CONTENTS Page A policy for national emergency disputes. 1. The nature of emergency disputes..- 2. The method of S. 2999; a comparison with Taft-Hartley provisions. JULY 2 (legislative day, JUNE 27), 1952.—Ordered to be printed Mr. HUMPHREY, from the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, submitted the following REPORT [To accompany S. 2999] The Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, to whom was referred the bill (S. 2999), to amend the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, as amended, having considered the same, reports favorably thereon with amendments, and recommends that the bill, as reported, do pass. PURPOSE OF THE BILL This bill is designed to provide the Government with a comprehensive and flexible plan for averting stoppages of work and operations resulting from labor disputes which may shut off supplies or services essential to the national security and for contributing to their settlement. This bill would supplement not supplant the present provisions of title II of the Labor Management Relations Act. As reported, this bill is the outgrowth of extensive hearings in which testimony was sought and procured from outstanding Government, labor, and business leaders and others with rich experience in industrial relations. Four separate and comprehensive revisions of the bill were made before the committee was satisfied that it was ready for reporting. It provides for (1) The issuance of a Presidential proclamation when a labor dispute threatens to create a national emergency; (2) Recommendations by the President for continuance of production and settlement of the dispute; (3) Emergency boards to hear the disputants and recommend terms of settlement; (4) Seizure by Executive order subject to congressional veto by concurrent resolution within 10 days of a seizure order; 1 (5) Termination of seizure within 60 days of an order unless continued by concurrent resolution; (6) Changes in wages, hours, and working conditions during seizure within the limits of recommendations of the emergency board; (7) No change in union security that exceeds maintenance-ofmembership without consent of parties during Government operation; (S) Continued production during Government operation; (9) Just compensation to owners of enterprises of which possession is taken; and (10) A compensation board to determine just compensation for which some standards are prescribed; its award would be appealable to the Court of Claims. It should be emphasized at this point that this enumeration does not set forth a static procedure or time table. As more fully described under "Analysis of the bill," the various provisions can be used singly or in conjunction with variations in timing as the particular occasion demands. A POLICY FOR NATIONAL EMERGENCY DISPUTES Under the Wagner Act the keystone of national labor policy was the encouragement of collective bargaining. The process of collective bargaining serves to substitute the exchange of ideas and propositions for outright contests of economic strength over inflexible alternatives. The presentation of grievances, ideas, and arguments by both unions and managements helps create an area of understanding. Within the area of remaining disagreement, trading and partial concessions, agreements to reopen questions and the like have made possible contracts acceptable to the parties. disagree. An integral part of the collective bargaining process is the right to enforce its will or to exact concessions. For labor, it is the right to In the normal case, cach side has an ultimate sanction to strike. For management, it is the right to refuse improvements, to insist upon the status quo until agreement is reached." the Wagner Act embodied them. Labor and management alike have endorsed these principles and Management Relations Act of 1947, which states, in part: These factors are the purported basic principles of the Labor organize and bargain collectively safeguards commerce from injury, impairment, Experience has proved that protection by law of the right of employees to or interruption, and promotes the flow of commerce by removing certain recognized sources of industrial strife and unrest, by encouraging practices fundamental wages, hours, or other working conditions, and by restoring equality of bargaining to the friendly adjustment of industrial disputes arising out of differences as to power between employers and employees. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the mitigate and eliminate those obstructions when they have occurred by encouraging Causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to the practice and procedure of collective bargaining In the normal situation, labor disputes and the right to strike fulfill a healthy purpose. They lead to agreements upon terms which the The triployer has the additional right to hire permanent replacements for economic strikers, parties are willing to accept after the exhaustion, if necessary, of all legal means of compelling acceptance or concession from the other side. In our resilient economy most such disputes, even when they interrupt production and services, do not unduly inconvenience the public at large. The very availability of the right to strike and the right to withhold improvements tends to minimize such disruptions. In peacetime, absent severe economic dislocations such as a depression, there are practically no work stoppages which would create hardships so extreme as to constitute a "national emergency." As an example a widespread stoppage of some substantial duration on the railroads would create critical shortages of civilian goods sufficient to result in such an emergency. A short strike would usually not be of emergency proportions because most communities have some reserve supplies of food, fuel, and other necessary consumer and industrial commodities. Stoppages confined to a few cities or a region would not reach serious proportions, particularly if only of short duration. Where only a limited area is affected, alternate methods of transportation can counteract the results of a brief railroad tie-up and alleviate those of a moderately extended one. Few industrial stoppages, even if in basic industries and of substantial length, have a profound effect upon national stability or wellbeing. For example, a coal strike usually does not have an immediate effect upon industrial production or home fuel supplies. In this industry, there is usually a substantial stockpile above ground, and strikes have almost always been settled when reserves dwindle to the near-danger point. Recent coal strikes which evoked substantial public reaction have all occurred in a crisis period. Stoppages in local public utilities may have a sharper effect upon a given locality and may more quickly jeopardize vital community services and activities. However threatening such situations may become, and they usually have been settled before serious damage results, they do not have an impact beyond a relatively small area and hence cannot be regarded as national emergencies. 1. THE NATURE OF EMERGENCY DISPUTES It is recognized, however, that war, the threat of war, and conversion from a war economy create national and international emergencies. In such periods, there are some few major or critical disputes which can cripple or seriously endanger the economy and security of the Nation. It has not been sufficiently recognized that it is the existence of an "emergency" that has converted such labor disputes into national-emergency disputes. The threat of stoppage cannot of itself result in an emergency but can only give rise to apprehension of one. Even a major labor dispute in a time of emergency will not necessarily create critical national hardship if it erupts into a stoppage of work or production. Other factors, such as the stockpile of materials and alternative supplies and services, may mitigate the effects of an actual strike so as to enable the Nation to endure it without serious consequences. Most stoppages do not have the immediate effect of sharpening an existing emergency to the point at which the national security is imperiled. A comparatively rare combination of circumstances operates to produce a situation in which a work stoppage imperils the national security. Section 211 of the bill was rewritten so as to make clear that it would be applicable only in cases of extreme emergency and critical danger. Only a very few labor disputes have the potential effect of rendering the Nation helpless or seriously weakened in combating some external threat or internal crisis. One of the principal procedures made available by the bill, Government possession and operation of private enterprises, is an extreme remedy. The committee was reluctant to recommend its use and recognizes that it has serious potentialities for abuse. However, there are situations of such gravity and urgency that seizure must be available for the preservation of the national security. Only under such circumstances would we sanction its use and then only with the safeguards provided by this bill. The frequency and ease with which injunctions have been issued in recent years has tended to insensitize many to the inappropriateness of injunctions in labor relations. They engender resentment and disrupt relationships, as they become more common. Their prohibitions are expanded. Unions have bitter experience that injunctions are antiunion weapons which have been used oppressively. With great reluctance, however, we included a provision for preventing stoppages during Government operation in the interest of national security. When national security is imperiled by a stoppage in a critical enterprise or plant it is obvious that the usual prerogatives of labor and management must yield to overriding public needs. In such circumstances, a stoppage must be averted or terminated without recourse to the normal means of resolution. It must be recognized that in such situations the parties to a dispute do not operate under the same pressures which are conducive to collective bargaining. On the one hand, public opinion is averse to a strike. This severely limits a union's bargaining power and thereby strengthens management's ability to resist union demands. Complete implacability on the part of management may also result in adverse public reaction-but its translation into pressure upon employers is more difficult to achieve. It takes two, at least, to make a strike. Both union and management must disagree before a labor dispute will, or threaten to, erupt into a stoppage. At such a time, some set of forces must serve as a substitute for the stresses which foster collective bargaining. Both sets of parties must be subject to pressures which impel them to bargain and to settle. Whatever device or set of devices is to be used, it must operate upon both parties with equal force. Neither side can be given an advantage or possibility of preferred position which will encourage action designed to precipitate Government intervention rather than to avoid it. The procedure must be capable of immediate and effective application and also provide safeguards against abuse. S. 2999 is designed to meet this problem of national emergency disputes (1) with expedition, (2) with a minimum of interference with the parties, (3) by making Government intervention onerous and yet maintaining a maximum of fairness to all disputants, and (4) with the double aim of maintaining critical production and services and the resolution of disputes through collective bargaining. |