the end of calendar years that you would have at sea with this kind of program.

I would like to show you the maximum. We were asked, "What was the maximum number of these that you would be interested in?" I mean that we could possibly do within the capabilities of the shipyards and so on. This then is the maximum. These are capabilities. I show them only as a matter of interest. We could lay down [number classified] submarines next year and [number classified] in fiscal year 1962 and these are the number of missiles at the end of those calendar years which you have to see-can see if you follow these out. (Classified chart.) This is indeed a heroic schedule, but this is a capability.

I would like to just show you this slide to introduce my next subject which is cost.

(Classified comments on future requirements follow.)

We are confident that these submarines, once supplied our country in numbers, can make a very significant contribution to our deterrent needs if it is desired to build them.

I would like to tell you about the cost. This is built upon a 1,500mile system. It does not take into account the 2,500-mile system which would run about [classified]. To get the nine-boat program in its entirety would cost [classified]. This means all the research, development, reproduction base, the actual construction of the submarine, the ship filled with missiles, [classified] spare missiles, the spare parts, the out-loading facility at Charleston, instruction, and training of the crew. The [classified] dollars figures, I would like to point out are hard figures because we are actually under contract. These are not estimates. For about 211⁄2 times this initial outlay you could get the rest of the 45-boat system. In other words you could add 36 boats to it, build additional outloading stations on the west coast and on this coast, 1 tender for every 9 boats. I will show you a breakdown of this.

(Classified comments on costs follow.)

Senator ANDERSON. Admiral, that's very, very fine. I do appreciate that. Admiral Rickover, we always depend on you to give us the-before you start, are there questions of Admiral Raborn?

(A series of questions and answers involving classified matters took place at this time.)

Senator ANDERSON. Very well. Admiral Rickover, you are ready now?

TESTIMONY OF VICE ADM. HYMAN G. RICKOVER, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR OF NAVAL REACTORS, DIVISION OF REACTOR DEVELOPMENT, ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION, AND DEPUTY DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF SHIPS, NAVY DEPARTMENT

Admiral RICKOVER. The Polaris missile is not my business, but Admiral Raborn neglected to tell you one important thing: That the Polaris missiles are prepared for firing by Navy crews and not by civilians. I believe it is the only missile system where, in the test phase at Cape Canaveral, naval personnel do this job. I think that's fine because it's building up an inhouse capability. This is what we have done for our nuclear plants from the very beginning.

Senator ANDERSON. Would you bring us up to date, starting with the Nautilus, the Skipjack, and telling us about this ship now, without the missile?

Admiral RICKOVER. The function of this ship is to fire missiles; the machinery plant exists to serve that purpose. Now, you might ask what is the purpose of the Polaris submarine? It is "to strike fear and terror in the hearts of the enemy." Long ago, in the days before missiles, there used to be a question in the officers' promotion examination in naval ordnance: "What is the purpose of the Navy's various projectiles?" One officer who had been up too late the night before answered: "To strike fear and terror in the hearts of the enemy," and he got by with that.

Congressman HOSMER. There is a remarkable nameplate up here on the bulkhead. It states the ship was authorized after the keel was laid.

Senator ANDERSON. Wasn't the ship originally planned as an attack submarine and later changed?

Admiral RICKOVER. The first three Polaris submarines were originally laid down as attack submarines. In order to expedite the Polaris program, they were shifted to the Polaris type.

Congressman PRICE. This ship was originally the attack submarine Scorpion, wasn't it?

Admiral RICKOVER. Yes, sir; this was originally the Scorpion, one of the three changed over. That is why it has been possible to complete the first Polaris submarine so fast.

Congressman HOSMER. Parts of this ship were the Scorpion? Admiral RICKOVER. Yes, sir; all parts except the middle missile section.

Congressman PRICE. That explains the difference why the keel was laid before the Polaris ship was authorized?

Admiral RICKOVER. Yes, sir.

Senator ANDERSON. When we were in the Skipjack a year ago you brought us up to date on the safety of these nuclear submarines. Do you want to tell us a little bit about the safety now?

Admiral RICKOVER. Yes, sir; the safety of our nuclear submarines is a very important matter. To assure safety obtains both during the construction period and during the testing and operation periods we use the AEC laboratories and their personnel as necessary. The AEC scientists and engineers are directly involved from the very day the ship is authorized. We have AEC laboratory representatives right in the shipyards to help us. We started a new procedure with nuclear submarines where, instead of the shipbuilder operating the plants during the testing period, we require the ships force to do so. I believe Admiral Raborn is doing the same with the testing of the Polaris missiles.

The nuclear propulsion plant is very complicated; we felt it was far more important for the ships force, who will have to operate the plant at sea, to do the operating at the shipyard than it was for the shipyard employees to do so. This new procedure has now been adopted for all nuclear-powered ships.

In addition, we have brought to bear all the talents available in the AEC and its laboratories to help build, test, and operate these nuclear

ships. This procedure, however, runs afoul of the standard Navy system because it is new. There are some elements in the Navy who would like to throw this whole thing back into the system, which means the scientists and engineers from the AEC laboratories would be required to work directly through the Navy supervisor of shipbuilding. This would be very difficult to do and in all probability would not work satisfactorily. So I am faced with the continuous problem of assuring the safety of these ships and getting all the help I can from the Atomic Energy Commission, while at the same time the Navy keeps telling me to throw it all into the routine Navy system. I am afraid that with this sort of sniping we will just not be able to watch safety as closely or as directly as is necessary. Then we will start having trouble with safety. There is a very small margin between a reliable, safe reactor plant, and one which does not work properly and so is a menace.

In the system we now use, the scientists and engineers from Atomic Energy Commission laboratories join with the crews of the ships and with the shipyard people to supervise the testing and to assure that everything goes all right. If a problem or a question arises we get additional qualified people from our AEC laboratories to help us. There is no redtape, they come right away. We can also run tests on the AEC land prototypes or on the computers and critical facilities. It is an outstanding example of fast, close cooperation between two agencies of the Government. The Navy doesn't have facilities and people like this and they can't order the AEC people to do the work. It is and must be a cooperative effort. But it is very difficult, particularly in a military organization to get any new or unusual system adopted or even to keep an existing and successful one alive. The tendency of any bureaucracy is always to derogate and frustrate everything new or unorthodox and move it back into the old system. This is a big problem we constantly face.

Congressman WESTLAND. Admiral, would you care to discuss the security problems?

Admiral RICKOVER. Ever since Mr. Westland saw the plastic model of the Polaris submarine, which can be bought at any dime store, he questioned the propriety of releasing such information. I told him that I not only had nothing to do with the release but that I had recommended against it, because such information is extremely valuable to a foreign power. That information was handed out by the Navy. In fact a sheet of instructions accompanying each of these $2.98 models states that it is built in strict accordance with official Navy blueprints; that the Electric Boat Co. furnished complete and accurate data; that it is a complete and authentic accurately scaled model incorporating all the interior details of the actual submarine. If I were a Russian I would be most grateful to the United States for its generosity in supplying such information for $2.98.

Congressman WESTLAND. Is that right? Is the scale right?

Admiral RICKOVER. Yes; it is right. Of course, there are some deviations, but there is much that is correct.

Senator ANDERSON. Why do we keep it classified if a child can buy it for $2.98? Why can't we talk about it. We are not supposed to say much about the things we know about the submarines. We don't deal with how deep they go. We don't deal with how fast they go.

I don't think those are nearly as important as the actual design. If the actual design is released why do we worry about whether we go below 400 feet or go faster than 20 knots an hour?

Admiral RICKOVER. I agree with you, sir. This is the sort of thing our military services do in a mistaken attempt to build up public opinion for their particular projects. My own experience has been that much of this sort of publicity does no good. The people one must convince are the Budget Bureau and Congress, not the boys and girls who buy the models.

Congressman WESTLAND. You don't believe that that $2.98 job should be for sale, do you?

Admiral RICKOVER. I certainly do not, sir. Further, it is very difficult to get our manufacturers not to advertise and show pictures of various pieces of equipment they build for these ships. Mr. Westland and I had a discussion about this matter and he suggested I talk with Congressman Moss with the object of devising a method whereby we could prevent publicizing this sort of information, yet not have undue classification. This is a serious problem; we should have a more realistic rule on classification to take care of it.

Today we must do much of our work-particularly manufacturing some of our components-on an unclassified basis. This is because we use existing industrial facilities which also make valves, boilers, pumps and the like for other people. We couldn't possibly meet the requirements of the Armed Forces Security Manual for guards, fences, personnel clearances, safes, and so on for all of our equipment made in these factories without inordinately adding to the cost. The alternative under existing rules is to establish large duplicate classified facilities at Government expense just for our work. This would cost millions of dollars so I deliberately chose not to do that. I want to use all the flexibility of our existing industrial capability without needless Government expense.

But because we can't classify those factories we are told by some people that we can't control or limit in any way what is shown or published about our equipment. We are even told we cannot prevent it being licensed for manufacture by foreign companies, even though it is clearly identified as the same design as the equipment used in the U.S.S. Skipjack or George Washington, as the case may be. I don't believe that is the intent of our people or of Congress; I think we can work out a sensible compromise which will provide adequate security for these items and still permit us to do our work without additional large expenditures of Government funds.

Congressman PRICE. This information was released and made available to the toy manufacturer because it didn't reveal any reactor technology. Was just as important information revealed?

Admiral RICKOVER. Yes, sir; the dimensions of the ship were revealed, including the relative size of the reactor compartment and the machinery compartment. I was asked to release this information. I wouldn't do it. But a great deal of information has been released on the details of our machinery plants. I refused to make this public but it was released anyway.

Congressman PRICE. Do you tell a lot of information when you give the size of the reactor compartment?

Admiral RICKOVER. Yes, sir; you certainly do.

Senator ANDERSON. If one model has fallen into the hands of the Russians, or someone similar, why is it bad now to sell additional copies? They got all they want from that one.

Admiral RICKOVER. You are correct, sir; there is no point to withholding the sale of additional ones.

Senator ANDERSON. It is too bad we sold the first one.

Congressman WESTLAND. The only question is whether or not they know that it is as good as it is.

Admiral RICKOVER. Of course there are some errors in it. But a good ship designer can look at that model and quickly learn a great deal. He can spend 1 hour on that model and tell he has millions of dollars worth of free information. It also gives him an idea of how many men he could put into the ship and all sorts of other things. I just wouldn't do a thing like that. I see no reason why we should slave away and spend a lot of money and use up a lot of our talent and then just turn it over to a potential enemy. I'll ask you a question, sir: Can you conceive the Russians doing a thing like that? I certainly would like to have similar information on their submarines. Congressman WESTLAND. It is inconceivable. The whole thing is inconceivable to me.

Admiral RICKOVER. That's the answer right there, sir.

Congressman PRICE. Getting back to the fact that even though it doesn't reveal any information on the reactor itself, it does give some information on reactor technology-aren't you more concerned that those toys are of the Polaris than they are of any other type submarine and that it gives away your whole arrangement on the Polaris?

Admiral RICKOVER. Yes; I personally am aghast that this was done, but our internal military controversy is so great that there is a tendency for each service wholeheartedly to fight the others in order to achieve its own objectives. You know that most of the leaks result from this interservice fight, I am sure.

Senator ANDERSON. I wonder if either or both, rather, of you would comment on this question of testing. How important is future testing in achieving an improved warhead for Polaris

(Remainder of question classified.)

Admiral RABORN. I would be glad to talk on that. We have conducted innumerable studies as to the necessity for large yield warheads and invariably all studies that we have done, and all that I have seen in other services show the accuracy of delivery means more than increases in yield of the warhead. The accuracy of both the land base missile and what we have demonstrated in this system are just short of phenomenal. They are a lot better than we dared hope for. Although really, I think we could have foreseen this because we were shooting for this and could have gotten considerably better.

(A classified portion of statement follows.)

So while we certainly would never be in a position of saying we could not, would not, welcome reduced weight for equivalent yield or improved yield which can come about in increased testing, we are certainly not in the position at the moment of saying we are in dire need of such a thing.

Senator ANDERSON. You don't really need it.

Admiral RABORN. We are not in dire need.

Senator ANDERSON. (This portion of the question is classified.)

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