which might have been hoped for from that little that has been bestowed upon it. The right understanding of this abstruse speculation, I look upon to be the only solid foundation, on which any rational system of ethicks can be built; for it seems impossible, that men should ever arrive at any just ideas of their Creator, or his attributes, any proper notions of their relation to him, or their duty to each other, without first settling in their minds some satisfactory solution of this important question, whence came evil? Whilst we find ourselves liable to innumerable miseries in this life; apprehensive of still greater in another, and can give no probable account of this our wretched situation, what sentiments must we entertain of the justice and benevolence of our Creator, who placed us in it without our solicitations or consent? The works of the creation, sufficiently demonstrate his existence, their beauty, perfection and magnificence, his infinite power and wisdom; but it is the happiness only, which we enjoy, or hope for, which can convince us of his goodness.

It is the solution therefore of this important question alone that can ascertain the moral characteristic of God, and upon that only must all human virtue eternally depend.

If there's a power above us,

(And that there is all nature cries aloud

Thro' all her works) he must delight in virtue,
And that which he delights in, must be happy.

But should this divine reasoning of the philosopher be at last inconclusive; could we once entertain such blasphemous notions of the Supreme Being, as that he might not delight in virtue, neither adhere to it himself, nor reward it in others; that he could make any part of his creation miserable, or suffer them to make themselves so, without a just cause, and a benevolent end, all moral considerations must be vain and useless; we can have no rule by which to direct our actions, nor if we had, any kind of obligation to pursue it; nor in this case can any revelation in the least assist us, the belief of all revelation being in its own nature subsequent, not only to the belief of God's existence, but of his justice and veracity; for if God can injure us, he may also de

ceive us; and then there is an end of all distinctions between good and evil, truth and falsehood, and of all confidence in God

or man.

I mean not by this to insinuate the least possibility of a doubt concerning the justice or goodness of our Creator, but only to shew the importance of this inquiry, and the utility of it towards settling our notions of his attributes, and the regulation of our own behaviour in conformity to them. I intend not by it to prove the benevolence of God, but to reconcile the miseries we see and suffer, with that uncontrovertable benevolence: I design not to shew that God approves virtue, but that the admission of moral evil is not inconsistent with that undoubted approbation: nor would I be understood to assert, that our obligation to be virtuous, depends on this abstruse speculation, but only that our right understanding it, will remove all doubts concerning the nature of virtue, and our obligation to pursue it, and fix them on the most firm and immoveable basis.

To find out, therefore, how evil of any kind can be the production of infinite goodness, joined with infinite power, should be the first step in all our religious inquiries; the examination into which wonderful paradox, will lead us into many useful and sublime truths; and its perfect comprehension, was that possible for our narrow capacities, would, I doubt not, make as surprising discoveries in the moral world, as mathematical and physical knowledge have in the natural.

To clear up this difficulty, some ancient philosophers have had recourse to the supposition of two first causes, one good, and the other evil, perpetually counteracting each other's designs. This system was afterwards adopted by the Manichæan heresy, and has since been defended by the ingenious Mons. Bayle: but as the supposition of two first causes is even in itself a contradiction, and as the whole scheme has been demonstrated by the best metaphysical writers to be as false as it is impious, all further ar guments to disprove it would be needless.

Others have endeavoured to account for this by the introduction of a golden age, or paradisaical state, in which all was innocence and happiness.

Pæna metusque aberant, nec verba minacia fixo

Ære legebantur, nec supplex turba timebant
Judicis ora sui; sed erant sine vindice tuti.

When man yet new,

No rule but uncorrupted reason knew,
And with a native bent did good pursue.
Unforc'd by punishment, unaw'd by fear,
His words were simple, and his soul sincere:
Needless was written law, when none opprest,
The law of man was written on his breast;
No suppliant crowds before the judge appear'd,
No court erected yet, nor cause was heard,'
But all was safe, for conscience was their guard,

Ver erat æternum, placidisque tepentibus auris
Mulcebant zephyri natos sine semine flores;
Mox etiam fruges tellus inarata ferebat,
Nec renovatus ager gravidis canebat aristis,
Flumina jam lactis, jam flumina nectaris ibant,
Flavaque de viridi stillabant ilice mella.

The flow'rs unsown in fields and meadows reign'd,
And western winds immortal spring maintain'd.
In following years the bearded corn ensu'd
From earth unask'd nor was that earth renew'd.
From veins of valleys milk and nectar broke,

And honey sweated from the pores of oak.

Amusing dreams! as absurd in philosophy, as in poetry delightful! For though it is probable, from the most ancient histories, as well as from analogy drawn from the rest of nature's productions, that the world might be more happy and more innocent in its infancy, than in more advanced ages; yet that it could ever be totally free from vice and misery, may easily, I think, be proved impossible, both from the nature of this terrestrial globe, and the nature of its inhabitants. So that these inchanting scenes can in fact never have existed: but, if they had, the short duration of this perfection is equally inconsistent with infinite power, joined to infinite wisdom and goodness, as any original imperfection whatever. Fables then of this kind can never in the least account for the origin of evil; they are all but mean expedients, which wi!! never be able to take away the difficulty, and can at most but ob

scure it, by shifting it a little backward into a less clear Jight; like that Indian philosophy, accounting for the support of the world, which informs us, that it is sustained by a vast elephant, that elephant by a tortoise, and then prudently drops any further inquiry.

The divines and moralists of later ages, seem perfectly satisfied that they have loosed this gordian knot, by imputing the source of all evil to the abuse of free-will in created beings. God, they say, never designed any such thing should exist as evil, moral or natural; but that giving to some beings, for good and wise purposes, a power of free-agency, they perverted this power to bad ends, contrary to his intentions and commands; and thus their accidental wickedness produced consequential misery. But, to suppose in this manner, that God intended all things to be good and happy, and at the same time gave being to creatures able and willing to obstruct his benevolent designs, is a notion so inconsistent with his wisdom, goodness, omniscience, and omnipotence, that it seems equally unphilosophical, and more evidently absurd than the other. They have been led into this error by ridiculously judging of the dispensation of a Creator to his creatures, by the same rules which they apply to the dealings of men towards each other; between which there is not the least proportion or similitude. A man who endeavours, to the utmost of his power, to make others virtuous and happy, however unsuccessful, is sufficiently justified; but in a Being omnipotent and omniscient, the cause of all causes, the origin of all thought, will, and action; who sees all things past, present, and to come, in one instantaneous view, the case is widely different: his active and permissive will must be exactly the same; and, in regard to him, all consequential and future evils, through every moment of time, are actually present.*

* Volumes have been written to reconcile the prescience of Deity with the free agency of man, but to little purpose; as it is impossible for the human mind to form any discrimination between prescience and predestination. The cause of this perplexity has originated from adopting certain passages in a book, written by ignorant and illiterate men, but whose supposed inspiration

Since therefore none of these pretended solutions can, I am certain, give satisfaction to your comprehensive understanding, let us now try to find out one more rational, and more consistent with the analogy of every thing around us.

[To be continued.]

puts all reason and common sense at defiance. Had not reason been thus shackled, this dispute would long since have been satisfactorily settled. Instead of honouring the Supreme Being, mankind have dishonoured him, by thus attempting to render him inconsistent with himself. That he has been pleased to make man a free agent, and therefore accountable for his actions, we have an internal evidence of, that sophistry cannot remove. But an admission of the prescience of the Creator, in respect to the actions of man, completely annihilates his freedom of will, and consequently his accountability. We have long since adopted the sentiments of Dr. Beattie upon this subject, who observes, in his celebrated Essay on Truth, "that it is not more derogatory to the character and infinite perfections of the Deity, to say he cannot know, than it is to say he cannot do certain things; we readily concede that he cannot do that which is inconsistent with his own nature, or which involves a contradiction in itself. He cannot deceive, he cannot make a thing crooked and straight at the same time; neither can he endue a being with free will, and at the same time possess a fore-knowledge of the volitions and actions of that being; because the terms involve a contradiction." We have not the volume before us, and therefore do not vouch for the language.

He

After all, what possible necessity is there for a foreknowledge in Deity of the actions of such a feeble being as man. His powers are so limited that he cannot possibly derange in the least, the order and harmony of the general system of nature. cannot arrest in his progress, that glorious luminary, the sun, nor even the little subordinate satelite, the moon. This would require a power far beyond his reach, a power which, notwithstanding the impious assertions with respect to the feats of Joshua and Mahomet, we are inclined to believe never has, and we trust in God, never will be conferred on that fickle, inconstant, and rash being, man. [Editors.