factor--the need for parties to make their mark in a competi- As has been stressed throughout the gubernatorial section of this portion of the report, there is no necessary relationship between the formal powers of a Governor and the degree of influence he actually wields. The business of administering an urban, highly populous State can be an arduous assignment, one requiring a more ordered system of controls over the executive branch. Yet such formal powers may not be necessary for the Governor to influence State policy and administration in smaller, less urban States. Governors with strong formal powers are more likely to be able to exercise effective direction and control. These summary findings concerning Governors' formal authority, therefore, cannot be ignored, especially if the various claims regarding the negative impact features of Federal grants are to be taken seriously. Many of these features, after all, go to the heart of the question of the Governors' formal administrative authority. This summary analysis of formal gubernatorial powers highlights great variations as well as many similarities in State practice. In brief, it can be stated that within the American federal system no Governor approaches the President of the United States in terms of comparable constitutional authority and not too many of them enjoy executive power comparable to the Mayors of the Nation's largest cities. The Legislature's Role State legislatures are as affected by the impact of Federal grant programs as the executive branches and the Governors. Their lawmaking, administrative oversight, and fiscal functions--and in some instances the constitutional amending role--are all conditioned to a greater or lesser degree by the grant-inaid system. Does a State authorize its localities to participate in a grant program; does a State itself join in various grant programs; is its bureaucracy structured and empowered to implement joint action programs; is the Governor provided adequate management controls over the executive branch; to what extent is a program matched with State funds-- these are but a few of the critical grantrelated questions which State legislatures alone can decide. These responsibilities are merely part of the greater role which has fallen to State legislatures in this rapidly changing era of mushrooming State functions, larger State budgets, expanding State personnel and more intricate intergovernmental relations. The purpose here is to ascertain to what extent the legislatures are in an adequate position formally to deal with, deliberate on, and decide these basic questions of State policy. To have raised this issue a century or more ago would have been inconceivable, for the most conspicuous feature of the first State constitutions was the preeminent position assigned the State legislature. The impact of Jacksonian democracy and the aftermath of the panic of 1837 produced some limits on legislative power to incur State debt. The major phase of shackling the legislature, however, occurred during the short space of about 15 years following the Civil War when voters in several States revolted against their legislatures and placed in the State constitutions a variety of restrictions and impediments to legislative activity. A century later many of these shackles still bind and to strike them off is the underlying motive of various current nationwide reform efforts. Despite the many restrictions imposed in the 1870's and 1880's the States continued to provide practically all domestic government in this country until around World War I, when the Federal Government began to stir. During the war years, two major grant programs were enacted and since then the total number of grant programs has increased to over 379 and continues to mount. The issue arises then: Do the legislatures have the time, the tools, and the organization to come to grips with the many questions of policy, administration and finance that the grant-in-aid system has produced? At Time and continuity. --Adequate time and continuity of attention are factors influencing the legislatures' capacity to deal with these questions. the end of World War II only 4 States had annual regular sessions, while today 14 legislatures do and another 6 meet annually with off-year sessions limited to budget or fiscal problems. In addition, the odd-numbered year sessions of the Tennessee General Assembly can be reconvened in the following year, if desired.* The other 29 State legislatures still meet for regular sessions on a biennial basis. Most State legislatures are restricted as to length of session. Eight States with annual sessions, and nine with biennial, have no limitations on the length of the sessions. All others have some limitations. Table 42 groups the States according to the frequency and length of legislative sessions. To what extent do the legislatures themselves have control over calling special sessions and determining the subjects thereof, and what limits are placed on their length? As indicated in Table 43, only 12 State legislatures may call themselves into session. Twenty-one may determine subjects. Only nine may both call themselves into session and determine subjects. In 28 States there is no limitation on the duration of a special session once it has convened. In nine States, the legislature has no authority to call itself into session, cannot determine subjects and cannot meet beyond a certain period. With reference to tenure, as indicated by Fig. 21, in Alabama, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi and Nebraska, all members are elected to 4-year terms. Of the remaining States, 33 have 2-year House terms and 4-year Senate terms; 12 have 2-year terms for both chambers. Although the noncontinuous character of most State legislatures is frequently cited as a major weakness, its negative impact perhaps may be exaggerated. A recent survey of State agency heads indicated that 44 percent of the respondents felt that their legislatures exercised greater control over their agencies' affairs than the Governor, while a little less than one-third listed the Governor as having greater authority and 22 percent rated them about the same.133/ At the same time, only 20 percent felt that the legislature was basically more sympathetic to their agency goals and 55 percent indicated the Governor had a better understanding. In a similar vein, less than one-fourth preferred legislative to gubernatorial or other controls. * In 1967, the Vermont legislature also adjourned its biennial session to reconvene on January 3, 1968. The example of Tennessee and Vermont may provide a precedent which other States now meeting only every other year may choose to follow. |