tions, signs, language, and particularly all extrinsic denominations and terms of art.

Note, All affections of being are not positive, but they may be sometimes negative. Some men are knowing, some are ignorant or without knowledge.

CHAP. II.-Of Essence or Nature, Matter and Form.*

AMONG the absolute affections of being the first that offers itself is essence or nature; and it consists in an union of all those things, whether substances or modes, which are necessary to make that thing be what it is; solid extension is the essence of matter; an animal body and soul united are the essence of a man ; and many flowers bound together are the essence of a nosegay.

Note 1. Whatsoever is clearly contained in the nature or essence of a thing, may be affirmed of that thing: Contingence is contained in the nature of a creature, and we may say of every creature, it is contingent or may not be. Existence is contained in the nature or essence of God, and we may therefore affirm that God has existence, or God exists.

2. The essences of mathematical beings are immutable; never so little an alteration destroys the essence of a circle or a square: But the essences of natural beings are not so, nor do they consist in an indivisible point, but admit of degrees. A rose with more or fewer leaves may be a rose still. Marble is still marble whether it be tinged yellow or grey, or made a little harder or a little softer. But when the alteration or difference is very great, it is sometimes hard to say whether it retain the same essence so as to deserve the same name: Is a bat a bird or a beast? Is every monster to be called man which is born of a woman?

Query, When Mr. Locke infers from hence that the essences of natural beings are but mere nominal essences, does he carry this matter too far, or not?

Though we do not so well know the distinct essences and natures of particular kinds of spirits, as to say certainly what they consist in, yet the essence of every particular kind of body certainly consists of matter and form.

Matter is the solid extended substance which is common to all bodies: The form includes and implies those peculiar qualities both real and sensible, which make any particular body be what it is, and distinguish it from all other bodies.

Note, Shape or figure, size or quantity, situation or place, together with motion and rest are called the real or primary qualities of matter, because they do and would belong to bodies whether there were any sensible being to take notice of them or But colour, sound, taste, heat, cold, &c. are called sen

no.

* See this chapter explained more at large in the eleventh essay foregoing, which was written when I designed to have drawn out this " Ontology" into a more complete form.

sible qualities, because they are ideas or modes which we attribute to things merely as they affect ourselves or any sensitive beings. They are called also secondary qualities, because they arise from the different combinations and dispositions of those real and primary qualities before named, and their power to impress our senses in very different manners.

The matter of a body is either proxime or remote; the proxime matter of a ship is timber, the remote is trees.

Note 1. Matter and form have been improperly ranked among the causes, yet they may be called constituent principles of things.

2. Matter and form have been transferred from things corporeal to intellectual: So we speak of the matter of a sermon or treatise, which is the theme of discourse; and the form of it, which is the manner in which the speaker or writer treats of it. Hence arises the famous distinction of material and formal, usually and pertinently applied to subjects of various kinds, whether intellectual or corporeal. Wheat is bread materially, and ideas or terms are materially, a proposition; but neither one nor the other are formally so.

Having spoken of the nature of things in this chapter, it may not be amiss to take notice of a few distinctions relating to it.

The term nature is sometimes taken for the eternal and unchangeable reason of things; so it is necessary in the nature of things that three and four should make seven; and that the three angles of a triangle should be equal to two right angles. Sometimes it signifies the course and order of second causes, whether minds or bodies together with the laws of matter and motion which God the first cause has ordained in this world; in this sense it is natural for the limbs to move when the soul wills, and the four seasons of the year should succeed each other in Europe.

In this latter signification of the word some things are said to be according to nature, as when an oak brings forth acorns. Some are beside nature, as when an animal brings forth a monster. Some may be called contrary to nature, as when the stock of apple-tree brings forth pears by virtue of the twig of a peartree grafted into it; Rom. xi. 24. Other things are above nature, as are all the instances of divine and miraculous operation; though these are sometimes called contrary to nature too, as when the streams of Jordan ran backward, or the sun stood still. CHAP. III.-Of Existence, whether actual, possible, or impossible, necessary or contingent, dependent or independent.

EXISTENCE is distinguished from essence as the actual being of a thing is distinguished from its mere nature considered as possible.

A being is possible when the ideas which are supposed to make up its nature may be actually united and have no inconsistency, as a golden mountain or a river of wine; but where the ideas are inconsistent it is called an impossible, as an iron animal, or silent thunder. This has neither essence nor existence.

Impossibles may be distinguished into four sorts; some things are metaphysically or absolutely impossible in the abstracted reason and nature of things, as a cubical circle, a thinking statue, a1 purple smell, or a bushel of souls. Others may be called physically or naturally impossible, i. e. according to the present laws of nature, such are three eclipses of the sun in a month, or that a full moon should always last. Others are morally impossible, that is improbable in the highest degree; so we may venture to say that it is impossible for an atheist to be strictly virtuous, or for a Hottentot to form a system of religion or mathematics; and such are many of the legends of the popish saints. Other things are said to be conditionally impossible, i. e. when such a condition is put as makes that thing impossible, which otherwise would not be so, as a tree bearing fruit on supposition it has no bloom.

Note 1. It is absolutely impossible that the same thing should both be and not be in the same sense, and at the same time, and in the same respect. 2. When we pronounce any thing absolutely or naturally possible or impossible, we should do it with great caution, since we know so little what ideas are or are not mutually consistent, either in abstracted reason, or according to the present laws of nature. 3. God is the only being that carries actual existence in his very nature and essence, and therefore we may say with assurance God exists. 4. Proper existence belongs only to individuals, for all general natures, i. e. genus, species, &c. are but abstracted ideas of the mind, and never exist alone, but only in individual beings.

But let us proceed to the ideas of necessity and contingency, which in this chapter relate to the existence of things, in the sixth chapter to actions.

All things which exist have either a necessary existence, i. e. they are because they must be; or they have a contingent existence, i. e. they are, though they might not have been, and may cease to be.

A necessary being wants no cause and is independent; but a contingent being is dependent, because it wants a cause to make it exist. This dependence is either total or partial; constant or occasional; for existence or for duration, or for operation, &c. see more in chap. 4. and in chap. 10.

Note, Independence in the highest sense belongs only to God, and is the same with self-existence, and near a-kin to the idea of necessary existence.

Necessity of existence may be distinguished into absolute or conditional : God alone is absolutely necessary, for he must exist whether any other thing be or be not; but as for creatures, though they are properly contingent beings, yet a conditional necessity may belong to them, i. e. such a creature or such an event may exist if the causes are put, which will certainly and necessarily produce it; if a hen's egg be hatched it will produce a chicken; if the sun rise there will be day-light; if a man will leap down a vast precipice, he must be destroyed.

It is called also sometimes a conditional necessity, when such premises or conditions are put from whence an event may be certainly inferred, though they have no manner of casual influence on this event; so we may say, that it was necessary Antichrist should arise, because the God of truth had foretold it.

Necessity may be divided into natural, logical, and moral; by natural necessity fire burns, and snow melts in the sun-beams. By logical necessity the conclusion of a syllogism follows from the premises. By moral necessity intelligent creatures are obliged to worship God, and virtue will be finally rewarded; though I know some writers take the term moral necessity in another sense.

Both necessity and contingence are ideas frequently applied to the events which arise in the natural world, i. e. the world of bodies, whether animate or inanimate; but the events in the moral world are more usually called contingent, i. e. the voluntary actions of intelligent creatures; though necessity may in some cases be ascribed to them too, as the blessed God necessarily acts agreeably to his own perfections; a rational and sensible being necessarily hates pain and misery.

Events in the natural world are said to be necessary, or to arise from natural necessity, when they are derived from the connection of second causes, and those laws of motion which God established in the world at the creation, and which he continues by his providence. This is the chief and most usual meaning of the word nature; and indeed fate in its derivation and original sense signifies but the dictate or decree of God. But if the appointment of God be left quite out of our thoughts, then fate is a heathenish term to denote a sort of eternal necessary connection of causes, without regard to the first cause; and some of the heathens have exalted this fate above the Gods themselves.

Events in the natural world are said to be contingent, or to arise from chance when they are different from what is usual in the course of nature, and utterly unexpected, though indeed the course of nature really produces them by the interposition of

some causes imperceptible to us. Yet the heathens have made this chance and fortune a fort of deities too, for want of their knowledge of the train of second causes, and a due regard to the first cause. Events in the moral world which arise from the mere free will and choice of intelligent beings, are called contingent, because they are not brought into existence in a necessary manner by any natural connection of causes; yet they are never ascribed to chance, for chance stands as much in opposition to design and freedom, as it doth to fate and necessity.

We might here just take occasion to observe, that not only with regard to existence are beings said to be necessary or contingent, but with regard to the manner of their existence also. God is necessary in this respect as well as in the other, and therefore his being and his attributes are unchangeable, but creatures are changeable things, because their manner of existence is contingent, as well as their existence itself.

Note 1. All the future events which arise from natural and necessary causes will not only certainly but necessarily exist; and though we call many of them contingencies because they are uncertain to us, yet they are not so to God who knows all things. So we say, it may or it may not ruin to-morrow.

2. All the future actions of free agents and the events arising from thence (both which are properly contingent) may be certainly foreknown by God; and therefore we may say, they will certainly exist, though there be no such determination of them as to make them properly necessary; for the great and unsearchable God, who has foretold many free actions of men, may have ways of knowing things certainly, which we cannot so much as guess at. It is too audacious for man to assert that God cannot know things, merely because we cannot find out a medium for his knowledge of them.

See some further considerations of necessity in chap. VI. where we treat of freedom.

CHAP. IV.-Of Duration, Creation, and Conservation.

DURATION is merely a continuance in being, and this has commonly been divided into permanent and successive. Permanent duration belongs to God alone, and implies not only his continuance in existence, but an universal, simultaneous and endless possession of all the same properties and powers without change. Successive duration belongs to creatures, and implies the continuance of the same being with changeable and changing modes, powers, properties and actions one after another.

It is only successive duration which is most properly divided into past, present, and future. The present taken in a strict sense is only the moment that now exists, and divides the hours or ages past from those which are to come. It is very hard for