selves impart. In other words, the court declined to take into account the fact that the property insured would temporarily be removed from its usual place of location in the course of its ordinary employment. Since the policy expressly covered the property only while in a particular building, it was held not to cover it when situated in any other location.

2. Lines 7 to 10 of the standard fire policy provide that: "This entire policy shall be void if the insured has concealed or misrepresented, in writing or otherwise, any material fact or circumstances concerning this insurance or the subject thereof; or if the interest of the insured in the property be not truly stated herein; or in case of any fraud or false swearing by the insured touching any matter relating to this insurance or the subject thereof, whether before or after a loss." Following this clause many other acts are mentioned which, unless provided for by agreement indorsed on the policy, will make the entire policy void. This section of the policy draws attention to the importance of furnishing the company with a correct statement of the description of the property either before or after a loss as well as a true statement of the insurable interest which the insured possesses in the property covered. As stated before, the fire-insurance contract must be viewed strictly as a personal contract which insures the owner of the property rather than the property itself. In fact there is no contract in which one party, the company, is so absolutely at the mercy of the other party as in fire insurance. For this reason the entire policy is justly held to be null and void in the case of misrepresentation or fraud.

Aside from this phase, however, the above clauses also direct attention to an important doctrine in fire insurance, usually designated the doctrine of the "entirety or inseparability of the contract." This doctrine applies in cases where more than one item of property is insured in the same policy. It is a very frequent occurrence that several items of property, such as several buildings, or the building and the stock of

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goods within the building, are covered by the same policy. Where this is done, it has been held by the courts in the great majority of states that if the premium is paid in one sum the policy is to be considered as a unit and inseparable. This means that if a policy covering several items of property is violated as regards one of the items the policy will also become null and void as regards all the other items.

Numerous cases may be cited to illustrate the operation of this doctrine. One of the most important cases upholding the doctrine is that of McQueeny vs. Phoenix Insurance Company, 52 Arkansas, 257. According to the facts of this case the Phoenix Insurance Company insured two buildings under one policy, the policy containing a clause that if during the term of the insurance the above mentioned premises should become vacant or unoccupied, except as specifically agreed in writing upon the policy, then the policy shall cease during the period of vacancy or unoccupancy. At the time of the fire one of the dwellings was occupied, whereas in the other no one was living. Both properties were destroyed. The insurance company acknowledged its liability on the building that was inhabited and paid the loss, but claimed that the policy was void as regarded the vacated building. The insured, on the other hand, took advantage of the doctrine of the entirety of the contract and maintained that the two dwellings were insured under one indivisible contract, and that if the company acknowledged liability for the loss of one of the buildings it therefore was also liable for the loss of the other. This was the view taken by the court, and, in all probability, if the company had refused payment on either of the buildings, it would have been absolved by virtue of this same doctrine from liability on both risks.

Again, in the case of Gottsman vs. Pennsylvania Insurance Company, 56 Pa., 210, the policy covered two items of property, namely, a building and the personalty within the building. The policy contained a provision to the effect that

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company must be informed of certain incumbrances on the property, and it happened that in this connection the owner of the property had incumbrances on the building unknown to the company, but had not violated the policy with reference to the personalty insured. Both items were destroyed, and the insured, while admitting that he was not entitled to any indemnity for the building, attempted to collect the value of the personalty, arguing that he had not violated the policy with reference to this item. The court, however, did not allow the claim, holding that the contract was a unit, and that if violated in respect to any one item it was also violated as regards all the others.

In recent years certain courts have emphasized the view that a policy of insurance should be interpreted with reference to the purpose of the contract. Thus, in the case of the Connecticut Fire Insurance Company vs. Tilley, 88 Va., 1024, the court did not permit the application of this doctrine. In this instance the policy covered sixteen tenement houses and contained the usual vacancy clause. At the time of the fire eight of the houses were vacant and eight were occupied. The company claimed that, since the policy was inseparable, and since its provisions had been violated as regards some of the items insured, there was a forfeiture of the policy as to all the items. The court thought differently however, and held that the indemnity was good as to those buildings which were occupied and void as to the others. "We think," said the court, "this decision substantially just to both parties, and in nowise conflicting with legal rules. There were sixteen different and distinct risks, all written as a matter of convenience in one policy. Under any other ruling the court would have been obliged to settle one way or the other, and this would have involved a gross injustice to one party or the other, and in no way have given legal effect to the well-understood intention of the fire insurance contract."

In criticising the many court cases which have been rendered with reference to the doctrine of the entirety of the contract, it seems that the nature of the property should be taken into consideration. If the several items covered under one policy are widely separated and not related to one another in such a way as to be, lost in a single fire, it would seem fair to both insured and insurer that the doctrine of the inseparability of the contract should not apply. On the contrary, if the several items of the property insured, such as a building and the contents within the building, are so related to one another that a fire in the one item will imply danger to the other, then it is clear that public policy should require the enforcement of the doctrine of the entirety of the contract. Not to do so would greatly increase the moral hazard. An example may serve to illustrate the application of the doctrine of the entirety of the contract in instances of this kind. Thus let us assume that a person owns a building and stock within the building worth $10,000 each, and both are insured under the same policy for $20,000. Let us now suppose that the owner procures additional insurance on the contents of the building for an amount greater than its value and without informing the first insurer. It will be apparent that by allowing the owner to thus increase the insurance on his personalty an increased moral hazard attaches to the entire property, because there is an inherent connection between the contents of the building and the building itself; if one catches fire the other is also likely to burn. Now if the policy is held to be divisible, and that part which relates to the building could not be forfeited by disobeying the terms of the policy as regards the personalty, the owner of the property might easily secure overinsurance on the personalty with a view to running the risk of not being discovered, and feeling that even if he were discovered he would still be sure of his indemnity on the other item. This would imply a wrong to the insurance company, since it would be deprived

of the security which had been especially provided for by the terms of the policy.

3. Lastly, the standard fire policy provides (lines 45 and 46) that "if an application, survey, plan, or description of property be referred to in this policy, it shall be a part of this contract and a warranty by the insured." To give added force to the information furnished in any application, survey, plan, or description of the property, and to protect the company as fully as possible against fraud, fire-insurance policies usually declare all such information to have the effect of a warranty. This brings us to a distinction between "representations" and "warranties." In probably no business is this distinction of such a vital importance as in insurance along all lines. Again and again the life-insurance policy calls the attention of the insured, usually in large print, to the fact that his answers in the application blank shall have the effect of warranties, and are made a part of the contract. The marine-insurance policy is also literally filled with provisions and indorsements which are declared to be warranties. Now why this emphasis? If a statement given by the insured is to be construed as a mere "representation" it need only be substantially correct, and before there can be a forfeiture the company must not only show that the statement was false, but that the falsehood was of material consequence, that is to say, was a material factor in inducing the company to accept the risk or to fix the rate. If, on the contrary, all statements are declared to be warranties, as is done in the standard fire policy, it means that they must be absolutely and literally true, and that there will be a forfeiture if the company can show that the statement was false, irrespective of the materiality of the same. By declaring the application blank or any plan or survey or description of the policy a warranty, the company relieves itself of the difficult burden of proving the materiality of the same, and its burden of proof is limited to showing that the statement was not cor