ESSAY VI.

Of the Power of Spirits to move Bodies, of their being in a Place and removing from it.

WHEN the ingenious_director of modern philosophy treats on this subject, in his Essay on Human Understanding, book II. chap. 23. § 18, 19, 20. he uses the word motivity to signify a power to move bodies, and by mobility he means the power of a being to change its own place; and makes both these to be properties belonging to spirits: But let us consider a little, and enquire whether either of them are the proper native powers of a spirit or a thinking being.

SECT. I. Of the Power of a Spirit to move Matter.

THAT spirits do continually put bodies into motion, is evident from the constant experience of our own souls moving our limbs, and the various parts of the body, which are subjected to voluntary motion: And that angels have many a time excited motion in several parts of the corporeal word, is manifest to those who believe the scripture. It is also clear, beyond all dispute, that God, the infinite and almighty Spirit, hath created the material universe, and has put the several parts of it into motion as he pleases. But the question is, Whether any created spirit hath any native or innate power in itself to move any part of matter? Whether this power be essential, and belong to its nature? Whether its thought or will can effect any change whatsoever in material beings? Or, whether the world of bodies and the world of minds are not so entirely different and separate in their whole nature, substance and special properties, that they cannot possibly have any communication with each other, except by a particular appointment and commission from God their common Creator and Sovereign ?

In the third essay, which treats of the Original of our Perceptions and Ideas, we have found, that neither the motions which are raised within a human body, nor the impressions which are made on the organs of sense, or on the brain, by outward sensible objects, are of themselves and in their own nature sufficient to raise any ideas or sensations in a spirit: But that all the whole train of sensations and corporeal ideas, which belong to human nature, are originally owing to divine appointment, uniting one particular spirit to one particular animal body according to certain laws of his own prescription. And perhaps a few more considerations may incline us to believe, that all the native powers of a spirit are not sufficient in themselves to move

any part of matter whatsoever, without the same divine appointment.

Consideration I. If spirit be entirely void of all solidity, that is, if a spirit be not matter, it is hard to conceive how it should originally, or in its own nature, have a power of itself to move matter. It cannot do it by impulse; for there can be no contact, whether immediate or mediate. Nor hath it originally or naturally in itself a power to move bodies by volition; for there is no natural connection betwixt my willing a stone to move, and its motion: I may will it ten thousand times, and it lies quiescent still: Nay, though it be but a feather or a grain of dust, I cannot conceive how my own volition, or even the strongest volition of an angel, should excite motion in it, unless he has a particular commission from the Almighty Spirit: And if it be so, thence it will follow, that the motion of the stone or feather, which is owing to such a divine commission, depends not so strictly and properly on any native essential power or influence of the angel's own volition, but rather on the divine volition as the prime or efficacious cause.

And this perhaps is the true reason why our animal spirits, nerves, muscles and limbs, are moved at the command of our thoughts or will, viz. because God the Creator has efficaciously decreed or willed from the beginning, and appointed it now as a law of nature, that such a particular machine of matter or flesh, or any of the limbs of it, should move when such a particular spirit willed it: And if we add here, that God has also appointed that this spirit should have such special ideas or consciousnesses according to such peculiar motions or impressions on this animal body, we have the chief part, if not the whole union between soul and body described, as I have shewn in a foregoing Essay.

II. That a spirit cannot of itself originally move any part of matter, will appear more probable, if we enquire of our opponents, what quantity of matter, or what particular parts of matter, any spirit can be supposed to move. Surely a created spirit of itself, and by its own essential or native powers, cannot move all matter or the whole material world; that would put the universe of bodies into the power of every single spirit, which is very absurd, and contrary to all experience and reason. If its power of motion be confined to a limited quantity of matter, what is it that limits this quantity? It cannot be the dimensions or shape of the soul; for a soul is not supposed to have any shape, dimensions or magnitude: Or if it had, I have shewn already, and shall shew further, that this cannot give any power to move matter, because these dimensions have no solidity, and cannot touch or impel a body. What is it then but the will of God, that determines what quantity of matter every spirit shall have power to move? And this is the very point which we are proving.

Well, but let us imagine, that a common human soul had a native power to move some quantity, suppose six feet of matter indefinitely; yet till it be united particularly by the will of God to a certain individual body, this individual quantity of matter which is moveable by it is not particularly determined: Then every spirit has the liberty of a wide range indeed, and may move indifferently six feet of matter, any where through the world, or what six feet of matter it pleases; it may rove from place to place through the earth, and by moving so much matter successively may cause strange alterations in the material system, and distribute blessings or mischiefs through the universe.

Again, Is it reasonable for us to suppose, that any spirit, as Adam's for instance, should be essentially, naturally, and of itself able to move any six feet of matter in the universe, where it pleases; and yet that it should from the very moment of its existence be confined and restrained to move only the body of Adam? And that as soon as it is created, and come into being, it should be cut off from its own proper essential power and liberty of moving any thing indefinitely of six square feet, and be limited only to move that very six feet of flesh and blood? Can we suppose the spirit of man, even innocent man, in the glory of his creation-state, should be formed in such bondage, and brought into being under such a narrow restraint of its own natural powers? Was man, who was made after the image of God, created in a state of such imprisonment, with his native faculties so far cramped and confined?

Or if we should so far consent, that the Platonic philosophy is true, as to suppose that a spirit, which was naturally able to move any parts of matter before, is thurst down into this body of six feet, and confined to it as a prison, wherein it can move only its own house as a snail does; then a dismission from the body would surely restore it to its native power of moving six feet of matter any where: And why then might it not by its own will and power assume another body, or why may it not re-assume its own body again, and set the muscles, blood and juices into all their proper vital motions? Or if it could not do that for want of skill in the construction of animal nature, yet why may it not put the dead body in the gross into motion, and become a ghost with a moving carcase, and fright the world? And yet it might secure itself from the assaults of men, by raising the body into the air when it pleases, upon the first view of danger. Besides, would not this opinion give to a wicked spirit such a release at the death of the body, by restoring it to its native power of moving six feet of matter, as to enable it to do an unk own quantity of mischief in the world? How many spirits go o ut of the body full of rage and revenge, and what murders would they commit?

A good spirit indeed, when released from the body, would

have the same liberty and range to do extensive good offices to men: But what a theatre of contest and combat would this habitable world be between the pious and the wicked spirits, according to their different and contrary inclinations and designs of good and evil, if spirits of themselves could move indefinitely six feet, or even but six inches of solid matter? Again, If a good spirit departed from the body had power to move any small portions of matter indefinitely, would not its re-union to one particular body at the resurrection be a sore and unhappy retrenchment of its native liberty, and a confinement to a prison again? And is this sort of philosophy suited to the blessed idea which the scriptures give us of the resurrection of good men? Is not the resurrection of the body designed for their greater advantage and happiness? And is it not more reasonable to believe, that it shall render them capable of more extensive service, by enabling them to have some communications with the material world again, from which they had been cut off by the death of the body?

Upon the whole therefore, is it not far more agreeable to the rules of reason and religion, to suppose that a spirit can of itself move no part of matter, nor hath any power over it, but by the particular appointment of God? And doth not this better account for the first union of each particular spirit to its own body, as a part of the providential government of the world by the will of God? Doth it not also better adjust the powers of departed spirits, by reducing them to their native impotence of moving matter? And give a better representation of the resurrection and the re-union of each spirit to its own body?

III. The argument will still grow upon us, and carry further force in it to prove that a spirit has not in itself a native power to move matter, when we consider how exceeding limited is the power that a human spirit has over its own body to which it is united; and thence it will appear, that this power, with its special limitations, was given it merely by special commission from God himself. This spirit, by all its volitions, can move nothing but those particular parts of the body which God has subjected to voluntary motion, and for which proper muscles are provided, together with the nervous powers which are necessary to move those muscular parts. It cannot make the pulse of the heart, which is a great muscle, beat quicker or slower; it cannot accelerate the motion of any of the juices, viz. blood or lymph, &c. in any of the containing vessels, it cannot alter the shape or situation of any atoms of which the flesh, blood and bones are composed, by an immediate act of the will upon them; nor can it move any member, except only in that way of muscular motion which God has appointed in the engine of the human body.

In this view of things there are ten thousand times more mo

tions of which the several parts and particles of a human body are capable, than those few which the soul has any immediate power to produce. Now if the soul had an innate or native power to move matter, might it not chuse which part of its own body it would move, and in what manner it would move it? If it must be confined to one body, yet how comes it to be so wretchedly restrained from moving the smaller parts of nature, and from rectifying any of the disorders of the solids or fluids in that body by an act of its will? Why is it so poorly limited to a few grosser motions of the members? I confess, in the main these grosser motions serve the common purposes of animal life in this world; but this cannot preserve the body in a state of health, or secure its ease and activity: What! could a spirit move any matter indefinitely before union, and can it not move any parts of that matter to which it is particularly united? Can it by its native power move the whole bulk of the animal body, or the larger parts of it, and yet not put the minute parts of it in motion? Doth not this confinement and limitation of its power sufficiently shew whence all this power comes, and that it is not essential to its nature, but all owing to the special ordination and will of God, in uniting such a body to such a spirit, according to certain rules of his own prescribing?

If we suppose a spirit to have no power of itself to move an atom of matter, except by particular divine commission; then it is easy to conceive that God in great wisdom and goodness, when be united the human mind to the body, has given it a commission to move such parts as are fitted in the main to serve the uses of animal life, and no more. In this case it is a bounty and benefit, to have the government over some part of the material creation; but in the other case it is a restraint, and cutting short of natural power: And if that were true, then we might infer with justice that gross absurdity, viz. that if a soul in its own nature hath power to move matter indefinitely, but by union it is restrained, then a spirit not united to a body would have power to move all the parts of that same body more universally than the spirit which is united to it; and that consequently Milo's spirit, when his body is dead, and itself disunited from it, can move and change those very parts and atoms of it which it could not move or change when the body was living; and if it had skill enough to know which parts to move, it might restore the body of Milo to motion and life again, as was intimated before.

IV. Another argument to prove that spirits have no essential or native power to move matter, is this, that the evil angels, who are full of malice, wrath and envy, could employ their powers in wild destruction among men. Devils are supposed to have residence among mankind to tempt them to sin: But they would