one very onerous—and which I shall have occasion hereafter to mention.

In the second place, in consideration of a release by France to the United States of her claims to indemnity for seizures and condemnation of French vessels and cargoes, made by us in our quasi war with France, as it has been called.

Thirdly, in consideration of having immense property released, then under seizure in the French tribunals, but not then condemned.

And lastly, and above all, in consideration of having by a new treaty our vast commerce, as it then was, put on a safe footing; and which was followed by a flood of commercial prosperity without a parallel in this, or, perhaps, in any other country.

All these great and valuable objects, and some of them of incalculable value, were obtained to this country, entirely by the release to France of her responsibility for these claims; and without any other earthly consideration whatever. This release was the whole of the purchase money paid for these objects. A release from the guarantee alone would have been a cheap purchase, at the whole amount of these claims. That guarantee was, by the treaty, a perpetual guarantee; and it was hanging like a millstone to the neck of this country. It exposed us to become a party to every European war to which France should be a party; or to a violation of our treaty obligation to France; or to the making of a full pecuniary indemnity to France for its non-fulfilment.

Feeling its oppressive weight, our Government, to purchase an exoneration from this guarantee, offered to France a war-annuity of two hundred thousand dollars in perpetuo; but this France rejected, as wholly inadequate to its value; nor would she define the amount she would accept as an equivalent.

As to the claims of France for account of captures and condemnations of her vessels and prizes, and their cargoes, made by the United States in the quasi war before mentioned, including claims for violations of her treaty privilege to the exclusive protection of our ports to her vessels of war, of her privateers, and their prizes, they amounted to many millions; and these many millions were released, as well as the guarantee.

The property then under seizure in the French tribunals, but not then condemned, and which also was released, probably was not less in amount than the whole which had been condemned.

Indeed, as to the value of the arrangement obtained at the sole expense of these petitioners, it was literally incalculable. The great riches of this country, at least the riches which have produced the great riches of this country, I consider as wholly due to this arrangement. It was the spring-head, the fountain-head, of our great and extraordinary commercial prosperity which followed that event. The honorable gentleman from Massachusetts, now in the chair, is now a merchant; he was then a merchant; his experience extends to the whole history of our commerce under the present Government; he knows whether I say this without the authority of facts to warrant me. I would gladly appeal to him, as I would to every other merchant of our country of the like experience, to say whether I am in error in ascribing to our arrangement with France, the origin and impulse given to our great and extraordinary commercial prosperity from that time.

Now, can it be a question whether the release of these claims to France, under these circumstances, and for these considerations, was, or was not, ipso facto, an assumption of them by the United States? And whether justice requires that they should be paid by the United States? It would seem to me to belan affront to that natural sense of justice which is common to all men, to un

[JAN. 5, 1835.

dertake, by a formal argument, to prove a moral prop. osition, which proves itself to every moral mind; and such this proposition obviously is. What! can my property be taken by my trustee and agent, and applied to his own use, and he not be responsible to me for that property? Who has ever said this? Who ever will say it, speaking on the forum of conscience?

These great and incalculable benefits to the whole country were obtained at the sole cost of these claims. Who will say that it would be right that a few citizens, comparatively, should bear the whole cost of these acquisitions made for the whole country? But even if they were willing to do this, and offered to do it, would it be proper, would it comport with the dignity of the country to permit such a thing to be done? Would she not say to them, in that spirit of magnanimity which gives character, and by which character is ennobled: " have obtained great and incalculable benefits to myself, by means of your property, intrusted to my hands at my request; but I cannot consent to owe these benefits to your bounty, nor to hold them as a gratuity at your hands. You must permit me to reimburse the property belonging to you, but which I have appropriated to my own use. Nor will I slander your claims for the purpose of depreciating and reducing your indemnity; still less will I higgle with you about the contingent value of your claims, by speculations upon the character of your debtor, and your chances of recovery as against him. It is enough for me that your claims have been paid to me by your debtor, and to my satisfaction. Here is your indemnity, take it; your complete indemnity."

If, in such a case, such should be her language, what ought it to be in this case, when these few citizens appeal to her justice, and ask that their property, taken for the public use, should be reimbursed from the public purse? Are we, who are that country, to be deaf to that appeal, especially when we remember that justice always is the true, as it always ought to be the standing policy of all Governments, and especially of free Governments; that there is no security like it for their peace and stability, that it is the great source of their respectability in the eyes of foreign nations; that it is the great ligament that binds the Government to the hearts of the people; that virtue is conservative in its nature; that it has in it, and carries with it, the principle of immortal life; that vice, on the contrary, is corruptive, and tends, by its own nature, to produce dissolution and death; that ethics have their eternal truth in the necessary relation of things, and bear upon the destinies of States, as well as upon those of individuals.

But various objections have been made to these claims; some now, and others on former occasions: some of them specious and plausible on the first appearance; but none of them, on examination, I trust, will be found to have in them any intrinsic difficulty. Most of them go to the claims in toto, and some of them to the claims as set up; that is, to the principle of a full indemnity. Such of them as appear to me to call for notice I will endeavor to notice; and the others I shall beg leave to pass over in silence. Such, for instance, as that of the honorable gentleman from New Hampshire, [Mr. HILL,] who tells us, that our merchants, whose vessels and cargoes were condemned, may still go to France for their indemnity; and various others from the same quarter, all equally well founded.

I include in this class one which the gentleman has borrowed, I presume to increase his original stock. It would be respectable, if the quarter in which it originated, and from whence it was borrowed, could make it so: but unfortunately it is one which no name can make respectable. It is this: that the vessels and cargoes so condemned were ensured, in whole or in part; and that so far the ensurers now stand in the shoes of the original

owners. As if the bona fide owner of property by legal assignment was not as much the owner as the assigner had been; and as if he did not succeed to all the legal rights of the assigner. Or, as if the fact of ensurance would make it right in the French Government to condemn those vessels and cargoes; or, if not, and they had paid for them to our Government, would make it right in our Government to retain the money to themselves, and to their own use.

But to proceed to the objections to be noticed, and to the explanations to be given.

It has been suggested that indemnity to these claimants, if indemnity is to be awarded, is to be estimated by the contingent value of these claims as against France herself; and upon the calculation of the chances for and against their being paid by France. Pray, having deprived these claimants of these chances, without their consent, and for our own benefit, what right have we to determine for ourselves the value of these chances, and arbitrarily to put them at a discount, and at what discount we please? But if we had this right, what standard can we have for this mode of liquidation? France certainly has always had the ability to pay. She never has denied her obligation to pay. Will you make, then, your opinion of her sense of national honor and good faith the scale of calculations on these chances, and for the liquidation of these claims? Will you undertake to fix a price current to the national faith of France, and the rate of its discount in the market of the world? Will you say that its discount shall be so much, or so much, twenty-five per cent., or fifty, or seventy-five, from its par value? This, indeed, would be a curious business for the national Legislature to be engaged in, and in the face of the world, and while settling such a claim as this is with our own citizens.

Have not these claimants a right to say to us: "We had so much property in the hands of France; we had a just claim to indemnity for this property; a claim acknowledged by France to be just; asserted by yourselves to be just; France, in a settlement with you, has paid to you the full amount of that claim-now, what right have you to say to us that we are not entitled to the full amount of that claim, when you have received the full amount? or what you considered as an equivalent to the full amount? You ask us to settle these claims at a discount-pray, were they paid to you at a discount?" Suppose we were before some judicial tribunal; we as defendants, and these claimants as plaintiffs, litigating this question. Should we dare to admit that we had received payment in full of the plaintiffs' claim, as their trustee and agent, from their debtor; and yet contend that we were not accountable to the plaintiffs for that amount? and upon the suggestion that the plaintiffs themselves, and by themselves, might never have recovered the claim of their debtor? Or, if we had the hardihood to contend this, would that tribunal hear us allege the bad credit, or the bad faith, or the bad any thing else, of France, as an excuse for not paying this claim to these claimants which France had paid to us? Might this tribunal not say to us:

[SENATE.

Will it now be said, in answer to this, that what we have received for these claims is not equivalent to their amount? This has been said; and, moreover, it has been said, and is now attempted to be proved by argument, that we have received no value whatever for the surrender of these claims. This is, indeed, the real battleground of the opponents to this bill; for all their objections, which have any the least plausibility in them, terminate in this ground. As this is so, I hope the indulgence of the Senate, if I should dwell at some length on this ground, and though at the expense of some unavoid. able repetitions.

In the first place, then, I say that we are precluded from saying that we have not received value for these claims, and adequate value, too, by the acts and declarations of our own Government. For when Spain claimed to be released from private claims for captures and spoliations, because France had been released from similar claims, our Government said, in reply, (Mr. Jefferson was then President, and Mr. Madison Secretary of State :)

"The claims from which France was released were admitted by France; and the release was for a valuable consideration, in a correspondent release of the United States from certain claims on them."

These are the very words of our Government in that reply. The claims were admitted by France, and the release was for a valuable consideration in a correspondent release.

Again: all our negotiations with France, and our final agreement with her, consummated by treaty, suppose and go upon the ground of mutual claims and mutual releases, for reciprocal and adequate considerations to each party.

But if we were to waive all this, and go to facts, what we have received for these claims, not equivalent to their amount! Why, if the value of what we have received was to be the measure of what we are to pay, for one, I should shudder at the result against our treasury. In my opinion it would exhaust our revenues for years to come. True, it is difficult to estimate and define the amount of that value, but it is easy to see that it must exceed, very far exceed, the amount of these claims. Of the guarantee I have spoken-of the tremendous consequences it was likely to draw after it to this country-of the high estimate put upon an exoneration from it by our Government-of the still higher estimate put upon its retention by France. Instead, then, of repeating what I then said, I will put this case: Suppose France should now say to us, renew to us this guarantee, and we will pay these claimants to the last cent of every claim, where is the man in this body, or in the councils of this nation, who would accede to the offer? The truth is, no pecuniary consideration to any amount whatever would induce us to reassume the obligation from which the property of these claimants has purchased our release.

But it is said, in answer to this, that we had previously been released from this guarantee; for that the treaty containing it had been declared void by an act of Congress.

Who will say that this rebuke by this tribunal would be improper, and not merited?

Will gentlemen now set up an act against these claims which is not only void in itself, but which their own Government has discarded, and disregarded, as being void, in treating with that very Government against whom it was passed, and was intended to operate?

But, again, it is said further in answer to this, that war abrogates all treaties, and that we had previously been at war with France, and that this guarantee was terminated by that war. Here, too, gentlemen who say this should recollect that war, to have this effect, must be open war; and that this was not an open war. By our constitution, we cannot make open war but by a declaration of war to be made by Congress; and certainly no such declaration was made.

It is true, France might have considered our hostilities as open war, and met them accordingly, if she chose so to consider them; but she did not so consider them. It was expressly stated by the French ministers to our ministers, "that France did not consider herself at war with the United States." These reciprocal hostilities were considered by both parties, as they were denomi nated to be, a quasi war; that is, as what might have terminated in an open war, but which did not so terminate; that extremity being prevented by an amicable agreement between the parties, consummated by a treaty. And that treaty, what was it? Was it a treaty of peace made to terminate a war? No, by no means; no such thing-nothing like it; it contained in its inception a mutual recognition of claims to indemnity for captures and spoliations. Did a treaty of peace, made to terminate a war, ever contain such a stipulation? Never; it finally, in its completion, contained a mutual renunciation of claims to indemnity for captures and spoliations. Did a treaty of peace, made to terminate a war, ever contain such a renunciation? Never; it was, as it professed to be, simply a convention to settle differences between the two Republics; and it is so described in the treaty itself. The guarantee then was a subsisting guarantee, and but for this new treaty, must still, at this day, have subsisted as a burden upon this country.

By the treaty of alliance, too, France had the exclusive privilege to the protection of our ports to their vessels of war in time of war, to their privateers, and the prizes of both. After our treaty with England in 1794, we deprived, and by that treaty we were obliged to deprive France of this exclusive privilege. This was done flagrante bello, and while France was in the actual exercise of this privilege. This treaty privilege was to continue twelve years; and, as it turned out, these twelve years, with short intervals, were twelve years of war. Was it a smail matter to be released from the claims growing out of this violation on our part of the treaty of alliance, founded as they were on the forcible privation of a treaty privilege, certainly of great value to France? and, what is worse, on which she would have a right to put her own estimate? As to this estimate, we were at the mercy of France. From these great and these vexatious, because indefinite, claims, we were released by this new treaty, procured at the sole expense of these petitioners.

Again: have we forgotten, especially those of us who are old enough to remember, the captures of French vessels of war and privateers, and their prize cargoes, and their condemnations by our courts, under our own acts of legislation, by which they were authorized, in the quasi war so often mentioned? France claimed indemnity for the property so captured and condemned; and our commissioners admitted the legitimacy of the claim on a final settlement with France by treaty. These captures were numerous, mostly they were valuable, and some of them of very great value. In one instance, the sales of one capture amounted to six hundred thousand dollars. In Rhode Island alone, I believe, the condemnations were not less than a million of property; but, owing to our mode of settlement with France, we have not the means before us of knowing the aggregate amount of these claims; we have no reason to doubt, however, it would have been very great, probably not much less han the whole amount of this appropriation.

[JAN. 6, 1835.

Again: the property that was then under arrest by the French tribunals, but not then condemned, is not that to be taken into the account? Our commissioners, in their correspondence with our Government, alluded to this consideration as one of the most urgent nature, from the critical situation of this property, and from the immensity of its amount. Its confiscation would have gone far towards giving a finale to the further prosecution of our foreign commerce. Now, these claims were the jettison by which this immense property was rescued from destruction, and by which the total wreck of our foreign commerce was prevented. Who will say that the loss of the property sacrificed to save immense property to our merchants from confiscation, and to save the foreign commerce of the country from extinction, and by which both were saved, shall be borne alone by the owners of the property so sacrificed? Who will say that these objects were no value received, or not adequate value received for these claims? Have not this body of citizens, these petitioners, a right to say to us, "credite me; not, indeed, Lesbos et Tenedos, and the others of the twelve cities of Apollo; but credite me, the immense property rescued from the fangs of the French revolutionary tribunals? Credite me, the rich harvests for years of the most prosperous commerce that this country ever enjoyed, or perhaps any other."

Now, when we look to this long array of considerations, to their several and to their aggregate magnitude, all of which were received by us solely by releasing to France her responsibility for the claims of these petitioners, who can say that what was received by us was not a full equivalent for these claims, even to the last cent of every claim? and that the claimants are not entitled to receive their indemnity accordingly?

The indemnity proposed by the bill is $5,000,000; with this, I understand the claimants will be content. I am persuaded it will not much exceed one-third of the claims released, and of which they have now been deprived for more than thirty years. Can this pittance of indemnity be denied to them? Your votes must determine.

When Mr. ROBBINS had concluded, on motion of Mr. KNIGHT,

The Senate adjourned.

TUESDAY, JANUARY 6.

FRENCH RELATIONS.

Mr. CLAY, from the Committee on Foreign Relations, to which had been referred that part of the President's message, appertaining to our relations with France, made a report, which concluded by a resolution, "That it is inexpedient at this time to pass any law resting in the President authority for making reprisals upon French property, in the contingency of provision not being made for paying to the United States the indemnity stipulated by the treaty of 1831, during the present session of the French Chambers."

Mr. CLAY then said that he should propose to make this report and resolution the special order for as early a day as might be agreeable to the Senate. He would say this day week. He then moved that the report be made the special order for this day week, and printed.

Mr. TALLMADGE rose and said that he concurred in many of the views conveyed in the report; there were others, however, from which he dissented. He had no doubt that the treaty was of binding obligation on France; and the refusal of the Chambers to make an appropriation to carry it into effect was a violation of the implied faith of nations. He could not concur with the report in its views of the supposed effect of Mr. Rives's correspondence on the deliberations of the Deputies.

He had no doubt as to the right of Congress to act upon the subject at the present moment in the manner recommended by the President. With the full knowledge that the French Chambers would convene much earlier than was supposed by the President when he sent in his message, it would have been better that the committee had postponed their report, and awaited the further action of France in relation to the treaty. Such had been his desire. He thought that if the report were made the order for this day two weeks it would be sufficiently early.

Mr. CLAY replied that it was very true that the reeport did not meet with entire concurrence in the com=mittee, nor did the resolution with which it concluded. But, as had been very properly remarked by the Senator from New York, this was not the time to enter into that question, or to discuss the merits of the report. The only question now to be considered, was that of designating a proper day for making the report and resolution a special order. He was of the opinion that the sooner Congress expressed its opinions on the subject of our relations with France, and particularly as to the recommendations in the President's message, as well on account of the commercial interests of our citizens and the premiums of ensurance, as the amicable relations which have so long subsisted between the two countries, the better it would be for all parties. He was also of opinion that if Congress should not determine on authorizing reprisals against France, as recommended by the President, the sooner it was known on the other side of the water the better. He could not know, nor could any human being foresee, what would be the effect of the President's message when it should be known in France; or what France might do when she heard of this threat to make reprisals. If she chooses, said Mr. C., to fall into a passion at once, she might do this, or that, but he would say that it would not be the most prudent course for her to pursue; but if she listened to the dictates of prudence, she would wait until she saw what would be done by Congress towards carrying out the views of the President.

It was with these impressions that he (Mr. C.) was of the opinion that it was the duty of the committee to report without delay, and to recommend to the Senate as early a day as possible for the consideration of the report. He did not know that there would be any discussion on the report. We (the committee) are for doing nothing, at least for the present. If the gentleman [Mr. TALLMADGE] or his friends contemplated proposing any affirmative measure-any immediate action of Congress-there would undoubtedly be a discussion. But be this as it may, he felt it his duty to resist a further postponement of the order of the day than the one he had named. He did not apprehend any delay of the printing of the documents. He would engage that the printers would have them on the tables of the members in two or three days at the farthest.

The motion of Mr. CLAY, to make the report and resolution the order of the day for this day week, was then adopted, and the papers were ordered to be printed.

Mr. POINDEXTER then moved that twenty thousand extra copies of the report and resolution be printed. Mr. CLAY said he would suggest five thousand, thinking the number moved by the Senator from Mississippi too large to be distributed.

Mr. POINDEXTER considered this question one of the most important that now agitated the country, and it was most desirable that the views entertained by this enlightened committee should be as widely disseminated as possible. He therefore was of opinion that the number proposed by the honorable chairman was not suffi. cient. Though the report would undoubtedly be spread upon most of the public journals, still it would be in a

[SENATE.

garbled form. The Post Office report was one of great importance; but, for his own part, he thought this one was of much more importance; and he thought that twenty thousand copies were as few as ought to be printed.

Mr. CALHOUN said he should vote for the largest number proposed. He had heard the report read with the greatest pleasure. It contained the whole grounds which ought to be laid before the people, that every one might judge for himself. He desired that every thing connected with this important subject should be laid before the nation. Of all calamities that could fall on this country, he should consider a French war, at this time, and on this question, the greatest and the most to be deplored. Under these considerations, he should vote for twenty thousand copies.

Mr. EWING stated that he should vote for twenty thousand copies, as the document was one of the highest importance, and the number was not too large for distribution.

Mr. PORTER said he should also vote for the largest number named, coming, as he did, from a State which felt particularly interested in the question. He was extremely desirous that his constituents should be put in full possession of all the information relative to this very important matter. There could be no doubt that, unless the French Government carried the treaty into effect shortly, France and the United States would be gradually drifting into a position in which it would require all the circumspection and forbearance of both nations to prevent those results which would be greatly to be regretted. We sympathized as we ought to do with public opinion, and it was right that it should be sounded. And, in order to effect that purpose, it was proper that the people should have correct and full information laid before them. The honorable Senator from Mississippi was perfectly correct when he stated that a great many persons do not take newspapers, and those who did would not pay that attention to them that they would to any thing in pamphlet form. It was only in the large papers that such a report as this could appear in full; for in the small ones room could not be found to give place to the whole document, the editors of which would be compelled to give extracts only, and in doing so they would be biased by the political opinions they entertain. He should vote for twenty thousand, though he should have preferred thirty or forty thousand copies.

Mr. HILL asked the ayes and noes; which were ordered.

Mr. CLAY said he should yield to the suggestions of his friends, and vote the larger number.

Mr. LEIGH said he should vote against the larger number, solely because he entertained the opinion that, if twenty thousand copies were ordered, they could not be printed and distributed in less than four months.

Mr. PRESTON said he most heartily concurred in the views thrown out in this report, as far as he could collect them from the mere reading. From what he heard, he was of opinion that the document should be as widely disseminated as possible. We ought unquestion ably to avoid going to war, with any nation, by all honorable means; and he was more disposed to avoid a war with France than with any other Power. He was strongly impressed by the views taken by the committee, and considered them sufficient to satisfy the people, as at present advised, that we can honorably and justly avoid war with France; that there was no present occasion for hostilities, or for those measures which would necessarily involve a state of war. He concurred most fully in the reasonable conclusion to which the committee had come, not to act on a contingency which might occur or not, but to look to the state of things as they

actually exist at present. He would not anticipate events which, if they unfortunately occurred, might place the country in a condition in which she might be compelled to adopt an attitude of hostility. Whether we were brought into that condition in consequence of a misconception of the Executive as to the true policy of the country, or by the exercise of the constitutional power which the Chamber of Deputies possessed to refuse an appropriation, it would be our duty to bring to the cause whatever of energy and patriotism we possessed, to defend the honor and the rights of the country, whoever may be the opponent, and whatsoever the risk. Concurring as he did in the sentiments of the committee, and professing his profound respect for the wisdom exhibited in the report, he was anxious that the document should be spread through the country as widely as possible. But the largest number proposed would be more than Senators would be able to distribute. Thinking so highly of the report as he did, he would not have voted against the large number without this explanation. Extracts would be published in the different papers, garbled to suit party views, and he would be glad if the honorable Senator would modify his motion so as to make it ten or fifteen thousand.

Mr. EWING hoped the honorable gentleman from Virginia would be satisfied when he told him that the printer would get the report out in two or three days, and have the whole twenty thousand printed in two weeks.

Mr. WRIGHT should vote against printing twenty thousand copies, not because he entertained any doubt that the report would not be read, for it was a document which would go more rapidly through the country than perhaps any other that had been printed for some time past. He was not ready to admit that any considerable portion of the citizens of this country were out of the reach of information in reference to measures of this importance, and about which the feeling of the country must be anxious until it receives the documents from us. He should vote against the larger number, for the cause assigned by the gentleman from Virginia, [Mr. LEIGH.] He knew, by experience, that when a large number of copies had been ordered of any document, it came to that section of the country in which he lived so old that the information it contained was not then sought after, and he could not dispose of the document. It was, indeed, entirely useless, and the public expense for that object was without utility. He had remarked, with some mortification to himself, that the printing account of the Senate, for the last year, was very large; and it convinced him that there was a manifest inutility in ordering such large numbers. Why, the Post Office report did not reach (the whole number to which he was entitled as a member of the Senate) him until the 1st of October. And at this period he got many replies from his constituents, stating that they had already seen the information which he had just communicated to them. This document was one which would be vastly interesting to every citizen of the country; but still he was of opinion that the usual extra number of five thousand copies would be sufficient.

Mr. PORTER and Mr. EWING explained as to the facility with which extra copies might be disposed of.

Mr. POINDEXTER observed that it would give him great pleasure to concur with his friend from South Carolina, [Mr. PRESTON,] but he did not think that the labor of distribution would be so great as that intimated by him. There was another view of the question, of great importance, which should be well weighed and considered. In all questions relating to peace and war, the judgment of the people of this country ought to be given before they were decided. If one department of the Government should differ from another on such im

JAN. 6, 1835.

portant questions, the people should be well informed as to the causes of this difference, in order that their sentiments on the subject may be distinctly ascertained. If, said Mr. P., we have the sensibilities and sympathies of the people with us, in case of a controversy with a foreign Power, all will go well; but if we are not sustained by them, we should not carry on the contest so happily. He was for putting the people in possession of the fullest information on this all-important subject, for the purpose of obtaining their solemn decision as to the difference between the President and the committee of this House. The message of the President had been widely disseminated, and it was due to the people that the contrary views of the Committee on Foreign Relations should also as fully be displayed to them.

Mr. WRIGHT inquired of the gentleman from Mississippi if he recollected what number of copies of the President's message had been ordered to be printed by the Senate.

Mr. POINDEXTER said he had not spoken as to the number of the messages printed, because every member had had it in his power to obtain as many copies as he wanted. He did not deem the question of the gentleman from New York had any weight to vary the question before the Senate.

Mr. BIBB admitted that this document was one of great importance to the people, and therefore should be widely disseminated, not only in this country, but also across the water. He trusted that many copies would find their way into the Chamber of Deputies. He would wish that every member of the State Legislatures might have a copy, and he could dispose of one hundred in that way among the members of the Kentucky Legislature. The question was then taken, and decided as follows: YEAS-Messrs. Bell, Bibb, Calhoun, Clay, Clayton, Ewing, Frelinghuysen, Hendricks, Kent, Knight, Mangum, Moore, Naudain, Poindexter, Porter, Prentiss, Robbins, Silsbee, Smith, Southard, Sprague, Swift, Tipton, Tomlinson, Waggaman, Webster-23.

NAYS-Messrs. Benton, Black, Brown, Buchanan, Grundy, Hill, Kane, King of Georgia, Leigh, Linn, McKean, Morris, Preston, Robinson, Shepley, Tallmadge, Tyler, White, Wright--19.

MAPS OF THE PUBLIC LANDS.

The resolution submitted yesterday by Mr. WRIGHT was taken up for consideration:

Resolved, That the Secretary of the Treasury be requested to report to the Senate the progress which has been made in his Department under the resolution of the Senate of the 28th of February, 1823, directing to be prepared and laid before the Senate maps of the several States of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Mississippi, Alabama, and Louisiana, and of the Territories of Michigan, Arkansas, and Florida; whether the said maps, or any number of them, have been completed according to the directions of the said resolution; what is the state of advancement upon such of the said maps as have not been completed; whether the means are in the possession of the Department to complete the said maps; and whether any of the said maps heretofore completed and laid before the Senate have since been posted up, so as to conform to the existing condition of the public lands; and to what date each map has been so posted up.

And Mr. WRIGHT having submitted the following amendment, it was agreed to; and the resolution, as amended, was adopted:

"And also to report the names of the several persons who have been employed by the Department as draughtsmen upon the said maps; the dates from which to which each person has been so employed; and the rates of wages, and the amounts paid to each, respectively, for such services."