the other side. As the infidels cannot believe that God would give us a revelation inconsistent with itself, they suppose that inconsistencies, when found in any pres tended revelation, forms a proof that it is not from God, and they hold the assertion, that God is just and benevolent, and that he will not pursue a course in his government, which when examined, is found inconsistent with justice and benevolence, (though it may be asserted by the advocates of the revelation that it is not,) is such an inconsistency, and proves, that those who assert it have not their doctrines from God.

But here the christians may again object, that the justice of God is not like that of man. That the justice of God may differ in some respects from that of man, on account of the difference of their natures, is readily acknowledged. In reasoning concerning the justice of God, we must make allowance for his superior power and wisdom. Yet if he possesses any quality, which may be called justice, it must bear a strong analogy to the justice of men, otherwise there would be no propriety in distinguishing them by the same word. If the justice of God be said to differ from ours, so much that we cannot safely reason concerning it, it may with as much propriety be said, that the punishment of God, or that mentioned in the scriptures, may differ from that of man in so great a degree, that we can know nothing of its nature, not even whether it be a pleasure or a pain. The same might be said of all other words used in sacred writ. It might be affirmed, that used by holy writers, and applied to holy things, they have a meaning different from that we attach to them, when applied to the things of this world, for if justice when applied to God, means different from what it does elsewhere, the same may be the case with other words.

The christians affirm, that as reason sometimes leads us astray. we should not place too great reliance upon

it, especially when it leads us to conclusions contrary to revelation. I have no hesitation in admitting, that our reason is exceeding liable to error, still as it is the only guide we have in our search after truth, we must trust it. If what our reason tells us is true, is sometimes found to be false, it is no reason for our believing that which it tells us is false.

I be told that the scriptures are of a higher aumay thority than reason; this cannot be true, for it is only by reason, that we learn the divine origin of the scriptures, and if that be doubted, our conclusion, that the scriptures contain the word of God, must likewise be held doubtful. In fine, I must esteem those the enemies of christianity, who would seperate it from reason.*

Though the above objections of the infidel, have remained so long without a satisfactory answer, I flatter myself that I have invented one, which will silence them forever. It is now presented to the attention of the reader.

*It is the opinion of many pious men, that christianity is
supported, not by reason, but by a special exertion of the power
of God Its doctrines, say they, are nonsense to the unconvert-
ed soul, and of course can be received by none, through a con-
viction of their truth, unless they are convinced by the act of
God. I am myself, when I view the absurdities with which
pretended Christians have loaded our sacred religion, some-
It seems impossible that.
times inclined to attribute its preservation to a miraculous in-
Yet when I
terference of providence in its favor
men, not compelled by the power of God, should believe doc-
trines so contrary to reason and common sense.

reflect that other religions, whose tenets are little less absurd
than those of Christianity, have stood as long, and braved with
success, as great opposition as ours, I attribute the triumph of
But I would give our religion a
each of them, to the blindness of man in discovering truth, and
distinguishing it from error
firmer base, by striking from it all absurdities. I would make
reason its support, instead of its enemy. By cutting from the
tree all its rotten branches, I would give it new life and vigour.
This I flatter myself, I shall perform, in the following chapter,
and if in doing it, too little should be suffered to remain, the
fault as the reader will perceive, will not be mine.

CHAPTER II.

ANSWER TO THE FOREGOING OBJECTION, TO THE DIVINE ORIGIN OF THE SCRIPTURES.

IT will be seen that the arguments of the infidels, as I have given them above, are based on the supposition that God cannot, or will not, be the author of a communication, which is not true.

God declares (if we may take the scriptures for his word) that he is just and benevolent; he declares at the same time, that he will pursue a certain course in his government; this, when examined, is found inconsistent with justice and benevolence. One or the oth

But

er of these assertions must therefore be false. may it not be false and at the same time from God?-No, say the infidels, God is too holy and too pure a being, to utter that which is false; he is not a man that he should lie, nor the son of man that he should not regard his word.

any

But these assertions are not to be received without some proof of their truth, nor do I believe that can easily be given. I have shown in a former part of this work, that no complete evidence of the justice, benevolence, holiness, or purity of God, can be derived from any source, except revelation, because it is not impossible, that just such a world as ours, and just such a creature as man, should be created by a being who possessed neither of those qualities. There are

some things in the universe indeed, which justify the conjecture, that God is benevolent, but the argument that may be derived from them, amounts not to demonstration. They might all have been so created, by a being whe had no regard for the welfare of his creatures. If we cannot, by natural reason, prove God's justice, holiness, and benevolence, it is plain that we cannot prove his truth; if he has not these qualities, he may be the author of a communication that is false.

There is nothing in the universe, visible to us, which could not be created by a being who might deceive his creatures. No proof then of God's truth, can be brought from this source; if there can, I would thank these infidels to point it out. He who does this will deserve the reputation of a genius, and the honor of refuting the doctrines of the christians, for when it is proved that God cannot deceive, it must be acknowledged that the scriptures are the work of man, and that we are imposed upon by human impos

tors.

If no evidence of God's truth can be derived from the light of nature, it is plain that none can be derived from revelation. His truth must be established before his revelation can be received. The witness must not be allowed to establish his own veracity, it must be proved from other evidence.

Admitting then, as we do, that the infidels have proved the doctrine of the scriptures false, and inconsistent with itself, it does not follow that it did not come from God. If the course which the scriptures declare that God will pursue in his government, is inconsistent with justice and benevolence, it may be falsely said, that he possesses these qualities, or it may not be true that he will pursue that course, and still both assertions be from the most high.

Though we have no proof of the justice, holiness,

and benevolence of God, piety (not reason) compels us to believe, without evidence, that he possesses those qualities, but when all this is admitted, we cannot prove his truth; we have still no evidence that he cannot, or that he will not, deceive us. Deception is by no means inconsistent with these attributes, as it will not be difficult to show.

Let us begin with God's justice, is deception inconsistent with this; is it unjust in God to deceive us. I have already shown that we have no proof from nature, that there is any quality belonging to God, that we may denominate justice. It may be as improper to affirm, that he is either just or unjust, as it is to affirm that he is black or white. Acts with him are not (so far as we know) to be divided into classes which are just or unjust. But if he possesses any quality which we may call justice, it is such impartiality in the distribution of happiness, as induces him to bestow it equally on all beings, so far as the welfare of the whole, and the nature of his purposes, will permit. But is there any thing in this inconsistent with deception. The answer must be that there is not, as far as we can behold. It may indeed be, that for reasons which we know nothing of, a deception of any of God's creatures would destroy such impartiality, or it may be, that this same quality in God. requires that we should be deceived. It may be, that God will make happiness more equal, by giving us a false communication, or it may be that such an act would have a contrary effect. Our conclusion then is, that God's justice. or impartiality, is neither an objection to, nor a support of, the doctrine of his truth.

As for holiness, when applied to God, it can mean nothing more than justice and benevolence, if any thing more than the latter. We can conceive no other qualities in God, to which that name can be applied.But it is of the greatest importance to reconcile this