Probability and EvidenceA. J. Ayer was one of the foremost analytical philosophers of the twentieth century, and was known as a brilliant and engaging speaker. In essays based on his influential Dewey Lectures, Ayer addresses some of the most critical and controversial questions in epistemology and the philosophy of science, examining the nature of inductive reasoning and grappling with the issues that most concerned him as a philosopher. This edition contains revised and expanded versions of the lectures and two additional essays. Ayer begins by considering Hume's formulation of the problem of induction and then explores the inferences on which we base our beliefs in factual matters. In other essays, he defines the three kinds of probability that inform inductive reasoning and examines the various criteria for verifiability and falsifiability. In his extensive introduction, Graham Macdonald discusses the arguments in Probability and Evidence, how they relate to Ayer's other works, and their influence in contemporary philosophy. He also provides a brief biographical sketch of Ayer, and includes a bibliography of works about and in response to Probability and Evidence. |
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A. J. Ayer accept actual answer antecedent apply argument asserting assigned assumption Ayer Ayer's believe black raven burn yellow calculus of chances Carnap causal statement concept conclusion conjunction consequence construed degree of confirmation entails equally equivalent example false falsified favour formulation frequency theory G. E. Moore generalisation of fact generalisation of law given Goodman Harrod Hempel's paradox Hume Hume's individual Inductive Logic inductive reasoning inference instance interpretation judgements of credibility judgements of probability justified kind law of large Nelson Goodman non-black things non-truth-functional conditional notion observations Philosophy physical objects Popper possible postulate predicates premiss principle of experience principle of indifference Probability and Evidence problem problem of induction properties question rational ravens are black reason relation Rudolf Carnap samples satisfied sense sodium salt spatio-temporal specious present state-descriptions statistical suppose tion toss true generalisation truth uniformity of nature universal generalisation universal proposition