Alliance and defense capabilities in Europe: hearings before the Subcommittee on Conventional Forces and Alliance Defense of the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, One Hundredth Congress, first session, August 4; October 7, 20; Novemeber 3, 17, 1987

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Page 168 - They aim at fixed values; but in war everything is uncertain, and calculations have to be made with variable quantities. They direct the inquiry exclusively toward physical quantities, whereas all military action is intertwined with psychological forces and effects.
Page 111 - ... initiatives. Reducing impediments to even greater international industrial cooperation and increasing industry input in government-to-government cooperative negotiations should be priorities for NATO defense planners. -- A crucial no-cost first step to unleashing private industry cooperative initiatives is a thorough review of US government technology export licensing procedures. viii As the European allies move toward the inevitable merging of defense acesodyne and the creation of a common armaments...
Page 177 - Balance: 1985-1986 declared that our conclusion remains that the conventional overall balance is still such as to make general military aggression a highly risky undertaking for either side. Though possession of the initiative in war will always permit an aggressor to achieve a local advantage in numbers...
Page 70 - Members of the Committee: It is a great pleasure to appear before you today to discuss the subject of health care reform.
Page 66 - Mr. Chairman, it is a great pleasure for me to appear before you and Senator Cotton and Senator Boggs once again.
Page 152 - Why the Soviets Can't Win Quickly in Central Europe', International Security, Vol.
Page 79 - Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, I just have a couple of questions. Joe, of the 68 agencies filing end of the year statements for 1983, 61 of them reported their agencies...
Page 73 - ... there would still appear to be insufficient overall strength on either side to guarantee victory.
Page 215 - ... Today that [force] equates to a little less than seven divisions, whereas before, we were looking at that [same force] as a 12-to-14 division front. So 12 to 14 divisions might well be there, but they're not all going to be shooting at once because [of] the terrain and geographic limitations." Perhaps this reasoning underlies the general's claim that with "the total NATO capability available to Central Army Group, the first echelon of the Soviet forces is going to have a whale of a time doing...
Page 220 - America's allies are more reliable than the Soviet Union's. Western active-duty units generally receive more training than Warsaw Pact units, and Western training is by and large much more realistic. It draws on more combat experience and the accumulated expertise of militarily skillful friends — Israel, for example. Finally, according to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, NATO enjoys a substantial technological lead in many critical military areas. Last June, for instance, General Charles A. Gabriel,...

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