us to conceive of any duration without succession: but this permanent duration of God is his eternity which carries some things in it above our present ideas. See more in the chapters of time and infinities.

As creation gives existence to all created substances, so conservation is said to give duration, i. e. continuance in existence to all creatures.

Though the most proper idea of creation is the causing a substance to exist which had no existence, yet the word is also used in a less proper sense, when any particular bodies are formed out of such a mass of matter as seems utterly unfit for that end; when such changes are made in any substance as are generally supposed to be above the power of creatures and belong to God alone: so God created fish and fowls out of the water, and man and beasts out of the earth; though the creation of the substance of water or earth, or the matter out of which they were made, is the original sense of the word.

Conservation here refers to the same things which are the objects of creation, and on which God is supposed to exercise his almighty power.

Queries. Enquire then, how far do creation and conservation differ? Is conservation a continued creation? See Essay XI. sect. ult. If a creature be once formed would it not continue to exist without any divine conserving act? Is it possible the Creator should exist without willing or nilling the continued existence of his creatures?

Note, Substances being once made, a creature cannot of himself destroy them, or make their duration to cease, any more than he could of himself create them but multitudes of modes are made and destroyed perpetually at the will of creatures, and are placed within their power.

Note, Though time, place, ubiety, might be introduced here and connected with duration, yet they are all plainly relative affections, and therefore I refer them to their more proper place.

CHAP. V.-Of Unity and Union.

THE next absolute affection to be considered is unity, which perhaps had never had the honour to make a chapter in Metaphysicks, if it had not been coupled with verity and bonity; which three properties being ascribed by Plato to God the great and eternal being. Aristotle his scholar ascribes them all to the idea of being in general, and thence came these ideas to make such a figure in ontology: though it must be confessed that several things have been said on these subjects which furnish the mind with useful distinctions.

Unity is that whereby a thing stands as it were divided in our conceptions from all other things: and this unity is either simple or compounded; we say one nosegay as well as one flower, and one family as well as one person, and one universe as well as one creature or one atom. See something further concerning unity, simplicity, and multiplicity in chap. XIV. of number.

Here we take occasion to treat of the doctrine of union, though perhaps some may call it a relative idea. It is that whereby two or more things either really become one thing or are considered as one; this distinguishes union into real and mental.

Real union is either natural and necessary, as between the root and the tree; or fortuitous and accidental, as between two apples making a twin; or designed and artificial, as between the graff and the stock, or drugs united to compound a

medicine.

Again, real union is corporeal, spiritual or human.

First, consider corporeal union or union of bodies, whether dry or liquid, which is made by blending, mixing, compounding, by contact, aggregation, colligation, &c. Under this head we may also treat of vital and of inanimate unions of corporeal beings. Some of these corporeal unions may communicate properties, as fire joined to wood, a graft joined to a stock, perfume to garments. Others do not, as a bundle of dry sticks, or a heap of stones.

Secondly, consider spiritual union or union of minds; which may be called either intellectual, by mutual consciousness of each other's thoughts, or by agreement in opinion or it is morat by friendship or mutual love; or supernatural, as it may relate to God and the sacred themes of revealed religion.

Query, How far an union of spirits may arise from a supe rior spirit assuming an inferior to act by it in the manner of an instrument, or under-agent? In this there is no real communication of properties; yet the same actions may be ascribed to both or to either when united, and the same properties too by common figures of speech. But this I leave to theological debate.

In the last place consider human union, i. e. the union of an animal body with a spirit to make a man ; and what are the effects of this union, viz. sensation, imagination, passion, &c. voluntary motions of the body, &c. And let it be noted, that though there be no real communication of properties here, yet there may be a nominal communication of them; as a wise head-piece, a meagre soul, a prudent body, a heavy genius.

Mental union is when several things really distinct and different are considered as one; there are no two beings, nor any

multitude of things so different and distinct; but may by their likeness or agreement, situation or other circumstances, come to be considered as one thing, and come under one name. Air, water, earth, and all the infinite variety of creatures make one universe; all individuals are united in one species, and all species under one genus; all substances, whether minds or bodies, come under one general name of being; and all the ideas and collection of thoughts as well as words in this book make one treatise of ontology. Note, in all these instances there is a real foundation for this mental union.

In many unions we have occasion to consider not only the terms which are the things united, but also the means or bond of union between these terms. In a nosegay the bond of union is a bread; in metals it is solder; in a heap of stones it is juxtaposition and gravitation; between friends the bond of union is love; between kindred it is birth; between master and servant it is contract, &c. But there are many things united where the bond of union is unknown, or must be resolved into the appointment of God. What is it unites the parts of matter in a hard body? What is it unites the flesh and spirit in man?

Union and composition may give occasion also to speak of abstraction, division, dissolution, separation, &c. which stand in opposition to union.

CHAP. VI.—Of Act and Power, Action and Passion, Necessity and Liberty.

THE next absolute affections of being, are act and power; though it may be a little doubtful whether there is not enough of relation between these two ideas to throw them into the rank of relative affections. Each of these viz. act and power may be distinguished three ways:

1. As actual being or existence is distinguished from potential, or a power to be; So a book already written differs from a book which may be written, or that is merely possible.

2. As actual doing or action is distinguished from a power to do: So the actual putting bodies in motion differs from mo tivity or a power to move them: So the acts of thinking in spirits have some sort of difference from the thinking power.

3. As actual suffering or passion is distinguished from a power to suffer: So actual division in matter differs from mere divisibility; or the actual motion of a body is different from mobility or a power to be moved.

Here we treat of action which is the exercise of a power to do, and passion which is the exercise of a power to suffer. Note, passion and suffering in this philosophical sense signifies only receiving the act of the agent or doer by the patient or sufferer. When hailstones smite upon a rock, the hailstones are the agents, the rock is the patient; it is no matter whether any VOL, VIII.

impression be made or no; or when a child honours his father, the father is the patient in a philosopical sense, and the child the agent.

Here it is proper to introduce all the needful distinctions of action. (1.) It is immanent or transient. (2.) It is natural, supernatural, voluntary, or accidental. (3.) It is necessary

or free.

1. Immanent action has no different patient but continues in the agent; so a man forms ideas, or he loves himself. Transient action passes over to some other object as a patient: So a man draws a picture on a canvas: So a father loves his son, and

feeds or clothes him.

2. Natural action; so the fire hardens clay. Supernatural action, so Elisha made iron swim by casting a stick into the water. Voluntary action; so the potter moulds his clay into a vessel. Accidental action; so a servant heedlessly throws down a glass and breaks it.

3. Necessary action; so the sun warms the earth; free action; so man chuses what food he likes and eats it when he pleases.

Note, Necessary agents act always, and that to the utmost of their power, i. e. when things requisite to their agency are present: But free agents act what, and when, and as far as they will.

Perhaps the doctrine of liberty and necessity might be here properly inserted. We have already spoken of necessity of existence as it is opposed to contingency: Here necessity of action stands rather distinguished from freedom or liberty, yet is not universally and utterly inconsistent with it, as will appear in what follows.

Necessity has been before distinguished into natural, moral, and logical. See chap. iii. Natural necessity is either internal or external. Internul necessity is that which arises from the very nature of the thing itself, so a sensible being seeks its own preservation, a fish avoids dry land, and a fox the water, and lead sinks in the sea: That necessity is external which arises from some outward force of restraint or constraint; so lead is upheld on the surface of the water; so a fox is driven into the sea, or a fish drawn in a net to land, and so a man is constrained to wound himself. This is sometimes called a forcible necessity.

Liberty is applied to the will, or to the inferior and execulive powers. The will is always free in its choice of what it likes: The lower powers are not always free to act or do what the will chuses. A man close fettered cannot walk, nor can he fight when his hands are tied, though he may will or chuse to do it. On this account freedom is better described by chusing thau by acting.

Again, Liberty of the will is always a liberty of spontaneity or voluntariness, without considering whether it can do otherwise or not: So when au intelligent being wills and pursues its own supposed satisfaction or happiness, this being is called free herein, though this action be necessary, and it cannot do otherwise. The liberty of the will is sometimes a liberty of choice and indifference, a freedom or power to chuse or not to chuse among two or more things proposed: So a man chuses to speak or to be silent. This freedom is inconsistent with necessity; and this is called by many writers liberty in the most proper sense; and perhaps it had not been amiss if the term liberty had been always confined to this sense only, but mankind have not always done so.

There may be also an absolute or perfect freedom, as when a hungry man wills to go to dinner; or a comparative freedom, when a sick man wills or consents to take some nauseous physic rather than continue in pain. Let this suffice for the distinction of free and necessary actions. See something more relating to this subject in the chap. of cause and effect.

Some philosophers suppose nothing worthy of the name of agent or action but the will and its exercises; and they call all other beings and their powers and operations merely passive; but this perhaps is too great a violence offered to the common sense of words, though there may be some appearance of reason for it in the nature of things.

Having spoken particularly of act and action; let us now say something more of power. We may distinguish several powers with the degrees and kinds of them. First, disposition, which is an imperfect power of performing any thing, and but the lowest degree: Next to this is mere ability to perform, i. e. with difficulty and care; and then a strong habit, i. e. to perform with ease and certainty.

Among powers, some are merely corporeal and inanimate, as the power of the sun to melt snow, and to draw up vapour : Some are vegetative, as nourishment, growth: Some are animal powers, as eating, swallowing, digesting, moving, walking, sleeping, &c. Some are spiritual, as meditating, reasoning, reflecting, chusing, refusing, &c. Some are human, arising from the union of mind and body, as sensation, imagination, language. Of the passions of man and what sort of powers they are, see the "Doctrine of the Passions explained and improved. Edit. 2d, 1732.

Again, of powers some are natural, as a man's power to form a voice: some acquired, as music, ploughing, language, learned by degrees; and some are infused, as the power of the apostles to speak many languages. Powers acquired by exercise are most properly called habits. All powers of natural action in animals or artificial in men, are called faculties, as a power