useless distinction.

An essential or physical whole, is wont to be applied to natural beings, all which were supposed to consist of matter and form: And thence it is applied to man consisting of body and soul; which the Peripatetics called the matter and form of But I think the sense of it may be better changed or enlarged to include the substance, with all the essential properties of a thing; which joined together make up the whole essence of it.

man.

An integral whole, is when any thing is made up of several parts, which have a real and proper existence in nature, and are quite distinct from each other; as the body of man is made up of trunk, head and limbs: An army is made up of soldiers. Number is made up of units. and a day of hours: A book is made up of pages, a page of words, a word of letters; and speech is made up of articulate sounds.

This is

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plied to number, time, dematical whole, when it is ap

or any thing that proper quantity, but the term integral may have a wider extent. An universal whole, is a genus which includes several species, or a species which includes several individuals. This belongs chiefly to logic; and therefore it is called a logical whole.

Though spirits have properly no quantitative, parts, and therefore cannot be called a whole of the mathematical kind, yet the terms whole and parts, may be applied to them in all