In a letter of the same date to the President, Secretary Bryan expressed the opinion that an American citizen who took passage on a British vessel knowing that this method of warfare would be employed, was "in a different position from that occupied by one who suffers without any fault of his own." 10 He felt that the United States could hardly insist that the presence of an American on a British ship should operate to prevent attack unless the Government was prepared to condemn as improper the methods employed. 11 The President replied that this American met death as a result of acts on the part of German naval officers which clearly violated the rules of international law. He considered it "probably " the duty of the Government to make clear to Germany that American citizens should not be endangered by actions which were not sanctioned by the accepted law of nations. On April 3 the Secretary sent President Wilson a memorandum which Mr. Lansing had prepared six weeks earlier, in which the Counselor held that the advantages to Germany of war with the United States appeared "to outweigh the disadvantages." 12 The President appreciated the force of the memorandum but thought it should not alter the course of the United States in the Falaba case, "so long as we think ourselves on the firm ground of right.” 13 Two days later Counselor Lansing prepared a draft note to Germany in language "plain almost to harshness." 14 If the sinking of the Falaba was to be denounced as an indefensible act, he did not see how this could be done in a pleasant way. He felt that the United States must condemn the violation of rights and state what remedy was expected; American public opinion would "never stand for a colorless or timid presentation." The Counselor considered this case "pregnant with more sinister possibilities than any with which the Government has had to deal." In a letter of April 7 to Secretary Bryan, Mr. Lansing held that the Government must either warn Americans not to traverse the war zone in foreign merchant vessels, or hold Germany to a strict accountability for every American life lost on the high seas by submarine attack.15 He felt that "the dignity of the Government and its duty toward its citizens " appeared to demand a policy in accord with the second course. 10 Document 62. "Document 63. 13 Document 64. 13 Document 65. 14 Document 66. 15 Document 67. President Wilson discussed the Falaba case in a letter of April 22 to the Secretary of State.16 The President proposed that a note to the German Government should be placed "on very high grounds", not on the loss of life of one American citizen. The emphasis should be placed on the interests of mankind, on the "manifest impropriety of a single nation's essaying to alter the understandings of nations", and on Germany's mistake in using an instrument which could not be used in accordance with any acceptable rules. 17 On May 1, Counselor Lansing called to the attention of Secretary Bryan the attack by a German aeroplane on the American steamship Cushing. While no lives were lost, the vessel was reported to be considerably damaged. Mr. Lansing did not consider the case so serious as the attack on the Falaba, but he believed it to be a more flagrant violation of neutral rights. Furthermore, it indicated that the German naval policy was "one of wanton and indiscriminate destruction of vessels regardless of nationality." The Counselor also called attention to the publication in morning newspapers of May 1 of the following paid advertisement which had been prepared on April 22 by the German Embassy : "Travellers intending to embark on the Atlantic voyage are reminded that a state of war exists between Germany and her allies and Great Britain and her allies; that the zone of war includes the waters adjacent to the British Isles; that in accordance with formal notice given by the Imperial Government, vessels flying the flag of Great Britain or any of her allies, are liable to destruction in those waters and that travellers sailing in the war zone on ships of Great Britain or her allies do so at their own risk." Mr. Lansing considered this notice a formal threat that American citizens on British ships would not be given ample opportunity to escape when the ships were attacked. Also, he felt that the use of the American press to warn Americans not to exercise their legal rights was "highly improper." In a letter of May 3 to Secretary Bryan, Counselor Lansing mentioned that three lives were reported lost as a result of the torpedoing of the American steamship Gulflight.18 If the attacks on the Gulflight and the Cushing were confirmed officially, he believed that the Government should make a vigorous protest. He felt that the United States was "being forced near to the breaking point" in relations with Germany. Two days later the Counselor informed the Secretary that he had reread the American note of February 10 19 to 16 Document 69. 17 Document 72. 18 Document 73. 19 See p. 52. determine how far a course of action was declared in case of submarine attack.10 He believed that the expression "indefensible violation" eliminated any argument as to the justification of German authorities for attacking American vessels without warning. The expression "strict accountability " meant that the German Government "must make full reparation for the act of their naval force and must also repudiate the act, apologize for it, and give ample assurance that it will not be repeated." He believed that the expression "steps. . . necessary . . . to safeguard" meant to protect American lives and property by force unless the German Government guaranteed that American lives and property on the high seas would not be molested. THE "LUSITANIA AND THE "ARABIC " One hundred twenty-eight American citizens lost their lives on May 7, 1915, when the British steamship Lusitania was sunk without warning by a German submarine off the coast of Ireland. This vessel was not armed when it left New York, according to the Treasury Department. Practically all of its cargo was contraband."1 Ambassador Page in Great Britain reported on May 8, the unofficial British opinion that the United States "must declare war or forfeit European respect."12 By submitting to Germany's disregard of lives and property, the United States would have "no voice or influence in settling the war nor in what follows for a long time to come." President Wilson observed in a letter to Secretary Bryan that the cable expressed what was considered to be public opinion at the time in Great Britain.13 He believed it a very serious thing to have such things thought, because everything that affects the opinion of the world regarding us affects our influence for good." Although in this cable Ambassador Page reported what he had heard unofficially concerning the terms of the secret treaty of London, the President did not comment on them. 66 In discussing the Lusitania incident, Secretary Bryan suggested the proposition that Americans who took passage on a British vessel destined to pass through the German war zone did so in a measure at their own peril, and were not entitled to the full protection of the Government. This proposition was considered by Counselor Lansing in a letter of May 9.14 He called attention to the Government's declaration of February 10 that it would hold Germany to a strict accountability for the loss of American lives and property within 10 Document 74. 11 Document 75. " Document 76. 13 Document 79. 34 Document 77. the war zone.15 The Government had not discriminated "as to the vessels carrying American citizens and property." If the Government had intended to discriminate, he stated, it should have issued a public warning to American citizens to keep off British ships. However, the Government had permitted in silence hundreds of American citizens to travel by British steamships crossing the war zone and by this silence had allowed them to believe that the Government approved and would support them in case their legal rights were invaded. It had "continued silent" even when the German Embassy published a warning just before the Lusitania sailed. These views were sent to President Wilson.16 He considered the Counselor's argument "unanswerable." Even if it were right to take the position "that a warning that an unlawful and outrageous thing would be done might operate as an exemption from responsi bility on the part of those who issued it ", the President considered it too late to take that position. "We defined our position at the outset and cannot alter it-at any rate so far as it affects the past." On May 10 Secretary Bryan forwarded to the President a letter containing Counselor Lansing's suggestions regarding procedure to be followed by the Government in the Lusitania case 18: (1) a protest against the torpedoing without warning of an unarmed passenger ship on the high seas; (2) a declaration that this action violated the rules of international law and the principles of humanity; (3) a reaffirmation of the "strict accountability " statement of February 10; (4) a demand that Germany disavow the act of the submarine commander, offer an apology, punish the guilty officer, promise to pay a just indemnity, and guarantee that in the future ample measures would be taken to insure the safety of American citizens on the high seas.19 If Germany refused to comply with these demands, the Counselor stated that two courses of action were open. The United States could sever diplomatic relations with Germany. Or the United States and other neutral powers could send identic notes to Germany and also to Great Britain protesting against the violations of international law with which each was charged, the protest to Germany covering breaches of "inhumanity" as well as of international law. These two courses of action were amplified a week later by the Counselor in a letter to the President.20 On May 10 the Secretary also sent the President a memorandum by the Counselor in regard to possible German defenses for the 18 See p. 52. 1 Document 78. Document 81. sinking of the Lusitania.20 The Counselor stated that the presence of munitions in the cargo did not in itself relieve the German naval authorities from stopping the vessel and permitting those on board to take to the boats before the torpedo was launched. Furthermore, Germany could not avoid responsibility by claiming that the vessel was armed as it had means of obtaining information showing that the vessel was not armed. Finally, the German Embassy's public warning to American citizens not to travel through the war zone on British vessels did not relieve the German Government of responsibility for committing an illegal and inhuman act. The note to Germany was sent on May 13 by Secretary Bryan. He called attention to the notice already given that the United States could not admit that there should be any curtailment of American rights in the war zone proclaimed by Germany, and that it must hold Germany to a strict accountability for any infringement of those rights.2 The United States assumed, he continued, that Germany accepted the principle that the lives of noncombatants should not be jeopardized by the capture or destruction of an unarmed merchantman, and recognized also the obligation to visit and search a suspected merchant ship to determine whether it was of belligerent nationality or was carrying contraband of war under a neutral flag. Secretary Bryan considered apparent that submarines could not be used against merchant ships without "an inevitable violation of many sacred principles of justice and humanity ", as it was practically impossible for the officers of a submarine to visit a merchantman at sea and examine its papers and cargo. Furthermore, it was not practicable for them to place a prize crew on the merchant ship, and they could not sink it without leaving the passengers and crew in small boats to the mercy of the sea. He mentioned that the German Embassy at Washington had published a formal warning that American citizens who traveled through the war zone, would do so at their own peril. No warning that an unlawful and inhuman act would be committed, he held, could be accepted as an excuse for the act or as an abatement of the responsibility for its commission. Finally, the Secretary expected the German Government to disavow the act of the submarine commander in sinking the Lusitania, to make reparation so far as reparation was possible for injuries. which were without measure, and to take immediate steps "to prevent the recurrence of anything so obviously subversive of the principles of warfare " for which Germany had " in the past so wisely and so firmly contended." 20 Document 80. 21 Document 81. |