This duplication can defeat the very purpose for which This is not to say, however, that planning requirements A greater degree of rationalization in metropolitan areas can be expected under Section 204 of the Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act of 1966.55/ This provision requires that local applications for specified urban development projects from such areas be submitted for review and comment to the areawide planning agency before being acted on by the Federal grant agency. The comments shall include "information concerning the extent to which the project is consistent with comprehensive planning developed or in the process of development for the metropolitan area. . Eleven of the 16 programs in Table 28 are among those directly affected by this requirement. The provision went into effect on July 1, 1967. ་་ Another problem arising from the multiplication of planning requirements occurs in Federal grant programs for development of less urbanized areas involving one or more counties. The Economic Development Administration, Appalachian Regional Commission, and Community Action Program all have planning requirements likely to apply to the same geographic area. The Farmers Home Administration administers grants for rural water and waste disposal facilities projects which must conform to areawide comprehensive functional plans. The States also, under the spur of increasing interest in State economic and resources development, have established their own regional or areawide programs. The coming together of all these programs with their different planning requirements and different geographic bases for administration has been a source of irritation to States and local communities. Taking into account these criticisms and a recommendation of the Advisory Commission contained in its 1966 report on Intergovernmental Relations in the Poverty Program, President Johnson in September 1966 requested the heads of departments and agencies administering development planning grants to work with the Director of the Bureau of the Budget "to insure the fullest coordination in fixing the boundaries of multi-jurisdictional planning units assisted by the Federal Government."56/ Subsequently, the Bureau of the Budget issued a circular instructing the agencies to set up a checkpoint procedure whereby, to the extent feasible, they will try to use common planning boundaries, statistics, and staff, and will strive to harmonize separate functional plans and comprehensive planning for the area.57/ Still another problem stemming from Federal planning requirements is more a case of Federal omission than one of too many planning conditions. It concerns State planning requirements, the most prevalent type in Federal grant programs. A State plan is basically an outline, in some detail, of essential elements of a program that the State agrees to carry out. Yet, the individual program plans have little if any relationship to the operations or planning of operations of State government, and Federal grant programs have not required these State functional plans to be in conformity with a comprehensive State plan. Some encouragement in this direction has come recently, however, with extension of the Department of Housing and Urban Development's "701" urban planning program to include aid for comprehensive State planning. This may serve to bring the functional plans for physical improvement, economic development, social welfare, and other State activities into a rational relationship in meeting State and national goals. Headquarters-Field Office Relations In the past five years, four new systems of regional offices have been established as a consequence of newly enacted grant-in-aid legislation: Bureau of Outdoor Recreation (1962), Office of Economic Opportunity (1964), Neighborhood Youth Corps (Department of Labor, 1964) and the Economic Development Administration (Department of Commerce, 1965). Prior to 1962, separate regional structures already existed for eight grant-administering departments or agencies: Forestry Service (Agriculture), Bureau of Public Roads (Commerce), Office of Civil Defense (Defense), Health, Education, and Welfare, Bureau of Employment Security (Labor), Housing and Home Finance Agency (now HUD), Federal Aviation Agency and Small Business Administration. Wide variations exist among these 12 regional office structures in the number of regions, the number and identity of the States that constitute the individual regions and the cities in which regional offices are located. Figure 18 indicates that State and local governments of 38 States and the District of Columbia have to deal with regional offices in five or more different city locations. Kentucky has to deal with ten different regional office locations, and Ohio, Pennsylvania, Virginia and West Virginia have nine regional contact points. Table A-24 shows the States by area of the country and the number of different regional office locations that State and local governments deal with. States of the Southeastern area are clearly better off in terms of variations in Federal regional office structure, and the Far West is not far behind. reported: Commenting upon this regional setup, an Executive Branch task force Even in a city such as San Francisco, which is one of the In major cities such as Seattle and Nashville, the few Variations in boundaries and office locations, of course, These facts underscore what Senator Edmund S. Muskie in November 1966 identified as "a problem for the State official or the mayor of a large city who Figure 18. NUMBER OF REGIONAL OFFICES OF FEDERAL finds that he must deal with a number of widely scattered regional offices in his negotiations with the Federal Government."58/ At the other end of the Federal-State-local pipeline the scattering of regional offices raises obstacles to Federal agencies coordinating in the field. Certainly such coordinating instruments as Federal Executive Boards could function more effectively if the representatives of Federal agencies were posted in fewer locations. The development of inconsistent patterns of regional offices reflects the existence of Congressional pressure on individual departments; an unplanned growth of departments and agencies and their subunits in response to different needs in different periods of our history; and the failure to make a concerted effort to bring some order out of the confusion. The chaotic results prompted President Johnson to state in his 1967 "Quality of Government" message:59/ Each major federal department and agency works through a Yet, for all their importance, there has been only infre- The cause of intergovernmental cooperation is poorly served The President charged the Director of the Bureau of the Budget to undertake a comprehensive review of the Federal field office structure and recommend a plan for restructuring them before 1969. Other aspects of headquarters-regional relationships add to the difficulties of interprogram coordination. Some Federal agencies, such as HUD, OEO, and EDA, are empowered to deal directly with local governments. Others, particularly HEW agencies, may deal only with the States. When the law further requires dealing with only a specified State agency, the resultant rigidities make a coordinated Federal attack on local problems all but impossible. Regional offices of Federal agencies sometimes do not have adequate delegated authority to cope with interagency and intergovernmental coordination problems in the field. Where decision-making is not decentralized, the field offices merely add another layer of review, a potential delay, with the result that State and local grant applicants must spend an inordinate amount of time tracking down their applications through various echelons of the Federal bureaucracy. This contributes to "grantsmanship" and encourages the establishment of outside groups whose sole service to State and local government is to "bird-dog" grant applications. Applications for grants under some programs may go directly from State and local governments to Washington, without touching base with regional offices. One result, for example, is that these offices cannot cooperate with OEO field offices when the latter, as part of a checkpoint procedure for determining availability of funds in other programs for carrying out poverty program objectives, seek to learn what is going on in a given community under these programs. Coordination has to be achieved in Washington before it can be achieved in the field. Summary The general objectives of the categorical grant-in-aid system might be regarded as: (1) achieving a minimum program level in specific functional fields throughout the country; and (2) doing so in such a way as to strengthen State and local governments. It seems clear, however, that the system itself, and particularly some of its newer features, are causing problems that handicap these objectives. State and local governments, bewildered by the proliferation of grants, complexity of requirements, and actual or seeming duplication and overlapping, complain of an "information gap." Multiplying and different planning requirements foster confusion rather than coordination. States feel they are losing their grip over public affairs within their jurisdiction due to the increasing practice of direct Federal-local grants. Both State and local governments feel a similar loss with the rise of grants to private individuals and institutions. The goals of equalization, if ever a very strong objective of the grant system, are no nearer achievement than some six or eight years ago, partly because of the trend toward project rather than formula grants. To complete this survey of the Federal grant-in-aid system, we now turn to an analysis of (1) machinery in the National Government for managing it; (2) the system's effect on State and local government; and (3) some of the characteristics of State and local government that are themselves responsible for diluting the effectiveness of the Federal grants. FEDERAL MACHINERY FOR DEVELOPING AND MANAGING GRANTS-IN-AID Why hasn't the Federal Government done a better job in developing and administering the grant-in-aid system? Why has it not held down the number of grants, avoided duplication in programs, achieved simplification of administrative requirements, maintained consistency among planning requirements, avoided bypassing State and local governments and particularly general purpose units of government? To attempt some answers to these and other questions we look at the several centers of policy and administrative responsibility in the Executive Branch, as well as the Legislative Branch. In the Executive Branch, ultimate responsibility for administration of grant programs rests with the President and this, of course, is just one of his many duties. It competes for the President's time and attention against the demands of his role as head of State, chief foreign affairs initiator and spokesman, Commander-in-Chief, chief administrator of explorations in space, head of his political party and chief administrator of direct Federal programs. The President, of course, has much of the executive apparatus of the Federal Government to assist him in administering grant programs. This machinery provides assistance at various levels of policy determination and program administration--all at various distances from the Executive Office of the President. The Bureau of the Budget Chief of these and close to him is the Bureau of the Budget. Established by the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 within the Treasury Department, |