on October 29, for approval of the President, an analysis of the fourteen points. This analysis included a statement that point II, which must be read in connection with point XIV, referred to navigation under the three following conditions: 1. General peace. Under this condition there would be "freedom to come and go on the high seas. 2. A general war entered into by the league of nations to enforce international covenants. Such a war would be conducted against an outlaw nation and complete non-intercourse with that nation was intended. 3. A limited war involving no breach of international covenants. This concerned the rights of neutral shipping and private property on the high seas during a war between a limited number of nations when that war involved no issue upon which the league of nations cared to take sides. In such a war the league would remain neutral and the rights of neutrals should be maintained against the belligerents, "the rights of both to be clearly and precisely defined in the law of nations." The President replied that this analysis was a satisfactory interpretation of the principles involved "but details of application mentioned should be regarded as merely illustrative suggestions and reserved for peace conference ".4 Colonel House cabled a statement of the British Prime Minister on October 29, that so far as Great Britain was concerned, point II of the President's peace program could not be accepted without qualification. Lloyd George admitted that point II might possibly be acceptable if it was made a part of point XIV concerning the league of nations. He did not wish to discuss freedom of the seas with Germany, and if it was a condition of peace Great Britain could not agree to it. The Prime Minister stated later on the same. day that Great Britain could not accept point II under any circumstances as it took away from Great Britain the power of blockade. He President Wilson cabled Colonel House on October 30 that he could not consent to participate in the negotiation of a peace which did not include freedom of the seas." On the following day the President cabled that he recognized the exceptional position and necessities of Great Britain with regard to the use of the seas. also realized that the freedom of the seas needed careful definition and was full of questions upon which there should be free discussion and a liberal exchange of views. Blockade, the President stated, would "require immediate redefinition in view of the many new circumstances of warfare". There was no danger of its being Document 410. 4 Document 411. 5 Document 412. • Document 413. T Document 415. abolished. Finally, the freedom of the seas would not have to be discussed with Germany "if we agree among ourselves beforehand ". On November 3 Colonel House cabled a letter from the British Prime Minister regarding point II, in which the latter stated that the British were willing to discuss the freedom of the seas "in the light of the new conditions" which had arisen during the war." On the following day House cabled a memorandum by the Allies which included a statement that they were willing to make peace with Germany on the terms laid down by the President in his address of January 8, 1918, and in his subsequent addresses. However, as point II, relating to the freedom of the seas, was open to various interpretations, some of which they could not accept, they must "reserve to themselves complete freedom on this subject when they enter the peace conference." The Government of the United States transmitted this Allied memorandum to the German Government on November 5, with no comment on the reservation regarding the freedom of the seas. On November 11, 1918, the armistice with Germany was signed. The principle of the freedom of the seas was not considered in the plenary sessions of the Paris Peace Conference. President Wilson explained in September 1919, that it was one of the principles he went to Paris most insisting on. The freedom of the seas meant, he stated, the right of neutrals to use the seas when other nations were at war. Under the league of nations, however, there were "no neutrals". Therefore, "by the very thing I was advocating it became unnecessary to define the freedom of the seas." 7 Document 417. 8 Document 418. 'Document 419. DOCUMENTS 1 The Declaration of London, February 26, 1909 1 [Translation] HIS Majesty the German Emperor, King of Prussia; the President of the United States of America; His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, King of Bohemia, &c., and Apostolic King of Hungary; His Majesty the King of Spain; the President of the French Republic; His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India; His Majesty the King of Italy; His Majesty the Emperor of Japan; Her Majesty the Queen of the Netherlands; His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias. Having regard to the terms in which the British Government invited various Powers to meet in conference in order to arrive at an agreement as to what are the generally recognized rules of international law within the meaning of Article 7 of the Convention of 18th October, 1907, relative to the establishment of an International Prize Court; Recognizing all the advantages which an agreement as to the said rules would, in the unfortunate event of a naval war, present, both as regards peaceful commerce, and as regards the belligerents and their diplomatic relations with neutral Governments; Having regard to the divergence often found in the methods by which it is sought to apply in practice the general principles of international law; Animated by the desire to insure henceforward a greater measure of uniformity in this respect; Hoping that a work so important to the common welfare will meet with general approval; Have appointed as their Plenipotentiaries, that is to say: 'Foreign Relations, 1909, p. 318. Signed in French only. This translation agrees substantially with that submitted to the Senate by the President (Executive A, 61st Cong., 1st sess.). It differs slightly from the translation contained in the General Report Presented to the Naval Conference on Behalf of Its Drafting Committee (Treaty C-5, Unperfected Treaty File; Executive A, 61st Cong., 1st sess.). Ratification of the Declaration of London was advised by the United States Senate on Apr. 24, 1912, but it was not ratified by the President. 163 |