visions of agreements which might "be broken by our embargo before it is made complete." He made further requests for information on the subject of commerce with neutrals, stating that answers must be received before the Government "could consider and possibly recommend the drastic demands which it is understood the Allies desire us to make on the European neutrals."

Secretary Lansing cabled the Ministers in Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and the Netherlands on August 8 that no definite policy had yet been established with respect to exports from the United States to those countries. The Government was securing the views of Great Britain and France on the following questions: (1) whether trade between Germany and neutrals should be entirely prohibited; (2) whether Great Britain and France would cancel outstanding agreements with neutrals, if the United States took this position; and (3) whether the Allies were prepared to meet any military emergency that might arise as a "result of cutting off neutrals" refusing to stop trade with Germany.16

PROCLAMATION OF AUGUST 27, 1917

The authority for issuing export licenses was changed on August 21, 1917. By an Executive order of that date, which superseded the one of June 22, an Exports Administrative Board was established and authorized to grant or refuse export licenses in accordance with instructions of the President.17

The second proclamation relating to exports, issued August 27, contained two lists of articles.18 The first list, applicable to the neutral European countries and to the Central Powers, brought under control practically all articles of commerce, in fact the Exports Administrative Board later held that every article was included and required license when shipped to those countries.19 The second, applicable to all other countries, included several articles not listed in the earlier proclamation. President Wilson explained that the two lists had been prepared in the interest of expediency; that obviously there was need for a closer supervision and control of exports to European neutrals within the sphere of hostilities than to countries farther removed.20

The President stated that, until required by the Secretary of the Treasury, no license would be necessary for the exportation of coin, bullion, and currency. Ten days later a proclamation provided that coin, bullion, and currency should not be exported from the United

16 Document 267. 17 Document 269. 18 Document 270. 19 Document 275. 20 Document 271.

States to any country except under license of the Secretary of the Treasury.21

EMBARGO ON EXPORTS TO EUROPEAN NEUTRALS

The Exports Administrative Board gave instructions on August 30, 1917, for withholding all licenses to export to Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and the Netherlands, articles controlled by Presidential proclamation.22 The Board gave instructions on August 31 that no ships destined for these countries should be given bunker licenses without its approval, except passenger ships not carrying cargo.23 One month later Acting Secretary of State Polk reported that no commodities were being exported to the Scandinavian countries except some food grains for Norway and Sweden under agreements made with them for the release of a double quantity of food grains for Belgian relief, and "some few other special isolated cases of shipments to Norway." 24

The general position of the United States in regard to commerce with neutral countries was set forth by Secretary Lansing on October 6.25 He did not wish neutral countries to gain the impression that the United States was dictating to France and Great Britain an embargo policy hostile to neutrals. Great Britain, he stated, had urged the adoption of " even a stricter control than we have been willing to sanction." The United States was prepared to assume full responsibility for its restrictive measures, and these measures would be dictated by necessity, "with all possible regard for justice and for the feelings of neutrals."

Secretary Lansing explained that the United States aimed to prevent aid from reaching the enemy as a result of the release of American shipments to neutral countries, and to secure cooperation of neutrals in the furnishing of their products needed by the United States or the Allies. He stated that an essential factor in determining the policy of the United States was the satisfactory settlement and utilization of neutral tonnage situated in parts of the United States. The withdrawal from active service of these ships complicated the question and imposed "upon this Government the need of stricter measures to meet the situation."

The position of the United States was further explained a few days later by Secretary Lansing." He called attention to the request made on July 24 for information regarding production, consump

21 Document 274.

" Document 272. 23 Document 273. "4 Document 277. "5 Document 280. "Document 284.

tion, and requirements of the northern neutral countries. He also called attention to the warning then given that until a mutual arrangement was made, the United States would consider their exports to the Central Powers as a depletion of the commodities which would be supplied to the neutral countries. In spite of this warning, he stated, some of the countries had continued to send large quantities of vital supplies to the Central Powers; and little information had been obtained on the needs of those countries.

The Secretary stated that there would be a continuation of the embargo policy which had been instituted. Export licenses would be denied to the northern neutral countries until the receipt of the information which had been requested. Furthermore, export licenses would be denied to them as long as they continued to give such aid to the Central Powers as converting fodder into dairy products, using oil to operate fishing craft, or using lubricating oil in manufacturing establishments working for German interests. The American people could not be expected to deny themselves the quantities of foodstuffs they desired in order that a surplus might be sent to the northern neutrals "to render easier for them the help which they are extending to our enemies." He stated that the United States was willing to send supplies to neutrals even at a sacrifice. However, in return for this service the United States must demand some guarantee that these supplies would "not be turned against us to kill our sons and prolong the war."

In negotiations held during October with representatives of the Netherlands, the Exports Administrative Board stated the position of the United States on exports for that country." Foodstuffs, fodder, and other commodities could not be licensed when they were to be used (1) for export to the Central Powers, (2) for release of other commodities to be so exported, (3) for the production of dairy products to be so exported, (4) for the direct or indirect production of articles destined for the Central Powers, or (5) for the transport across the Netherlands of war materials of enemy origin and ownership being sent direct to the enemy army. If the Netherlands continued to supply what was "equivalent to a large part of the ration of the German Army ", the United States could not furnish supplies directly or lend assistance in obtaining them.

PRINCIPLES INSISTED UPON BY PRESIDENT WILSON

A War Trade Board was established on October 12, 1917, superseding the Exports Administrative Board.28 During negotiations for

"Document 283.

* Document 282.

an agreement with Norway, representatives of the War Trade Board, in cooperation with the British and French Governments, proposed to ask for a cessation of all direct or indirect exports from Norway to Germany. This proposal was brought to the attention of President Wilson. On November 15 he told the Acting Chairman of the War Trade Board that he was unwilling to insist that there should be no export from Norway to Germany as he considered that inconsistent with the principle always demanded by the United States.29 He was "entirely unwilling" to go further than the principle of action already settled, "that we will supply or attempt to supply nothing to Norway except what we can be shown the people actually lack and we can not undertake to supply them with any food elements of which they deprive themselves by exportation."

President Wilson reiterated this position on November 19.30 As the United States was fighting a war of principle he could not consent to demand of Norway "what we would not in similar circumstances allow any government to demand of us." The only legitimate position for the United States, he stated, was that it would not supply the deficiencies which Norway thus created if the exports were to enemies of the United States. On November 20, the acting chairman of the War Trade Board explained that while the President was unwilling to insist upon a cessation of exports by northern neutrals to Germany, he was not opposed to a limitation of exports of their own products.31

Four days later the Secretary of State gave instructions that in negotiations with Norway it would be desirable "to lay stress on the fact that we are acting with the Allies and frequently we are compelled to yield to them and make terms more onerous on neutrals." 32

SILK AGREEMENTS

On June 9, 1917, representatives at Paris of the United States, France, Great Britain, and Italy made the following recommendations to their Governments "in order to put an end to the exportation via Switzerland of silks and silk goods destined for the enemy Empires": "

1. The Allied Governments should prohibit the export of silk and silk goods to neutral countries bordering upon enemy states or situated in northern Europe.

2. As the prohibition of export of thrown and reeled silks might injure Italy's principal export trade, the contracting Governments

"Document 286.

30 Document 287.

Document 288.

Document 291.

Document 255.

should fix a minimum price for these silks. An inter-Allied purchasing bureau should buy these silks to prevent a decline in the quotation below the minimum price.

3. The advance of funds necessary for this operation should be shared equally by the United States, France, and Great Britain. In case of any profit, one-fourth each of the total amount should be allotted to the United States, France, and Great Britain. The last fourth should be reserved for Italy "in view of the sacrifices accepted by Italy."

Two months later, August 9, the United States, the Allies, and Switzerland concluded an agreement which listed "apportionments of imports allotted for Switzerland for silks and silk goods" and provided that Switzerland should " immediately and absolutely" prohibit the exportation of all silk goods except as specified in the agreement. Although this agreement was renounced by Switzerland, it was replaced by one of September 4 which was essentially the same except that the "apportionments" for Switzerland were increased. The agreement of September 4 went into effect in November.

34

Instructions were sent to the Ambassador in France on December 8 that when France, Great Britain, and Italy had formally adhered to the agreement of June 9 and were ready to deposit their quotas, he was authorized to deposit the quota of the United States.85 On December 17, delegates of the four Governments signed a protocol to be added to the agreement of June 9.36 They "took note" of the decision of the Italian Government to participate in the operation provided for in that agreement, thus dividing into four parts the expenses and risks of the operation. It was stipulated that the ratification of this protocol should comprise ratification of the agreement of June 9. The Ambassador in France reported on June 18, 1918, ratification by the Governments concerned.

AGREEMENT WITH SWITZERLAND, DECEMBER 5, 1917

The first general commercial arrangement with a neutral country was the "Memorandum of December 5, 1917, between the War Trade Board and the Swiss Government in Regard to Exports from the United States to Switzerland." 37 This agreement contained the following provisions:

1. The War Trade Board desired that Switzerland should receive the maximum stated quantities of certain enumerated articles.

84 Document 268.

35 Footnote 5, p. 610.

30 Document 303.

87 Document 296.