Defense Industrial Base: Industrial Preparedness and Nuclear War Survival : Hearings Before the Joint Committee on Defense Production, Congress of the United States, Ninety-fourth Congress, Second Session, November 17, 1976
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977 - Defense contracts
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aircraft American Answer assessment assumed attack become believe billion blast Boeing buildings capacity cities civil defense committee components concerned CONGRESS THE LIBRARY considered continue contractors cost cover critical damage defense industry Department destroy destruction deterrence dispersal economic effective effort emergency equipment essential estimates evacuation example facilities fact factors Figure forces foreign further GANSLER going hardening important increase indicate industrial base industrial preparedness initiated JONES kind LIBRARY OF CONGRESS limited machine machinery major materials measures military mobilization nuclear operation peacetime percent period planning plants population possible potential preparations present probably problems procurement production protection Question recovery reduce relatively Representative response savings sector Senator PROXMIRE shelters soil Soviet civil defense Soviet Union strategic surge survival tion United warheads weapons
Page 195 - The CPSU has always held and now holds the class struggle between the two systems — the Capitalist and the Socialist — in the economic, political and also of course In the ideological spheres will continue. It cannot be otherwise, because the world outlook and class aims' of Socialism and Capitalism are opposed and irreconcilable.
Page 7 - the commercial market, when compared with the cyclical nature of defense business, and more recently, the post-Vietnam era of decreasing defense procurement has made defense business unattractive to many suppliers. Additionally, the myriad of government policies, and the restrictions of government practices, act as disincentives to many potential suppliers.
Page 56 - ... vulnerability has been reduced by deliberate policies, apparently adopted largely for military reasons, of locating three-quarters of new Soviet industry in small and medium-sized towns. The civil defense program also provides for evacuation of some industry and materials in time of crisis. In sum, the ability of US nuclear power to destroy without question the bulk of Soviet industry and a large proportion of the Soviet population is by no means as clear as it once was, even if one assumes most...
Page 198 - Grechko asserted that It was precisely the change in the correlation of forces in favor of socialism and the process of the relaxation of tension taking place on \ this basis which prevented the dangerous eruption of the war in the \ Near East from assuming dimensions threatening universal peace.
Page 195 - Is to achieve a power posture such that ". . .no question of any Importance In the world can be solved without our [Ie, Soviet] participation, without taking Into account our economic and military might.
Page 174 - The underlying reality is that at no point since the 1930's has the Western world faced so formidable a threat to its survival. As then, the military balance is deteriorating, but the trend in large measure goes unnoticed because the Soviets today, though expansion minded, speak in less bombastic and threatening terms than the Nazis did." ("A Testing Time for America,
Page 137 - The cost-reimbursement type contract is suitable for use only when the uncertainties involved in contract performance are of such magnitude that cost of performance cannot be estimated with sufficient reasonableness to permit use of any type of fixed-price contract.
Page 32 - We believe these Soviet preparations substantially undermine the concept of deterrence that forms the cornerstone of US security. We believe further that they have effectively circumvented the protection the United States thought it had obtained through the ABM Treaty. It seems logical to conclude, then, that these defensive preparations, combined with the increasing power of Soviet strategic offensive forces, have in fact destabilized the strategic relationship between the two nations.