for assuring adequate economic growth and full employment, the effects of major technological developments on the economy at large, and the functions of wages, prices, and profits in the economic system are all matters of vital interest. Yet unless their contextual relationship to collective bargaining is understood they can only too easily be ignored. If unions and managements are to give consideration to these broader national interests, they can do so only within a framework of reliable information concerning the state of the economy, reasonable expectations as to the future, and a frank interchange of opinion between union, management, and Government representatives as to the significance of these data for industrial relations. We have proposed, and the President has approved, the convening of periodic conferences of labor, management, and public officials under Government auspices which will be addressed to national and international influences affecting economic problems. Conferences of this type should help clarify the context for responsible collective bargaining and develop a more informed viewpoint for future negotiations. They will obviously not provide formulas for the disposition of matters at issue between parties engaged in negotiations. Nor do we believe that such formulas would be desirable or in the interest of preserving free collective bargaining. But conferences of this kind can apprise the parties of relevant governmental objectives and policies and also provide an opportunity for industry and labor spokesmen to offer constructive recommendations to the Government. B. Fact finding Procedures Should Be Improved There are areas in which the assistance of third parties in the collective-bargaining process can be useful. One such area is in developing the facts pertinent to agreement. Fuller cooperation by labor, management, and Government in developing and making available pertinent data can facilitate sound and equitable collective bargaining decisions based on reason with a minimum disruption of operation. There is obviously no magic formula for placing questions about the need for and pertinency of particular facts beyond dispute; such questions frequently are an integral part of the bargaining itself. Other aspects of the par ticular relationship between the parties may also have a legitimate bearing on questions of factual disclosure or development. Factfinding approaches, including questions as to whether and under what circumstances a joint endeavor might be most helpful, must of course be left to the parties themselves in the natural development of their bargaining relationship. Yet, factual data, always valuable, can be of greater value than heretofore recognized at the early stages of negotiations. In preparation for negotiations the parties might jointly determine what information is relevant to issues which have been or are likely to be raised. If the facts sought are in the public domain, or obtaintable through public agencies such as the Bureau of Labor Statistics, Department of Labor, or the Bureau of the Census, Department of Commerce, a joint request should be addressed to such agencies as far in advance as possible, specifying the data desired. At other times it is likely that the facts sought relate to company or industry operations and must be developed by the parties themselves. We recommend greater experimentation by the parties with techniques of factfinding by jointly appointed outside experts or by personnel drawn from their own staffs. 78-505 0-67-pt. 2-9 C. Other Forms of Third-Party Assistance Can Be Used to Good Advantage Third-party expert assistance goes beyond its use solely in fact finding. While the objective is for the parties themselves to reach agreement, on any issue concerning which this difficult proves or impossible we believe they may make effective use of various available private techniques in order to achieve agreement. Calling on third parties for private mediation, recommendations on all or some crucial issues, comparative analysis of a particular problem, or voluntary arbitration-these are well-known and worthwhile techniques. They may be used singly or in combination as well-intentioned parties may agree would suit their purposes under the given circumstances. The form of third-party assistance is secondary to the parties' willingness to enlist such assistance. Whether they obtain it from Government or from some private agency, or whether it takes the form of mediation, factfinding, recommendations, or voluntary arbitration is less important than the good faith of the parties and their willingness to let it function in their mutual interest. We do not in any sense imply that the use of third-party procedures is a preferable objective, or that the use of third parties will lead to more desirable long-range relationships or sounder settlements. These are only supplementary procedures. The central emphasis must be on the development of bilateral relationships based on sufficient maturity, sophistication, and judgment to enable the parties to work out solutions appropriate to their particular circumstances. Responsibility flourishes best in an atmosphere of self-reliance. D. Strengthening of the Public Mediation Process Will Contribute to Both the Effectiveness and the Responsibility of Private Collective Bargaining In all but relatively few exceptional cases the Federal, State, and local mediation services provide the only appropriate form of governmental service. At the national level the National Mediation Board renders these services in the railroad and air transportation industries, and the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service in other industries. Local service and intrastate industries are in many instances serviced by State or city agencies. Mediation can be of great help in encouraging more forthright use of reasoning and persuasion, and in disabusing an overly suspicious party of the impression that the other has come to the bargaining table with ulterior purposes. This ! service is not easily performed, and, as many experienced mediators agree, it would be we to develop means of imparting greater vigor and influence to the function of mediation a greater help in collective bargaining. We understand that in order to function more effectively, the Federal Mediation and Conclation Service currently has plans to raise the professional status of its mediation staff, to participate actively at an earlier stage in the mor difficult and important cases, to make more us of panels of mediators, and to establish the national labor-management panel provided for in the Taft-Hartley Act, while continuing to remain an entirely voluntary process. We als suggest that regional counterparts of this pane' could be of help. IV. Present Procedures for the Handling of Critical and National Emergency Dis putes Should Be Improved, in the Light of Experience, To Promote Both Free Collective Bargaining and the National Interest In the case of major disputes, involving whole or important segments of critical industries, extraordinary measures may be found necessary. Nor mal mediation may prove unequal to the task of removing a strike threat or ending an actual strike It is our view that the emergency dispute pr visions in the present law can and should be m proved to cover more adequately the necessities of these situations. Extraordinary measures should be applied with great restraint, and only when no other means are available to protect the national health and safety Whenever it becomes necessary to place restraints or inhibitions on the freedom of the parties t pursue what they consider to be legitimate obie tives, it is imperative that methods be provided for equitable solution of the disputed issues. The Committee accordingly recommends. place of the present emergency dispute provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act, the following proce dures: (1) The Director of the Federal Mediation a Conciliation Service would have the authority to recommend to the President the appe ment of an Emergency Dispute Board in a collective-bargaining situation in a major r critical industry which may develop int dispute threatening the national health or safety. This board would be authorized to mediate between the parties and to recommend procedures or techniques to them which appeared conducive to settlement. The board should work closely with the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service. When deemed necessary the board could seek authorization from the President to make, and would be empowered with his approval to make, recommendations to the parties as to terms of settlement of the issues in dispute. The members of this board would represent the public, it being recognized that in certain cases it would be advantageous to include members with labor or industry background. The board could be appointed at any stage in the negotiations, and the decision whether to set up any such board would rest with the President. (2) The President would be authorized to direct the Emergency Dispute Board to hold a hearing on the question of whether a strike or lockout or threatened strike or lockout in a major or critical industry threatens the national health or safety. Upon receipt of the board's report, the President would be authorized to determine whether such threat exists, and to declare, if he so finds, the existence of a national emergency. On the declaration of such emergency, the President. would be authorized to direct the parties to continue or resume operations in whole or, to the extent practicable, in part, until agreement regarding the dispute was reached, but in no event longer than 80 days. The President's declaration of emergency should be subject to judicial review at the instance of any affected party. (3) Upon such declaration of emergency, the board would be authorized to continue mediation as between the parties, to make findings of facts regarding the issues in dispute and related matters, and to make recommendations to the parties and the public at the President's discretion regarding settlement of these issues, including any recommendation which might appear appropriate regarding the effective date of any adjustment in previous terms and conditions. The board would also be authorized to make recommendations at any time to the parties regarding any changes in terms or conditions of employment which in its judgment should be put into effect during the 80-day period on a concurrent or retroactive basis.* Mr. Meany, Mr. Dubinsky, Mr. Harrison, Mr. Keenan, Mr. McDonald, and Mr. Reuther: The proposal that the board would be authorized to make recommendations to the parties regarding any change which in its judgment should be put into effect during the 80-day period on a concurrent or retroactive basis seems ineffective and illogical. If the President has authority to order the employees to continue or resume work for 80 days, he should have authority to order whatever terms and conditions of employment he finds to be equitable. 5 (4) We recommend eliminating, in view of its demonstrated ineffectiveness in the past, the last-offer ballot procedure contained in the present law. (5) If, despite the efforts of the Emergency Dispute Board, it appeared likely that there would be a strike or lockout at the expiration of the 80-day period, the President would be authorized to refer the matter to Congress, with his recommendations for appropriate action. Even though the additional governmental powers recommended are mild compared with other suggestions which have been made for dealing with critical and national emergency disputes, we regret that a further intervention by Government into free collective bargaining is necessary. Nevertheless, inasmuch as the welfare of vast numbers of our citizens who are not directly concerned in these disputes is involved, and the economy of the country is often adversely affected, we conclude that there is a clear need for more effective governmental action under existing circumstances.** V. Summary We reaffirm the principle of free collective bargaining. We emphasize the need in these trying times for greater social responsibility on the part of industry and labor. We counsel a more effective use of collective bargaining with maximum reliance being placed on the processes of persuasion and reason. We urge the employment of imaginative meas. ures to strengthen the mediation services so that they may serve the parties better. We urge the parties to explore so far as prarticable other voluntary means of avoiding needles deadlocks, for they are in the best position to de velop instruments suitable to their conditions and problems. We recommend, regarding disputes affecting the national health or safety, the establishment of in proved procedures which recognize the ultimate and overriding public interest. ADDENDUM Some among the Committee members feel strongly that there is today a concentration of power in certain unions which results in the impairment of effective collective bargaining and in the substitution of power for reason in this process, and accordingly constitutes a major threat to industrial peace. Other Committee members have pressed with equal vigor the view that whatever danger there is from concentration of economic and financia power has developed basically on the corporste side and that protests against "labor monopoly" are essentially distorted. The view of the substantial majority of the Committee is that this matter warrants special study which will permit a thoroughgoing and deliberate examination of this issue, but that the present report-containing so much of important consensus should not be held up awaiting this study. The Committee has accordingly decided to proceed with the proposed study and to make it the subject of a subsequent report. It is appropriate, at the same time, to include here the statements filed by several of the Com mittee members regarding this subject: **Mr. Ford: The present national emergency provisions have had remarkable success in fulfilling their intended purpose. I would confine changes to eliminating the requirement for a vote on the employer's "last offer." In my opinion, the remaining changes indicated here would weaken the whole concept of free collective bargaining, and would not help to alleviate national emergency strikes. To extend the scope of sanctioned intervention to any "major or critical industry" would set up a standard that is undesirably vague, and that seems to me clearly to be broader than the concept of disputes imperiling the national health or safety now embodied in the law. Orders to continue or resume operations should be issued through judicial process, as at present, rather than at the discretion of the President. Factfinding boards with power to recommend terms of settlement would be both unjustified and unwise. I do not agree with the statement that this provision is necessary because the act, as it now stands, limits the freedom of the parties to reach settlement in their own way. The act only postpones strikes and lockouts; it does not prohibit them. The past performance of the factfinding-with-recommendations approach is not impressive. The record indicates that its use severely weakens collective bargaining and is likely to lead ultimately to compulsory arbitration. Joseph L. Block The occurrence of national emergency disputes is, in my opinion, due in large part to the monopoly power which enables a single union (or a combination of unions) to call a strike that brings to a halt all, or the preponderance, of the production in a vital industry. Surely, the possession of this power is not in the public interest. It should, therefore, he curbed by law, just as Congress has protected the public by enacting the antitrust laws to prevent business from having monopolistic powers. And, naturally, any such law should apply equally to management (in respect to lockouts) as well as to unions (in respect to strikes). The enactment of such legislation would go a long way toward eliminating the need for governmental intervention in collective bargaining, though the public interest would still need protection in special situations such as defense operations and vital links in our transportation facilities. Our primary objective must always be the preservation of our free society, but we should be mature enough to do this without impairing the health and safety of our people or our Nation's posture in world affairs. Indeed, these latter objectives are essential in order to make our freedom secure. Arthur F. Burns Labor disputes which involve a nationwide industry commonly have their origin in the monopoly power of private groups. If the power of monopolies, whether of business or labor, were sufficiently curbed by law, there would be little or no need for the larger intrusion of Government in collective bargaining recommended in this report. Both our Nation's traditions and its future greatness require a forthright attack on the problem of private monopoly power. Since the Committee plans to study the relationship of concentration of labor and management power to the development of national emergency situations, I regard the recommendations of the present report as being subject to later revisions or qualifications. Henry Ford II See separate statement. Mr. Meany. Mr. Dubinsky, Mr. Harrison, Mr. Separate Statement by Henry Ford II to the Report on "Free and Responsible Collective Bargaining and Industrial Peace" I concur heartily in the endorsement of free collective bargaining contained in this report. I agree that the collective-bargaining process has, in general, an impressive record of accomplishment. I feel strongly that free collective bargaining must be preserved, that it must become more responsible and work consistently with the national interest. I believe that collective bargaining must be free and responsible; not free if responsible, as the report seems to suggest in both section II and section III. Whatever reforms may be advisable, now or in the future, must be undertaken within a framework of freedom. In a democratic society, the need for reform cannot serve as justification for the elimination of freedom. I do not believe that an increase in the activity, the influence, and the power of the Federal Government in the actual processes of collective bargaining would be in the public interest. I am concerned that the proposed changes in the emergency dispute provisions of the TaftHartley Act would dangerously enlarge the role of the Federal Government in collective bargaining, and I have expressed my disagreement with them in a footnote to the text. It is difficult to understand how the advocacy of a more dominant Government role in the collective-bargaining process, by these and other proposals, can make for more freedom in the process. Our present method of reaching private decisions by labor and management is one hallmark of a free economy. The present method can, I believe, be made more efficient and more effective not by creating a more dominant role for Government but by bringing into better balance the respective roles of labor and management. Both the results of collective bargaining over the past decade and the increasing tendency of Government to involve itself in collective-bargaining situations demonstrate, I am convinced, that present policy toward collective bargaining grants excessive power to labor unions. In a free economy, market-wide collective action can be permitted only in special circumstances and should be subject to continuing scrutiny and review. The market scope of business enterprises, acting either alone or in combination with other businesses, has long been circumscribed by common law and by statute and is under continuous review 7 |