A BRIEF

SCHEME OF ONTOLOGY,

OR THE

SCIENCE OF BEING IN GENERAL;

WHEREIN

ALL THE VARIOUS AFFECTIONS OR PROPERTIES,

ADJUNCTS AND RELATIONS OF IT,

ARE CONTRACTED INTO A COMPREHENSIVE VIEW, AND RANGED IN A NATURAL AND EASY METHOD.

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PREFACE

TO "A BRIEF scheme of ONTOLOGY."

EVERY man who employs himself in thinking, endeavours to dispose his

ideas in such an order as appears to him most comprehensive and perspicuous in itself, and most obvious to his own survey, as well as easiest for his recollection. If I could have met with any such short and plain scheme of Ontology as I wished, among the authors whence I learnt that science, I had never taken pains to form this model or draw the present sketch. I am not conscious that I have admitted into it any of those barren and perplexing subtleties which have over-run this branch of learning, as it has been cultivated in the schools under the title of Metaphysics.

In our days indeed that name is dropt, and with much better reason it is termed Ontology, or the Knowledge of Being in General, with its varions affections, i. e. the properties, adjuncts, and relations that belong to it. It is an useful science in itself which teaches us to place every being and every thought and idea in its proper order in our minds, and gives us an extensive and regular survey of things; and I am sure it may be exhibited in such a manner as to secure it effectually from that just censure, and that forbidding character which the learned professor De Vries gives to the metaphysics of the schools in former ages. His satire on it may be thus expressed in English." This science, saith he, was treated of by the sophisters in such way, that one would swear they aimed at nothing else but to vex and torture the understanding with difficult trifles, and to infect all language with blundering nonsense, and with the grating horror of barbarous sounds, which have no meaning. These were men of empty and vain subtlety, who built up huge volumes of worthless words and disputes about nothing; whose leaves if they were not divided by the grocers to wrap up spice and sugar, would now lie for ever in heaps to feed moths and bookworms. This is so far from deserving the title of wisdom or prime philosophy, that it is rather the extreme folly of monkish dreams and dotages."

Such just and severe satire as this being spread abroad in some modern schools, and in the polite world, hath tempted our youth to run to another extreme many of them will sneer at the name of Metaphysics, and pass a scornful censure on all the science of Ontology at once: they are ashamed of knowing it, and therefore renounce al! pretence to it with pride and pleasure. The endless multitudes of senseless and empty distinctions of the ancients, their useless and thorny questions and disputes introduced into this science, and the many odd and absurd canons and axioms which they were wont to place among those principles which they called the prime foundations of all learning, have appeared to our age in so ridiculous a light, that we have been too ready to throw away this useful part of philosophy, because of the follies which have been blended with it. But it becomes a philosopher to distinguish between the gold and the dross, and not to renounce and abandon a rich mine because the ore is not refined, or perhaps has been debased with vile mixtures by some foolish labourers and melters.

If we would not suffer ourselves to be imposed upon by a little empty raillery, but take a just view of things in order to pass a right judgment, we should find this part of philosophy is very necessary and of admirable use to all men of science, and that in every branch of the learned professions: To bave all the vast multitude of themes and ideas about which we have occasion

to think, speak or write, ranged in a set of regular classes, so that we know where to find and place them all, is of unspeakable advantage in explaining, defining, dividing, distinguishing, illustrating, and arguing upon every subject we take in hand. Nor does this serve only the purposes of the college, and direct, assist, and facilitate the labours of students and the learned world, but gentlemen and persons in every degree of common life might be taught to enlarge the number of their ideas, to extend their reasonings far wider, and dispose their thoughts in more useful order by the assistance of this part of knowledge, if it were displayed in a happy and perspicuous manner, with the exclusion of thorns and straws, and all the perplexing trifles that had over-run the academies of former ages.

I wish some skilful hand would undertake this work: If I was ever able to perform it according to my own idea, yet it is too late in life for me now to return to these studies. What I have here written has in part lain long by me: It pretends to nothing more than a brief and compendious sketch of notions that relate to this science, and a mere arrangement of the most useful themes which should here be treated of, in a contracted view: and though it may be of chief advantage for the recollection of those who have been ac quainted with the matters, yet I hope it will not be unserviceable for the instruction of such as have known nothing of them if they will read with attention and care. In some places I define not only the general theme but the particular kinds of it also; in a few others I only just mention the terms of the particular distinctions, and neither add any definitions or examples to them, where the very terms are so plain that a common reader may know the meaning of them without explication: but in most places I give such examples as may sufficiently explain and illustrate the subject and the several divisions and branches of it, without laborious and disputable definitions.

What the metaphysical writers have called axioms or canons, are very numerous almost under every head or theme of discourse; but many of them are so false in the most obvious sense of them, and want such a number of limitations and learned distinctions to reduce them to truth, that I thought it needless to stuff this epitome with them. Many others are so useless to any valuable purposes, that they deserve no room in the mind or memory. Those few which are useful I have placed in their proper chapters as notes, and several others I have added which seemed to me not unprofitable.

It is not often that I divert out of my way to tell the world particularly what the moderns or the ancients have said on these subjects, nor how far I agree with them, or differ from them; but in the main I directly pursue my own track of thoughts, and range this infinite variety of ideas collected from the universe of beings in such a method as appears to me the most comprehensive and natural," plain and easy.

A BRIEF SCHEME OF ONTOLOGY:

OR THE

Science of Being in General;

Wherein all the various Affections, or Properties, Adjuncts and Relations of it are contracted into a comprehensive View, and ranged in a natural and easy Method.

CHAP. I.-Of Being and Not-being, with a general Scheme of the Affections of Being.

ONTOLOGY is a discourse of being in general, and the various and most universal modes or affections, as well as the several kinds or divisions of it. The word being here includes not only whatsoever actually is, but whatsoever can be. Being is the first and most obvious, the most simple and natural conception that we can frame of any thing which we see, hear, feel, or know. It is in some sense included in all our other concep tions of things, and is therefore the most general or universal of all our ideas.

By the affections of being are meant all powers, properties, accidents, relations, actions, passions, dispositions, internal qualities, external adjuncts, considerations, conditions or circumstances whatsoever; in a word, all those modes which belong to things, either as they are in themselves, or as they stand in relation to other things, or as they are represented or modified by our ideas and conceptions. Since every thing may be greatly distinguished and illustrated by its opposites, here we begin to treat of the affections of being in general, we may consider very briefly what sort of notions we may frame of not-being or nothing.

Not-being, as it excludes all substances and modes whatsoever, is mihility or mere nothing.

Not-being, as it excludes particular modes or manners of being out of any substance, may be considered, either as a mere negation, such is blindness or want of sight in a stone; or as a privation, such is blindness or want of sight in a man; of which see Logic, part 1st, chap. II. sect. 6.

Note 1. Pure nothing considered merely in itself has no proper affections belonging to it; though our imagination sometimes may so far abuse us as to mistake nothing for something, as in the case of shadows; and at other times we mistake something for nothing, and suppose a room full of light and air

to have nothing in it. So weak and imperfect is our present state of knowledge.

2. Though a nonentity or not-being is really nothing in itself, yet as it is introduced by some relation to being it may afford foundation for some sort of thoughts or conceptions, or some relative affections which hereafter will be described. On this account nonentity has been usually distinguished from mere nihility or pure nothing.

3. Hence it follows that that old axiom of the schools Nonentis nulla est Scientia, or what has no being cannot be known, must be understood with some limitation: For (1.) we may know things possible though they have no actual being: (2.) We may know things past and future which have no present being: (3.) We may also form a sort of idea of nonentities or not beings from their relation to beings; we can see a shadow, and talk of silence: And even when we speak of pure nihility or nothing, we are ready to frame some sort of notion or idea of it since we reason and discourse about it. Perhaps this may arise from the imperfection of our present state.

4. Though pure nothing is that which in truth neither has a being nor affections, nor can be properly made the measure of any being, yet negative quantities, which (as mathematicians generally say) are marks and measures of what is less than nothing, are of great use and necessity in algebra; because this science teaches us to form our ideas of all real and positive quantities as so much more than nothing.

Having distinguished being from its opposites, let us proceed now to lay down a general scheme of the affections of being. The most general and extensive distribution of the affections of being is into absolute and relative.

Absolute affections belong to each being considered in itself, and these are nature or essence and existence, duration and unity, power and act.

Relative affections or relations arise from some respect which distinct beings bear to one another, or at least to some part or property of themselves: Now these are real or mental.

Real relations are those which arise from the constitution of any being among others in the universe to which it has a real reference whether we think of it or no. Such are, whole and part, cause and effect, subject and adjunct, time and place, agreement and difference, number and order, to which may be added truth and goodness, lest the mataphysicians should complain of this omission.

Mental relations are such as arise not from things themselves, but only from our manner of conceiving them and referring one thing to another: Such are abstracted or second no