system and a related supply standardization program, was established by Public Law 436, 82nd Congress, 1 July 1952 (66 Stat. 318).

g. The position of Director of Installations, to maintain direct surveillance over the planning and construction by the military departments of all public works projects, was established by Section 408 of Public Law 534, 82nd Congress, 14 July 1952 (66 Stat. 625).

h. Legislation enacted during the years 1949-52 concerning the National Security Act, as amended, but not directly affecting the Department of Defense dealt with: (1) The National Security Council, which was formally located in the Executive Office of the President by Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1949, effective 20 August 1949 (63 Stat. 1067); (2) the Director of Mutual Security, who became a member of the National Security Council by Public Law 165, 81st Congress, 10 October 1951 (65 Stat. 373); and (3) the National Security Resources Board, which was formally located in the Executive Office of the President by Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1949, effective 20 August 1949 (63 Stat. 1067), and the functions of which were transferred from the Board to the Chairman by Reorganization Plan No. 25 of 1950, effective 9 July 1950 (64 Stat. 1280). Reorganization Plan No. 25 of 1950 also provided for a Vice Chairman of the Board.

Source: For the organization chart, see:

Office of Secretary of Defense Records, 1950, National Archives, Washington, D.C.

2. Secretary Lovett's Letter-18 November 1952.

An analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the organization of the Department of Defense was made by Secretary of Defense Robert A. Lovett in a letter to President Truman dated 18 November 1952, and released on 8 January 1953. For the organization of the Office of the Secretary of Defense as of 15 October 1952, see Chart 11.

Source: For the organization chart, see:

Office of Secretary of Defense Records, 1952, National Archives, Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

November 18, 1952

Some months ago in connection with a discussion of means by which my successor could be provided with a running-start on certain of the administrative and operational policy problems in the Department of Defense, you suggested that I write you an informal letter indicating subjects or general areas where work already begun might be profitably continued by the new administration. You mentioned that what was wanted was a paper which would express my personal observations and that its form need not be that of a properly coordinated staff study but could be more in the nature of a series of notes which might be expanded in conversation or by reference to Department of Defense files if the subject appeared interesting or helpful.

Accordingly, I am setting out below a series of notes on a variety of subjects in which the Office of the Secretary of Defense has or should have special concern. I will try to make them as brief as possible, but one or two

of the points discussed are so controversial that they will need some moderate, factual expansion here.

At the outset it would perhaps be well to state in very broad terms my own general feeling about civilian-military relationships, with a word in passing on the quality of our professional military personnel and their permanent civilian counterparts. This will permit anyone who may read this letter to take into account some of my personal beliefs so that he may adjust for them.

In my opinion, the quality of our professional military officers and the permanent civilian staff is remarkably high. It compares very favorably with any large industrial organization of its approximate size, complexity and wide range of functions. I have great respect and affection for our professional military men and having had an opportunity of seeing them both at the council table and in the field, I know of no country more fortunately situated in this respect than ours.

The permanent civilian staff, consisting mainly of specialists in numerous fields and administrative personnel, has shown faithfulness, reliability and a sense of responsibility of the highest order. In technical, financial and industrial matters I have great regard for their competence and I feel that they provide about the only continuity in the over-all Military Establishment.

Since "unification" is necessarily evolutionary, improvements should be made as experience is gained. Neither the framers of the National Security Act nor any of the Secretaries of Defense can see very far into the future, and while much has been accomplished, much remains to be done in order to provide a more efficient and economical form of national security.

(1) General

(a) The primary purpose of the Department of Defense is, of course, to protect and defend this country. This duty may involve fighting a war. If this becomes necessary, the duty of the Department of Defense is to fight a successful war.

Our objective, however, is to avoid war, if possible. An adequate force, ready for immediate defense and prompt retaliation against any aggressor, serves as a deterrent to a potential enemy. The better equipped the Department of Defense is to fight, the better it serves its role of a deterrent to war.

(b) In the event of war, an essential job of the Secretary of Defense and his colleagues, both military and civilian, will involve "distributing shortages" among Army, Navy, and Air Force. Based on past experience, these shortages will involve manpower in bulk and critical occupational specialty; materiel in all its forms; land, water and air transportation; communications facilities; funds; industrial and military facilities and so forth.

(c) Under the present Act, and in the event of war, I believe that the present system of controls provided in the legislation for the exercise of authority by the Secretary of Defense, in some areas, will prove to be inadequate. This is so because one of the principal elements of control lies through the budget process, the dollar being the single common-denominator of all requirements. This is, of course, supplemented by control of manpower in bulk although military manpower ceilings for all three Services are currently set by the President and by the Congress.

In the event of war, the dollar control will become especially weak and I believe that better controls must be provided. Some of these will be touched on later in this letter.