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may be employed in the service of the nation laying the embargo, or that they may hinder and obstruct the operations of the enemy.' He stated that no embargo had been laid upon the two ships. The United States had not prohibited their sailing or the exportation of the bunker oil which they carried; it had merely required the licensing" of all commodities desired to be removed from the jurisdiction of the United States." The law on this subject did not distinguish between the exportation of an article of commerce and the taking out of an article which had never been entered at a customs house and had never left the ship on which it came into the territorial waters of the United States.39 The Secretary considered it obvious that there was a wide distinction between necessary compliance with licensing regulations of the United States relating to articles taken out of its jurisdiction, and detention "by seizure, by force or by any such manner."

The cases of these two ships were submitted to arbitration and in 1932 a decision was rendered that the United States did not detain the ships in contravention of Swedish-American Treaties.

SAILING SHIPS

On September 29, 1917, it had been announced by the Exports Administrative Board that clearance would be refused sailing vessels destined to go through the war zone.40 The bunkering rules of January, 1918, had contained a like restriction.41 On September 27, 1918, the practice of the War Trade Board in regard to bunker licenses was as follows:

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1. Sailing vessels would not be permitted to sail from a port of the United States or its possessions, "with any quantity of brass, copper or other similar metals as such."

2. Sailing vessels would not be permitted to sail from a port of the United States or its possessions if carrying "any quantity of petroleum or its by-products or foodstuffs as cargo," unless so stowed in the hold beneath cargo of a different nature as to make it manifestly difficult for removal by a submarine.

3. Sailing vessels would not be permitted to sail from a port of the United States or its possessions, bound for a port on the west coast of Africa north of Cape Palmas inclusive, a European port, a Mediterranean port, or a port of an Atlantic island east of 30 degrees west longitude and north of 4 degrees north latitude.

4. Exceptions to the foregoing rules were as follows: (a) Spanish sailing vessels en route to Spain and Portuguese sailing vessels en route to Portugal, would be permitted to traverse the danger zone if "fully loaded with no objectionable cargo as defined" in para

See p. 91.

Document 276.

Document 315.

Document 397.

graphs 1 and 2. (b) Sailing vessels carrying German safe-conducts would be permitted to sail from ports of the United States to Cette with cargoes destined for Switzerland, if their cargoes "were unobjectionable as defined" in paragraphs 1 and 2.

Rules in regard to the bunkering of unarmed steamers were also set out by the War Trade Board on September 27, 1918. No unarmed steamer would be permitted to proceed independently from a port of the United States or its possessions if the deck cargo included “petroleum or its by-products, food stuffs, brass and copper or other similar metals as such", when the voyage would necessitate navigating waters north of the latitude of Charleston, South Carolina.

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CENSORSHIP OF MAILS

A Censorship Board established on October 12, 1917, maintained a strict censorship on all vessels coming from any neutral country and destined to any other neutral country which stop en route at any port in the United States, as well as all mails on all ships leaving or entering the United States." "

The Secretary of State informed the Minister in Cuba on March 1, 1918, that all mail in transit between Spain and Latin American countries, which was not subject to the censorship of the Allies, was "taken, held and examined " by the censorship of the United States, when vessels carrying mail touched at a port of the United States."5 The Secretary desired that there should be a thorough censorship of all mail touching at Cuban ports, other than mail originating in or destined for the United States which was not subject to the censorship of the Allies.

The Minister reported that the Cuban Government would carry out the wishes of the Secretary. He was instructed on March 13 that Cuba's censorship should be efficiently done under the supervision of the United States. It should be "so comprehensive as to permit at the same time a thorough search of the entire ship, passengers, officers, and crew in discretion of American official." This form of search of all neutral vessels had been carried out for nearly two years by Great Britain, and it was "being done by the United States ". The right of search of neutral mails passing through belligerent territory was discussed by the Secretary of State in a cable of July 5, 1918, to the Minister in Cuba. The views expressed to the Minister could not be presented as views of the Government of the

48 Document 282. "Document 289. 45 Document 331. 46 Document 335. 47 Document 368.

United States but "as grounds upon which a practice of censoring mails may perhaps be justified ".

Secretary Lansing stated that mails were extensively used to transmit merchandise, which might include "money, evidence of indebtedness, etc., comprehending money orders, checks, drafts, notes, and other negotiable instruments, stocks, bonds, coupons, and other similar securities." Mails might thus be used to transmit contraband of war and hostile despatches directly or indirectly to or from an enemy country. If, therefore, a belligerent had a right to prevent the transmission of contraband and hostile despatches, the Secretary believed there was "ample ground" for a belligerent to inspect mails passing between neutral countries in the Western hemisphere and Germany or countries contiguous to Germany, so long as those neutral countries did "not take steps to keep contraband and noxious despatches out of Government mails."

The Secretary concluded that there could be no objection in principle to the censorship of mails. However, there might be objection to dilatory tactics and excessive detention of vessels, or to the abuses of exercising censorship such as the detention of innocent articles and personal letters.

CONTROL OF IMPORTS

The Trading with the Enemy Act of October 6, 1917, provided that whenever during the war the President" shall find that the public safety so requires and shall make proclamation thereof it shall be unlawful to import into the United States" any article mentioned in the proclamation, except under general regulations prescribed by the President.48

Under this authority the President proclaimed on November 28, 1917, that tin, wool, rubber, ferromanganese, leather, flax and jute, and other enumerated articles should not be imported into the United States except under license of the War Trade Board.19 The Board explained in connection with this proclamation that the supply coming to the United States of these indispensable commodities produced abroad was limited by reason of export embargoes imposed by countries controlling the territory in which these commodities originated.50 Governmental supervision of imports, the Board stated, would make possible a more effective scheme of reciprocity among the countries associated together in the war; the Allies would be enabled more effectively to express their willingness to reciprocate, by making liberal shipments of commodities needed by the

48 Document 279. "Document 293. 50 Document 294.

United States in exchange for the "vast quantities of vital supplies " which were being sent to them.

The Board stated that "the various trades dealing in the embargoed commodities " had been or were being so organized that the total requirements of each industry could be accurately surveyed, and a system of control provided which would insure the equitable distribution of the imported commodity. These commodities had been allowed to come to the United States only under guarantees given to representatives of the Allied Governments that they would not be re-exported except under specified restrictions; that they would not be used in trade with the enemy; and that no purchase had been made as a speculation. The plan for licensing imports obviated the giving of guarantees by persons or firms to a foreign government. Persons or firms in the United States would deal directly with their own government in connection with importations.

The President issued a proclamation on February 14, 1918, which provided that licenses would be required for all imports into the United States.51 The War Trade Board announced in regard to this proclamation and one of the same date requiring licenses for all exports,52 that the "critical tonnage situation" had made necessary the instituting of complete control over all imports and exports.58 The two proclamations did not mean an embargo on exports or a prohibition of imports; they placed in the hands of the President the power to regulate and this power would be exercised "with the single purpose of winning the war."

The Board later stated that the chief purpose of the import proclamation of February 14 was to enable the United States to eliminate less essential imports so that additional shipping might be made available for the transportation of troops and supplies to Europe. In exercising import restrictions the United States desired to affect as little as possible the industry and commerce of the Allies," and to work as little hardship as possible to neutrals."

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51 Document 325. 52 Document 324. 33 Document 326. Document 339.

CHAPTER VIII

ENEMY TRADING LISTS

EARLY STATEMENTS OF POLICY

Secretary Lansing stated on April 23, 1917, that he was not prepared to make an announcement in regard to the policy of the Government toward a black list measure. However, he expected that

a "harmonious understanding" would soon be had with the British Government about the general question.

The Law Adviser stated in his memorandum of May 17 that the United States would not accept completely the British and French black lists but would refuse exports to persons in neutral countries who were using the goods in trade for the benefit of the enemy.2 The United States would not prevent imports from black listed firms or payments to them for imports unless the transaction amounted to trading for the benefit of Germany. The United States was in a different position from European countries in regard to such trade with South America, he stated. It could "not afford to arouse the ill-feeling of Latin American countries" nor to lose the profits which accrued from trading with Germans in those countries, profits which helped defray the expenses of the war.

The diplomatic representatives of the United States in neutral countries were directed on June 20 to investigate firms on the British and French "statutory " lists, consulting evidence in possession of Allied colleagues. They were to instruct consular officers to send the Department of State information with respect to firms of enemy nationality or association or activity, firms acting directly or indirectly in enemy interests, and indications that American goods were reaching unfriendly consignees or passing through neutral countries to the enemy. Diplomatic and consular officers were to cooperate fully on the basis of reciprocity with officers of the Allied Governments, exchanging information and furnishing them copies of reports and affidavits "in relation to war matters.' These instructions were explained to a consul on July 17 as not contemplating more than an exchange of information. American

1 Document 250. "Document 252.

Document 258.

'Document 264.

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