be to clear the way for repeated violations of international law by belligerent powers on the ground of military necessity; that a neutral nation could not permit its rights on the high seas to be determined by belligerents; and that the rights of neutrals were "as sacred as the rights of belligerents and must be as strictly observed ". The reply of October 12, 1916, of the Allies defended their treatment of mails. On October 17 Secretary Lansing wrote the President that in considering the subject "we should bear in mind that, while we are neutral in the present war, we may be belligerent in the next and may deem it necessary to do certain things which we now regard as extreme restrictions upon neutrals "42 He recommended. that the United States should insist that mail coming from neutral countries in continental Europe should be treated as inviolable and should not be subject to detention, inspection, or seizure. Furthermore, the extent and exercise of the belligerent right to detain, inspect, or seize mail going to continental Europe should be submitted immediately to arbitration or to a joint commission of inquiry. On November 14 he suggested to President Wilson that this proposition be incorporated in a note to the British Government and on the 26th the President authorized that such a note should be prepared. A month later the President informed Secretary Lansing that he would "discuss this and other kindred matters with you when we have seen just what the several belligerents are willing to do about discussing terms of peace "." 44 A further general statement on the subject was not sent to the Allies. However, on the day the United States entered the war, Secretary Lansing informed the Ambassadors in Great Britain and France that numerous complaints had been received from American citizens that remittances to persons in Germany, Austria-Hungary, and in neutral countries, had been detained by British and French authorities." The Secretary called attention to his statement of May 24, 1916, that money orders, checks, drafts, notes, and other negotiable instruments might be classed as merchandise, and instructed the Ambassadors to state that the United States reserved all rights to press claims for unjustified losses or delays resulting to American citizens through the detention of these articles. BRITISH BLACK LIST AND BUNKER CONTROL Secretary Lansing cabled Ambassador Page in Great Britain on January 25, 1916, that he had given consideration to the British Trading with the Enemy Act of December 23, 1915, the "apparent "Document 208. 43 Document 210. "Document 214. Document 244. 46 object" of which was to prevent any person who was doing business in the United Kingdom from trading with enemies of Great Britain. The Secretary stated that this act had been framed without a proper regard for the right of persons in the United States to trade with persons in belligerent countries. He expressed the "grave apprehensions" which were "entertained on this subject by this Government, by the Congress, and by traders domiciled in the United States." The Ambassador was instructed to present a formal reservation to the British Government of the right to protest the application of the act. Six months later, July 26, 1916, Acting Secretary of State Polk cabled Ambassador Page in regard to an announcement of a few days previous that the British Government had placed upon a proscriptive black list the names of certain persons, firms, and corporations in the United States, and had forbidden all financial or commercial dealings between them and subjects of Great Britain." The Acting Secretary stated that this announcement had been received with the "most painful surprise" by the people and Government of the United States. The scope and effect of the policy he considered "extraordinary." British steamship lines would not accept cargoes from listed firms or transfer their goods to any port. Neutral steamship lines understood that if they accepted freight from those on the list they were likely to be denied coal at British ports, and might themselves be put upon the black list. Neutral bankers refused loans to those listed, and neutral merchants declined to contract for their goods, fearing a like proscription. Furthermore, he understood that Americans doing business in foreign countries had been notified that their dealings with blacklisted firms were to be regarded as subject to veto by the British Government. Although these British measures apparently were directed only at the enemies of Great Britain and would be enforced with strict regard to the rights of neutrals, Acting Secretary Polk felt they were essentially inconsistent with those rights. American citizens were entirely within their rights in attempting to trade with the people or the government of any belligerent, he stated, subject only to well-defined international practices which the United States believed that Great Britain had "too lightly and too frequently disregarded." There were remedies and penalties, he stated, for breaches of an effective blockade, for trade in contraband, and for every unneutral act. The United States could not consent to see these remedies and penalties altered or extended at the will of a single power or group 40 Document 160. 47 Document 198. of powers. Although it was an accepted principle among nations that neutrals might not be condemned nor their goods confiscated except upon fair adjudication and after an opportunity to be heard in prize courts or elsewhere, the black list condemned "without hearing, without notice, and in advance". The Acting Secretary stated that whatever might be said regarding the legality, "in the view of international obligation", of the act of Parliament upon which the practice of the black list was based, the United States considered the practice inconsistent with the justice, amity, and impartial fairness which should characterize the relations of friendly governments. Finally, the United States could not consent that its citizens should be placed upon an ex parte black list without calling the attention of the British Government," in the gravest terms, to the many serious consequences to neutral rights and neutral relations which such an act must necessarily involve ". Great Britain replied on October 10, 1916, that the black list had been issued in accordance with purely municipal legislation, that it was not directed against neutral trade, that it was part of the general belligerent campaign designed to weaken the enemy, and that the only disability suffered by listed persons was that British subjects were prohibited from giving them the assistance of British credit and British property. This note was not answered by the United States. A few weeks after the American note on the black list had been sent to Great Britain, Secretary Lansing cabled Ambassador Page in regard to the British "white list" of ships whose owners had accepted certain requirements of the British Government. An American steamship carrying a Philippine cargo had been refused coal at Colombo, Ceylon, because the ship was not on this white list.48 Secretary Lansing stated that the Government of the United States was "loath to believe" that the British Government, instead of being content with the exercise of recognized belligerent rights, would continue to "resort to such arbitrary practices as this" in cases in which there were apparently no legal grounds for interference with neutral trade. On December 28, 1916, Secretary Lansing protested the application of Great Britain's policy in regard to the granting of bunkers to neutral ships.49 He stated that American steamship lines had been told that they could not charter or use ships of other neutral countries, which ships had accepted a bunker agreement with Great Britain, unless the American company agreed to bind both the chartered ships and its own ships. The Secretary believed that this Document 199 British policy indicated "an intention to secure control of all neutral shipping through so-called agreement". He stated that if the agreement were limited to the chartered ships which accepted the agreement, he could understand the British position, but the attempt to control American ships not requiring British facilities could “not possibly be permitted by this Government". ABANDONMENT OF THE DECLARATION OF LONDON On March 30, 1916, a British order in council was issued which contained further modifications to the Declaration of London and which foreshadowed even more severe treatment of neutral commerce than had been provided for by earlier orders in council. Secretary Lansing reminded Ambassador Page by a cable of April 8 50 that this order in council related to questions discussed in the American note of October 21, 1915, and that the note had not been answered. The Secretary considered "intentionally discourteous" the action of the British Government in issuing an order in council making more rigorous the practices to which the United States was objecting. Although the Secretary stated in the cable of April 8 that he had under consideration a statement in regard to the latest order in council, no note on the subject was sent to Great Britain. And the British reply of April 24, 1916, to the American note of October 21, 1915, was not answered by the United States. By an order in council of July 7, 1916, Great Britain withdrew all recognition of the Declaration of London and proclaimed other rules for the conduct of maritime warfare, and France issued a decree to the same effect. Ambassador Page was instructed on September 18 to notify the British Government that "in several respects" the rules set forth in this order in council were considered out of accord with the law and practice of nations.51 Furthermore, the United States reserved the right to question the validity of these rules, and to present claims if American interests were unlawfully affected by their application. The British Government then stated that if the United States did not consider the rules cited in the order in council to be in accordance with international law, these rules should be challenged in prize court. In a reply, Secretary Lansing stated that the United States "must announce that it, of course, has no intention to resort to British courts" for the maintenance of American rights infringed by British orders in council.52 Secretary Lansing advised the President in a letter of September 22, 1916, that steps should be taken to impress the British Govern 50 Document 178. 51 Document 201. "Document 211. ment with the "growing irritation in this country at the blacklisting, censorship of mails and other measures adopted by Great Britain, and the indifference shown by the British Government in failure to make prompt reply to our notes "53 He advised that the Chargé at London be given an instruction on the subject which he should confidentially show to the British Secretary for Foreign Affairs. The Secretary enclosed a draft telegram stating that during the war not one rule contended for by the United States had been admitted by the British Government; that in no important instance had the British Government "modified their pretentions to extraordinary belligerent privileges so as to conform their conduct to established usage ". Furthermore, the exportation from the United States to the Allied Powers of thousands of shiploads of munitions, food, clothing, and metals, while their enemies had been able to obtain scarcely a single cargo, "and the forbearance, if not the leniency, shown by this Government toward Great Britain in cases involving grave breaches of international law ", had led the British Government to misjudge American policy. If the British Government was expecting an attitude of "benevolent neutrality" on the part of the United States, they should know that "nothing is further from our intention ". President Wilson considered it unwise to send this message. He had recently talked with Ambassador Page and was sure the Ambassador would be able to convey to the British Government "the lamentable and dangerous mistakes they are making". The President had covered the subject matter dealt with in Secretary Lansing's letter "in a way which I am sure left nothing to be desired in the way of explicitness or firmness of tone "54 63 Document 203. 84 Document 204. |