have the private sector invest in more modern equipment. You have t distinguish between the problem of the extra capacity or the extr equipment that is around versus modern equipment that you could us to produce the things for much lower cost. What we would like to do is stimulate industry to make investment in new modern plant equipment and thereby reduce our costs. We hav all this government equipment around and people like you are saying Why don't we use it? If you would put this old stuff out into the fiel and start to use it, you may be saving a few dollars on buying ne production equipment. But the cost of the end items that you ar buying is much more expensive. That is the trade that we are goin through. Representative MITCHELL. Mr. Gansler, it seems to me that yo simply reemphasized what I alluded to earlier. Had there been a con prehensive plan for conversion into peacetime following World Wa ÌI, that equipment wouldn't be sitting there because the disposal of i would have been a part of the comprehensive plan. Had such a pla existed following the Korean war and the war in Vietnam, we wouldn be sitting on a stockpile of nonproductive equipment. I know my time is up, but I simply wanted to make that commen to stress the importance of developing, right now, a comprehensiv plan for conversion from peacetime to wartime, to a kind of in-be tween time. We don't have it, and each year that passes that we don have it, we create a monster like this. Mr. GANSLER. Your point is correct, sir. We have been selling i off. We have disposed of, since the peak of the Vietnam period, some thing—well, we had then about $211⁄2 billion worth out in the privat sector, and we are down now to on the order of $1.2 billion. So w have actually gotten rid of about half of it during that time perio just since Vietnam. This is the stuff that is in the private sector. Th majority of the rest of it is at government installations or is part o the reserve for war. I personally agree with you that we would rathe have that segment modernized, or be new equipment in use, than simply sitting ready. In terms of being able to get it rapidly on stream it will be more difficult if it is sitting in storage. So we would much prefer to have it in use than sitting idly. It is just hard to use it all in terms of the reduced amount of things that we are buying. Representative MITCHELL. Thank you very much. Senator PROXMIRE. Thank you very much, Mr. Gansler, for mos responsive and helpful testimony. We appreciate it. [See Additional Questions for the Record, appendix III, pp. 135 148.] Our next witness, is Mr. Thomas K. Jones, program and produc evaluation manager of the Boeing Aerospace Co. Mr. Jones, we are happy to have you here. Accompanying Mr. Jones are Mr. John Potter, director of facilitie for Boeing, and Mr. Edwin York, a specialist in nuclear effects. STATEMENT OF MR. THOMAS K. JONES, PROGRAM AND PRODUCT Senator PROXMIRE. You are Mr. Jones, is that correct? Senator PROXMIRE. And on your right is? Mr. JONES. On my right is Mr. Potter, and on my left is Mr. York. Senator PROXMIRE. Go right ahead, sir, we are happy to have you. We have a copy of your statement, and we are very interested in hearing it, and I might also say that your very helpful exhibits which you` attached to your statement will be printed in full in the record. Mr. JONES. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. Senator PROXMIRE. Would you pull the microphone a little closer, Mr. Jones, because it is hard to hear. Mr. JONES. On behalf of the Boeing Co. I want to thank you very much for the opportunity to present our views on industrial survival and the findings of the study we have conducted on this subject. We have prepared for your committee a detailed study report that we hope will be useful to you. See appendix II, page 55.] It is most timely that your committee has taken an interest in this matter. The growing emphasis on industrial survival in the Soviet Union, coupled with the present lack of such emphasis in this country, could have far-reaching consequences with respect to the future security of the United States. I recognize, of course, that Americans find it difficult to believe that civil defenses could provide effective protection against nuclear weapons. In our country there is widespread belief that nuclear war inevitably would destroy both the United States and the Soviet Union, and that it might bring the end of mankind itself. The avoidance of war, however, does not necessarily depend upon what Americans believe. It depends upon what the leaders of the Soviet Union believe, even if their belief should be ill-founded. We have only to look back at World War II, and perhaps even Korea, to recognize that a set of invalid assumptions can lead an aggressor into a war he neither wanted nor expected. The threat of mutual assured destruction will provide an effective deterrent only if the Soviet rulers believe that the threat is indeed mutual. Examination of Soviet literature reveals, however, that the Soviets do not subscribe to the West's concept of assured destruction. On the contrary, there is a growing body of evidence that the Soviet Union is preparing to survive and to recover from nuclear war should such a war occur. The most important ingredient in industrial recovery is the survival of the work force. The Soviet Union's published plans and observed preparations make it clear that the Soviets intend the bulk of their work force to survive should a nuclear war occur. The best defense against nuclear weapons is to be somewhere else when they go off. Therefore, the Russian attempt is to employ a combination of evacuation and shelters. Although about half of America's nuclear arsenal should survive a first strike by the Soviet Union, the surviving weapons could destroy people unprotected against blast, thermal, and prompt radiation effects, in, at most, 3 percent of Soviet territory. Evacuation, because it distributes people over a comparatively large area, allow them to survive. The United States could, by foregoing half the effectiveness of its arsenal against industrial facilities, spread a lethal level of radioactive fallout over 15 percent of the Soviet Union. However, the evacuees will dig simple shelters to protect against this possibility. The decay rate of that radiation intensity would, within a week, permit the Russians to be out of their shelters for at least an 8-hour workday in 97 percent of their territory. [See page 203.] Our own analyses, results of which are shown in figure 6 of the report [see page 641. confirm the validity of Russian estimates of population survival. Even if their city dwellers merely walked out of town for 1 day and then dug shelters, they would be very, very well protected. With an established plan, Americans could also survive a nuclear attack, although they would face a more severe radiation problem. However, about half of this radiation problem is due to the capability of the Soviet backfire bomber force, a potential that could be largely eliminated by air defenses. The Soviets also appear to have planned well for the survival of their industrial facilities. Again, dispersing over a large area is the most effective form of protection. During the past decade, the Soviet Union has located more than three-fourths of its new industry outside of its large cities. Furthermore, confirmed observations show that adjacent factories are separated to insure that a single U.S. warhead cannot destroy more than one, and even the buildings in a single complex have been rather widely separated. We have estimated that destruction of an entire Soviet complex would require eight times the megatonnage needed to destroy a typical U.S. complex with the same building area. The Soviet civil defense manuals also provide for a number of ways to protect the critical production machinery within the factories. A book written by A. A. Gromov, hero of Socialist labor and director of the First State Ball Bearing Plant, outlines how these protective methods are being applied to his factory. It was this aspect of the Russian industrial survival program that was the least amenable to evaluation through purely statistical analysis. It was also this which seemed to hold the most practical potential for application by U.S. industry. Therefore, in an internal planning study which we initiated. in 1975, we concerned ourselves principally with protection of the tools of industry. As I have implied, our objective was twofold: First, to evaluate the effectiveness of Soviet preparations and second, to determine the feasibility of such measures applied to U.S. industry. Our research method was to duplicate the Russian planning processes and protective methods as outlined in their manuals and in the factory manager's books. This task was assigned to Mr. Gromov's U.S. counterpart, Mr. Jack Potter. We then selected Boeing's high-technology manufacturing complex at Auburn, Wash., as a model, and set out to dete whether we could insure the survival of its large and costly mac As an additional step, we considered the application of these ures to an urbanized industrial region, using the Seattle-Tac Everett area as a model. The study team considered all of the protection methods spelle in Soviet literature, and determined that the easiest way w uniquely Russian one: simply packing the machinery in sandba earth. Figure 24 in the document we have provided you [See p shows how they would go about this. That figure was excerpted an unclassified report of a training exercise in a Soviet factory, because most of the U.S. weapons are relatively small, this me would be fully adequate for Russian factories. It would protect aga fire, debris, and blast pressures up to about 80 pounds per square i However, since American factories would need protection aga high-yield 1 megaton weapons, our study team looked for someth better. We determined, finally, that the most effective yet practica way to protect a machine is to surround it completely with a la of crushable material, such as foamed plastic or the metal chips t are a readily available byproduct of machining operations. This sho insulating layer would then be overlaid with soil or sandbags to p tect the machines from fire and debris. Moreover, the soil layer wou form an arch or a natural bridge that would protect the machi against the blast pressure. Time studies indicate that work crews cou protect all vital equipment at the Auburn facility within a few day by using another Russian method: shovels and wheelbarrows. To confirm the validity of our calculations, we have conducted number of tests. In a series of static tests, starting with some simp tests conducted in a farmyard, and concluding with burial of a pr cision machine, we checked out the principle of earth arching and th effects of earth settling and corrosion on machine components. Nex we were permitted to emplace a variety of small industrial compo nents in the vicinity of a 5-ton high-explosive blast conducted by the Defense Nuclear Agency at Holloman Air Force Base. None of the tested components failed. A more conclusive test, which was sponsored by the Defense Nuclear Agency at White Sands missile range on October 6th, subjected larger machines to a high-explosive shot equivalent to 500 tons of TNT. This shot produced the kind of shock and blast effects that we would get from a nuclear explosion. We tested six different sets of components, each representative of machinery with different structural characteristics. We set them on styrene blocks, packed them in bags of aluminum chips, and covered them with varying depths of soil. These test articles were placed around the explosives so that they experienced various overpressures ranging from 80 to 600 pounds per square inch. We have assessed the damage to each of these items. As expected, the amount of damage varied with the type of equipment represented and the amount of protection provided and, of course, with the blast pressure to which each was subjected. The results are noted briefly in the document prepared for the committee. It is interesting to note, however, that a large grinding machine survived 200 pounds per square inch with only a slight dent; all working parts appeared un damaged. A gas-powered minibike was successfully protected against a blast pressure of 600 pounds per square inch, and a soil heave of 112 feet; after the test, it was dug out, started and driven away. In brief, the results of this test indicate that industrial machines, if properly protected, can survive within a few hundred feet from a 40 kiloton nuclear blast, or 2,000 feet from a 1 megaton. [Our printed statement, sir, was in error. That should have been 1 megaton, not 2.] These protective measures, if applied to the Seattle-Tacoma-Everett metropolitan area, could permit resumption of some production operations as early as 4 to 12 weeks after a nuclear attack, depending on the level of radiation intensity. From our study we have concluded that the Soviet civil defense program can effectively protect the industrial base of the Soviet Union and could facilitate a relatively swift recovery from a nuclear war. Further, if the observed examples of Soviet industrial dispersal and separation of their industrial buildings represent the pattern for Russia's future capital expansion, Soviet industry would require little or no preattack hardening in order to survive and recover quickly. By quickly, I mean 2 to 4 years compared with about 12 years for the United States. We believe that the Soviet preparations substantially undermine the strength of the concept of deterrence that forms the cornerstone of U.S. security. We believe further that they have effectively circumvented the protection the United States thought it had obtained through the ABM Treaty. It seems logical to conclude, then, that these defensive preparations, when combined with the increasing power of Soviet strategic offensive forces, have in fact destabilized the strategic relationship between the two nations. Under such a condition, the so-called balance of terror tilts significantly in favor of the Soviet Union. In any future confrontation, should the Soviet execute their civil defense plans, the consequence of further escalation would be disastrous to the United States, while it might well be tolerable to the Soviets. The most probable outcome of such a situation is not nuclear war; it is more likely to involve increasingly costly concessions by the United States in order to avoid such a war. In my personal view, these Soviet war survival capabilities make it imperative that the United States make some critically important policy decisions. We can choose to try to make nuclear war as unthinkable for Russia as it now is for the United States, or we can try to make it as survivable for the United States as it row is for Russia. Addressing the second option, we see no technical or economic reason why the United States cannot build an effective civil defense or survival capability. It is therefore recommended that the Congress give strong consideration to a program for the protection of both American citizens and the industrial capacity that provides the quality of life enioved by Americans. This course could permit the United States to maintain its security for less cost and with less nuclear weaponry than would otherwise be required. It could also reduce the temptation for Soviet adventurism. Thank you very much. 79-247 77-3 |