"exercised the right to determine from the circumstances whether the ostensible was the real destination". Furthermore, they had held that the shipment "to order" of contraband articles to a neutral port from which cargoes had been transshipped to the enemy, was corroborative evidence that the cargo was really destined to the enemy.

Thus, the Secretary stated, some of the doctrines which appeared "to bear harshly upon neutrals" were "analogous to or outgrowths from policies adopted by the United States when it was a belligerent." The United States could not consistently protest, therefore, against the application of rules it had followed in the past, unless they were not applied as previously.

WORKING ARRANGEMENT WITH GREAT BRITAIN

On December 6, 1914, Ambassador Page had cabled the Secretary of State a proposed "working arrangement" which had been prepared after discussions at the British Foreign Office.10 The purpose of the proposal was to remove trade and shipping difficulties existing between the United States and Great Britain.

According to this arrangement, the United States would (1) take steps to insure the correctness of manifests of outgoing cargoes; (2) rescind an order which prohibited the publication of manifests of cargoes until thirty days after the vessels carrying the cargoes had cleared from a port of the United States; and (3) decline to support claims of exporters who consigned shipments "to order". In return the British Government would gladly negotiate for the grant of permits for the "exportation from Great Britain and its colonies to the United States of rubber, hides, jute, plumbago, manganese, ferromanganese, chrome, tungsten ore, and other ingredients of steel", on receiving assurances against the exportation of these articles and against the exportation of products derived from some of them to destinations objectionable to the British Government.

The working arrangement went into effect early in 1915. On January 5, exporters in the United States were reminded of the importance of having foreign shipping manifests complete and accurate in order to avoid delay incident to search while in transit.11 In furtherance of the Government's policy to make "every practicable effort to secure the uninterrupted flow of American commerce", the Treasury Department would furnish an officer to supervise the loading of cargo and to certify to the completeness and accuracy of the manifest. Six weeks later, the Government rescinded the order

10 Document 37.

11 Document 42.

prohibiting for thirty days the publication of manifests. Agreements regarding British embargoed articles were made by the British Government with American manufacturers.

AMERICAN PROPOSAL OF FEBRUARY 20, 1915

Late in 1914 the Department of State replied to an inquiry of the German Embassy as to whether the United States was willing to prevent Great Britain from seizing shipments of "relative contraband ", especially foodstuffs, from the United States to Germany. The Department stated that there was a clear right for citizens or subjects of a neutral country to trade with those of belligerent countries in noncontraband goods, and to trade in goods which were relative contraband, except goods "bound or destined for belligerent governments or as supplies for their armed forces." 12 The Embassy was assured that the United States proposed to extend assistance to its citizens whose goods might be seized or detained by a belligerent in violation of international law, and that this policy would be pursued with strict impartiality toward all belligerents.

On February 3, 1915, the Secretary of State informed the Secretary of the Treasury that although neutrals had the right to ship to Germany foodstuffs and other conditional contraband not destined or intended for ultimate delivery to a department of the Government or its armed forces, a reported German decree appeared to establish governmental control of the food supply.13 He stated that in view of this decree, the British Government had declared that they must regard shipments of foodstuffs to Germany as destined for the German Government.

The Department of State received formal assurances from the German Government on February 8 that foodstuffs imported into Germany directly or indirectly from the United States, would not be used by the German armed forces or by Government authorities. Furthermore, the German Government expressed its willingness to have food from the United States distributed by American organizations.

On February 16 Secretary Bryan cabled Ambassador Page that the propositions received from the German Government on February 8 seemed to remove the reasons given by the British Government for stopping food intended for noncombatants.14 The Ambassador was instructed to state informally to the British Secretary for Foreign Affairs that a policy which aimed to keep food from the civil population of a nation, would create a very unfavorable

13 Document 41. 23 Document 47. 14 Document 51.

impression throughout the world. Also he should suggest that the German declaration of February 4, that the waters surrounding Great Britain and Ireland were to be considered as an area of war,17 would probably be withdrawn if the food question could be adjusted. Four days later, February 20, the Secretary of State suggested the following arrangement to the British and German Governments:18

1. Germany should agree that all its importations of food from the United States should be consigned to agencies designated by the United States; that these agencies should have entire control of the importations and should distribute them solely to retail dealers licensed by the German Government to receive and furnish food to noncombatants; and that the food should not be requisitioned by the German Government or be diverted to its armed forces.

2. Great Britain should agree that food should not be placed upon the absolute contraband list and that food cargoes should not be interfered with or detained if consigned to the agencies in Germany designated by the United States.

3. Germany and Great Britain should agree that: (a) they should not use submarines to attack merchant vessels of any nationality except to enforce the right of visit and search; (b) they should not sow floating mines on the high seas or in territorial waters, and should not plant anchored mines on the high seas "except within cannon range of harbors for defensive purposes only "; (c) they should require their respective merchant vessels not to use neutral flags for the purpose of disguise or ruse de guerre.

The Secretary stated that in submitting this proposal the United States did not wish to be understood as admitting or denying any belligerent or neutral right established by the principles of international law. The United States should consider the agreement a modus vivendi based upon expediency rather than legal right. This proposal, however, was not acceptable to the belligerents.

BRITISH ORDER IN COUNCIL, MARCH 11, 1915

In retaliation against the German announcement of February 4, 1915, that the waters surrounding Great Britain and Ireland were to be considered as an area of war, the following declaration was made: "the British and French Governments will therefore hold themselves free to detain and take into port ships carrying goods of presumed enemy detination, ownership or origin. It is not intended to confiscate such vessels or cargoes unless they would otherwise be liable to condemnation."

The Secretary of State commented on this declaration in cables of March 5 to the American Ambassadors in Great Britain and

"See p. 52.

18 Document 52.

France.19 He stated that the apparent intention of the two powers to interfere with and take into custody all ships trading with Germany was in effect a blockade of German ports, although there was no assertion of the rule that ships attempting to enter or leave a German port might be condemned. Furthermore, the first sentence of the declaration claimed a right pertaining only to a state of blockade and the last sentence proposed a treatment of ships and cargoes as if no blockade existed. The two together presented 66 a proposed course of action previously unknown to international law," and as a consequence neutrals had no standard by which to measure their rights or to avoid danger to their ships and cargoes. The Secretary believed that the British and French Governments ought to assert whether they relied upon the rules governing a blockade or the rules applicable when no blockade existed.

Secretary Bryan was "fully alive to the possibility" that the use of the submarine for defensive and offensive operations might make the former means of maintaining a blockade a physical impossibility. However, he felt that there should be some limit to the radius of activity, especially if this action by the belligerents could be considered a blockade.

The declaration of the Allies was made effective by a British order in council of March 11, 1915,20 and by a French decree of March 13.

President Wilson stated in a letter of March 24 to Secretary Bryan that the United States was "face to face" with something the British Government intended to do, "and they are going to do it no matter what representations we make." 21 The President felt that the United States could but express clearly its attitude and state that it expected to hold the British Government to a "strict responsibility" for every invasion of American neutral rights. In this connection, he called attention to Ambassador Page's statement of March 21 that American export trade with the Allies was increasing rapidly and would "grow by leaps till the war ends." 22 He also called attention to Ambassador Gerard's statement of the same date that German embargoes had practically stopped all trade between the United States and Germany; that American cotton ships brought nothing on their return voyage.23

The case of the United States against the British order in council of March 11, 1915, was set forth in Secretary Bryan's cable of March 30 to the American Ambassadors in Great Britain and France.24 The

Secretary stated that the order in council constituted "a practical assertion of unlimited belligerent rights over neutral commerce within the whole European area and an almost unqualified denial of the sovereign rights of the nations now at peace." He held that the following rights had been conceded to a belligerent: (1) the right of visit and search; (2) the right to capture and condemn neutral vessels found to be engaged in unneutral service or to be carrying contraband of war intended for the enemy's government or armed forces; (3) the right to blockade enemy ports and coasts and to capture and condemn vessels taken in trying to break the blockade; (4) the right to detain and take into port for judicial examination all vessels which it suspected "for substantial reasons" to be engaged in unneutral or contraband service, and to condemn them if the suspicion was sustained. These had been considered the "only permissible exceptions" to the principle of universal equality of sovereignty on the high seas of belligerents and neutrals. The Secretary declared that he could admit no British claim of justification for interfering with the neutral rights of the United States; to admit the claim "would be to assume an attitude of unneutrality towards the present enemies of Great Britain."

Secretary Bryan mentioned that in the note transmitted with the order in council of March 11 the British Government had informed the United States of their intention "to establish a blockade to prevent vessels from carrying goods for or coming from Germany.” 25 He stated that the unprecedented feature of the so-called blockade was that it barred access to many neutral ports and coasts and subjected approaching neutral ships to unusual risks and penalties and to the same suspicion that would attach to them if they were bound for ports of Great Britain's enemies. Although operations were to be confined to European waters, the area of the high seas covered was so great and the cordon of ships was so distant from the territory affected that neutral vessels must pass through the blockading force to reach important neutral ports. He stated that the British Government had no legal right to blockade these ports and that, therefore, they presumably had no intention of claiming to blockade

them.

The Secretary was "not oblivious to " the great changes which had occurred in the conditions and means of naval warfare since the formulation of the rules that previously governed legal blockade. He "might be ready to admit that the old form of 'close' blockade with its cordon of ships in the immediate offing of the blockaded ports" was no longer practicable in the face of an enemy capable of making an effective defense by submarines, mines, and aircraft.

25 'Document 54.