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vs. Brown, 82 Tex., 631, it was held that "the knowledge of a broker, acquired in effecting insurance, is not the knowledge of the company that issued the policy, even though the risk was secured at the request of such company.

Liability of the Company for the Acts or Knowledge of Sub-Agents and Clerks.—While there is not a unanimity in all the decisions, the weight of authority is to the effect that the insurer is liable not only for the acts of its agents, but also for the acts and knowledge of the sub-agents and employees to whom it has delegated authority. In insurance it is a common practice, and is frequently found necessary, for the agents to employ others to assist them in their work, and having delegated their authority to them, the courts have regarded it as "just and reasonable that insurance companies should be held responsible not only for acts of their agents, but also for the acts of the agents employed within the scope of their agents' authority." While it may be argued that the company has not authorized its agents to delegate their authority to others, and that it would therefore be an unreasonable extension of the company's liability, it must be remembered that agents are employed by the companies in accordance with the usages and necessities of the business. While the company may not expressly have authorized its agents to delegate their authority, it did know or should have known that according to the general usage or necessity of the business, these agents would be obliged to employ others to assist them in their work.

Wolff, in his "Law of Insurance Agency," states the principle as follows: "A clerk who is authorized by the agent of a fire-insurance company to solicit insurance, is sufficiently the agent of the company so that notice to him of a material fact connected with the risk is notice to the company."

'Wolff's "Law of Insurance Agency," p. 135. Also see many legal citations mentioned on this page,

Again he states, as decided by the Supreme Courts of Illinois and New York,1 "a clerk of an insurance agent, who keeps his books, conducts his correspondence, receives and collects premiums, solicits business and fills in blank policies (without signing them) may bind the company by consenting to the premises insured being vacant."

1127 Ill., 365; 51 N. Y., 117.

CHAPTER VII

THE DESCRIPTION OF THE PROPERTY INSURED

THREE sections of the Standard fire policy refer to the description of the property which is covered by the policy. The first of these refers to the description of the nature and location of the property; the second relates to the effect upon the validity of the policy of concealment or misrepresentation in any matter pertaining to the insurance; and the third provides that any application, plan, or description of the property shall be a warranty and constitute a part of the contract.

1. With reference to the description of the character and location of the risk, the standard policy provides that the company insures "to an amount not exceeding $...to the following described property while located and contained as described herein, and not elsewhere, to wit;" and then follows a blank space of considerable size in which may be written the description of the property insured. Nothing could seem more definite than the above statement, and one would anticipate but little controversy as to its proper meaning. The importance in fire insurance of the location of the property is well recognized, and it is a well-established doctrine that an insurance policy covering property in a certain specified place will not follow the property on its removal to a different location. Yet some courts have qualified this general doctrine, and, while admitting that the location of the property is an essential feature in the contract, hold that it must always be viewed with reference to the character of the property, the primary object for which insurance was

taken, and the reasonable use to which the property must necessarily be put. Thus where a policy insures a stock of goods as contained in a specified place and "nowhere else to wit," the policy will be held to cover this property only while located in the described building, and the insurance will not follow the property if removed to another locality. If, on the contrary, however, the property is of such a character that it must necessarily be moved from place to place, the presumption is made in many states that the exact location of the property is a matter of subordinate importance which must be viewed in the light of existing circumstances.

As an instance, where the section of the policy concerning the location of the property was interpreted leniently with reference to the character of the property, we might mention the case of McClure vs. Girard Fire and Marine Insurance Company, 43 Iowa, 349. The property destroyed was a vehicle which was insured along with other property described in the policy as contained in a certain building and "nowhere else to wit." The vehicle in question, however, had been removed to a carriage shop for repairs, and while in this new location was destroyed by fire. The company denied the claim on the ground that the property had been moved, and that its removal had increased the risk because the danger of fire to property while contained in the repair shop was greater than in the building specified in the policy. The court, however, viewed the policy with reference to the character of the property and rendered a decision favorable to the insured in the following words: "It may be conceded that the situation of the property is mentioned in the policy as a fact affecting the risk. The words describing the situation must be regarded as a warranty, not only that the property was contained in the building but would continue so, and if at the time of the loss the carriage was not contained in the building within the meaning of the policy we do not see how the plaintiff can recover. But what is meant by the

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term? The material fact was that the carriage when not in use was kept in the building described as its ordinary place of deposit. The words which are used must be construed with reference to the property to which they applied. Carriages which are kept for sale and are insured as contained in a single warehouse could not be removed to a different warehouse without voiding the policy. There is nothing in the nature of the property to indicate that they will be removed and the insurance is not made with reference to such facts. But where a person procures a policy (as in this case) on horses, harnesses, and carriages as contained in a certain place, the presumption must be that they are in use and that the policy is issued with reference to such use. . . Each policy must be construed according to the intention of the parties as manifested by all its terms. We are of the opinion, therefore, that while the words 'contained in a specific place' are words relating to the risk and constituted a warrant that the carriage would continue to be contained in the place designated, they mean only that the specific place described was their place of deposit when not absent therefrom for temporary purposes incident to the ordinary uses and employment of the property.

As representing the other view may be mentioned the case of Village of L'Anse vs. Fire Association of Philadelphia, 119 Mich., 427. Here the village had insured all its fireextinguishing apparatus under a standard fire policy. The property was insured in a given building and "not elsewhere to wit." While being used to extinguish a fire the apparatus was completely destroyed, and the company denied the claim on the ground that the property according to the terms of the policy was covered only while located in the specified building. In deciding the case the court took a view opposite to that given by the Iowa court, and held that the words of the standard fire policy are unambiguous and not susceptible to a construction other than that which the words them

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