4

They are admissible to prove identity of persons; identity and comparison of handwriting; resemblance of animals; scenery and all natural objects; buildings; the condition of a street or sidewalk at the time of an accident; the character of an injury to a person; the situation of land with reference to the grade of a street; as accurate copies of public records which could not be withdrawn from the files; to represent the scene of a crime at the time of its commission, and the locality and conditions at a railroad crossing where a collision had occurred.

Skiagraphs, or X-Ray photographs, taken by the X-ray process by an expert, where proved to have been correctly taken and accurately developed, are admissible in evidence when the expert testifies that they are true representations of that portion of the person to which they relate at the time taken, etc. The expert here testified that he was an X-ray expert and was regularly engaged in taking such photographs for physicians; that he took the negative from which the photograph was developed and that he developed the photograph, and that it was an accurate and correct representation of that portion of plaintiff's chest and body, etc. It was intended to show by the skiagraph that plaintiff's heart was displaced; that the walls of that organ had become thick and that an abnormally heavy tissue had formed on the walls of the heart. The testimony of the X-ray expert who had taken the skiagraph tended to show that the picture correctly represented the condition of the heart of plaintiff. Photographs taken by the X-ray process are admissible

• Udderzook vs. Commonwealth,

76 Pa. St., 340.

C. & J. Elec. Ry. Co. vs. Spence,

Vol. XI.-12.

213 Ill., 224, citing 22 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 2nd Ed., 755.

in evidence after proper preliminary proof of their correctness and accuracy has been produced.

SECTION 51. MAPS, CHARTS, DIAGRAMS, SURVEYS.

Maps made by authority of law and filed in the proper office are public documents, and when coming from their legal custodian, and duly certified by him as required by law, are receivable in evidence.

Unofficial maps, showing the place and scene of a crime, when proved to be accurate representations thereof, may be used in connection with the testimony of witnesses in a criminal case." This is for the purpose of better enabling the court and jury to understand the case, by having thus pictorially explained and presented to them the streets, houses, and other surroundings and circumstances connected with the crime, and so that the testimony as introduced may be more easily understood.

It is common practice in the courts to receive in evidence private or unofficial maps, diagrams, models, or sketches, made by the parties themselves for their own private use and convenience, which are shown to be correct representations of places and objects and things which cannot otherwise be as conveniently shown or described by witnesses, as legitimate aids to courts and juries. The correctness or accuracy of such maps or charts need not be shown by the person making them, but any person having knowledge of their accuracy may certify as to their correctness as representations of the locality or objects sought to be shown thereby.

In Lake Street Elevated Railroad Co. vs. Burgess, 200 Ill., 631, plaintiff offered in evidence a pencil diagram or sketch purporting to show the rear end of the front or motor car, the front end of the adPolhill vs. Brown, 84 Ga., 338. ❀ 17 Cyc., 412–413. 'People vs. Phelan, 123 Cal., 551.

joining car, and the platform and opening into which plaintiff claims to have fallen, and also the station platform. There was no writing on the sketch except the words indicating the points of the compass, and the figure "18" in the space between the motor car and the front end of the platform of the adjoining car, and the characters "2 ft." in the space of the platform or entrance of the car back of the motor. Defendant's claim agent was placed on the stand by the plaintiff, and this diagram or sketch exhibited to him, and he was asked as to its accuracy, and he replied, as far as he could tell, it seemed to be correct. Afterwards, his attention was drawn more specifically to the sketch, and he stated that the corner of the motor car did not seem to be quite as rounding in the sketch as it was in fact, and that it gave the appearance of greater space in the space where plaintiff claims to have fallen than was really there, and spoke of other minor inaccuracies. Plaintiff then offered the sketch in evidence, and upon objection by defendant's counsel, the court said: "You offer it as a sketch simply to aid the jury in arriving at or understanding their testimony, but not as a correct sketch of the car. It will not be introduced in evidence. You can use it in making your argument, but not to go into the jury room, except there is no better. It may be used, not as a perfect sketch of the car or the location, but as an aid to the jury in understanding the testimony of the witnesses in respect to the cars." The court further said: "Of course, gentlemen, this is not meant as a picture of the car or the location there—I mean of the location; but any lawyer, or anybody, has a right to sit down with a pencil there and make a sketch of any kind that tends to represent the location and the things in controversy, and that goes in simply

as an aid to the jury. It is not intended except as an aid to the jury."

SECTION 52.

COMPENSATION OF EXPERTS.

The question as to whether an expert witness is entitled to special compensation in addition to the ordinary witness fee provided by statute, and whether he can be compelled to testify in regard to matters calling for a strictly professional opinion, without special compensation therefor being paid or secured to him, is one that has occupied the attention of courts. At common law no witness fees were paid. Costs are a creature of statute, and, in the absence of a statute authorizing it, no fees can be taxed as costs."

In England, by statute,1o a witness must "have tendered to him according to his countenance or calling his reasonable charges."

By statute in some states, experts are allowed special compensation, to be taxed as costs.

In Wright vs. People, 112 Ill., 540, Dr. Wright, a witness, called to testify on behalf of the plaintiff, and, having voluntarily stated his profession as that of physician and surgeon, and having testified as to the conditions he found on the plaintiff, John Finneran, was asked this question: "If one person should strike another a heavy blow on the head, at or near the temple, with that 'billy,' would it, or would it not, be likely to produce upon the person receiving such blow, a condition alike or similar to that in which you found John Finneran?" Witness: "I regard that as calling for a professional opinion, and if so, I claim

3 Blackstone's Com., 369; Con

stat vs. Matteson, 22 Ill., 546; Eimer vs. Eimer, 47 Ill., 373; Smith vs. McLaughlin, 77 Ill.,

596; County Commissioners vs. Lee, 3 Col. Ct. App., 177. 10 5 Eliz., c. 9.

that I am privileged from answering the question until my fee of ten dollars is paid or secured to me; and I would ask the court if that question does not call solely for a professional opinion."

The witness: "Then I refuse to answer it, except upon the conditions I have stated."

The court then asked plaintiff if he was willing to pay or secure said fee of ten dollars, to which the plaintiff replied that he was not, although admitting the fee to be a reasonable charge for such opinion, but insisting that the witness was not entitled to charge any fee other than the statutory witness fee, and that he was compellable to answer the question.

The court to witness: "The court holds that you cannot legally claim such fee, and refuse to answer because the same is not paid or secured to you; and the court orders and directs you to answer, to the best of your ability."

Witness: "Believing the court has no right to direct or order me to answer the question without my fee being paid or secured, I still refuse to answer.

Thereupon the court informed the witness that his refusal to answer was a contempt of court, and that he stood arraigned before said court to answer for such contempt; and again being asked by the court to answer the question, and the witness still refusing, the court adjudged him guilty of a contempt of court for such refusal to answer, and sentenced him to pay a fine of five dollars and costs of the proceeding for contempt, to which defendant excepted.

The Supreme Court, in passing on the question, say: "Having without objection stated the condition of the patient he had visited professionally, the witness