pathy becomes a function of the perception of resemblance; and sympathy becomes, to a certain extent, reflective. Even in mob action the reaction of the perception of kind may be seen with the utmost clearness. When, for example, a mass of men simultaneously respond to a party cry or symbol the action for the moment is merely a like responsiveness to the same stimulus. An instant later, when each man perceives that his fellow-beings are, in this respect, resembling himself in feeling and in action, his own emotion is enormously intensified. It is this which gives to all symbols and shibboleths their tremendous social importance. The phenomenon has been very well described in the concluding pages of Dr. Boris Sidis's Psychology of Suggestion.'

6

Let us pass, now, to the conception of the psychical stuff or substance of society.

Professor Baldwin's thesis, as we have seen, is that "the matter of social organization consists of thoughts, all kinds of knowledges and informations." He thus places himself in definite opposition to those writers who have made sympathy, or any kind of emotion, the psychological stuff of society. It is for this reason that he makes a sharp distinction between animal' companies' and human societies. Criticism of this thesis may be made from two points of view: one, the historical, supported by observations from animal communities; the other, the psychological, supported by those analyses of the relations of sympathy and perception which I have sketched above. From the standpoint of the observer of animal and primitive human societies it is difficult, if not impossible, to establish a line of demarcation between the more highly organized bands of animals, like troops of monkeys, or herds of elephants, or bands of wild horses, and the simplest hordes of human beings, like Bushmen or Australian Black fellows. No one can say when, in the development of man from brute, sympathy ceased to be

เ

the chief stuff or substance of the social relationship, and thoughts in the form of inventions and knowledges began to assume that important place. In like manner, when modern human society is looked at from the psychological view-point, it is often, indeed usually, impossible to say whether sympathy or thought predominates in the intercerebral action of the associating individuals. Professor Baldwin's thesis would compel him to maintain that the same individuals are a society' one day and merely a 'company' another. At one time they are thoughtful and self-controlled; at another time they are an audience swept by emotion, or a mob given over to fury. Shall we, then, say that the stuff of society is thought merely, or feeling merely, or some combination of the two? Surely the last of these possibilities is the one that is most consistent both with evolutionary hypotheses and with psychological conclusions. The substance of society at first is sympathy and instinct mainly. At its best estate society may rise to a level where thought has for the moment completely subordinated feeling. But usually, and throughout the greater part of its career, society is sympathy and instinct more or less organized, more or less directed, more or less controlled, by thought. When the thought element appears society has become reflective, and a better way to mark the distinction between the lowest and the highest societies than that which restricts the word 'society' to the latter and calls the former 'companies' is one which indicates this element of reflection. Animal and primitive human communities are, for the most part, sympathetic or non-reflective societies; progressive human communities in general are reflective societies. The reflective stage corresponds to the appearance of the perception of kind and to reflective sympathy.

But even if we were to accept the thesis that the social stuff is exclusively intellectual we could not possibly admit that it

consists of all sorts of thoughts and knowledges indiscriminately. It undoubtedly includes all sorts of thoughts and knowledges, but not all sorts of thoughts and knowledges in and of themselves make society or the social stuff. The social stuff, so far as it is intellectual, is one kind of knowledge in particular, namely, knowledge of resemblances, knowledge of those modes of likemindedness that make cooperation possible. The same logic that leads Professor Baldwin to try to separate the social stuff from other kinds of stuff should lead him further to distinguish the thought that is essentially social and capable of organizing all other thoughts and knowledges into social material from the thought and knowledge that have no such inherent power.

Perhaps, however, it is in his few remarks about the social process that Professor Baldwin has been most unjust to himself, and has missed an opportunity to make a really important contribution to social science. He is willing to grant that the social process consists in imitation. Yet, if the earlier chapters of Social and Ethical Interpretations' prove anything at all, they prove that imitations are progressively controlled, as individual development proceeds, by the process of ejective interpretation. To carry this thought into sociological interpretation it is necessary to bear in mind the function of resemblance, especially of mental and moral resemblance, in controlling relationships. In the ejective processes of the 'dialectic of personal growth' not all of our acquaintances are indiscriminately utilized. We detect the difference between those who, in ways important to ourselves, resemble us and those who, in ways important to ourselves, differ from us. Our ejective interpretations, therefore, are accompanied at every step by a process of ejective selection. These ejective selections are the psychological basis of all social groupings, not only of those of the more

intimate sort, such as personal friendships, but those also of the purely utilitarian sort, like business partnerships. In a word, while imitation is a process that penetrates society through and through, it is not a distinctively social process. It is wider than the social process, just as thought is more comprehensive than the social stuff. The distinctive social process is an ejective interpretation and selection. In its widest form it includes imitation controlled by or made a function of ejective selection.

I may now very briefly indicate the further criticisms which, in pursuance of this thought, must be made upon Professor Baldwin's views-criticisms, namely, that apply to his treatment of social policy. No exception is to be taken to the analysis which describes the individual as the particularizing social force, and society in its entirety as the generalizing social force. But I fail to discover in Professor Baldwin's account of the subject any adequate recognition of the social causation of individuality. That causation must be sought in the phenoma of unlikeness in the social population. Throughout human history individuality and the possibility of social variation have been due to the commingling of ethnic elements, or, within the same nationality, to the commingling of elements long exposed to different local environments. The commingling itself is brought about by emigration and immigration. If the biological phenomenon of panmixia is all that Weismann, Galton and other investigators have represented to be, its levelling effects are counteracted and social progress is made possible only by continual groupings and regroupings in the population under the influence of ejective selection.

Finally, there is no possible explanation of social policy which leaves out of account the facts of mental and moral resemblance and the consciousness of kind. Without like-mindedness there can be neither spon

taneous nor reflective cooperation. Not only must there be an agreement of thought, but for most, if not for all, public cooperation there must be a vast mass of sympathies and agreeing emotions. Men must have like sensations, be similarly sensitive to suggestion from resembling fellows, and enter subtly into like judgments without always being fully conscious of the process by which their conclusions are reached. The greater part of all public action must. be described as a consequence of sympathetic and half-reflective agreement in plans and purposes, rather than as a consequence of systematic deliberation Moreover, it must not be forgotten that all public policy is a means to an end, proximate or ultimate; and that the ultimate end in every case is the maintenance and development of a certain type of man. That type itself is a mode of resemblance; and the recognition of it, which directs and controls all policies, is a mode of the consciousness of kind. FRANKLIN H. GIDDINGS.

ATOMIC WEIGHTS.

THE following table of values is recommended for general adoption in analytical

practice by a commission appointed by the German Chemical Society consisting of H. Landolt, W. Ostwald and K. Seubert. (Ber. d. D. Chem. Ges. 1898, 31, 2761.)

The commission recommends that:

1. The atomic weight of oxygen be taken as 16.000, and that the atomic weights of the other elements be calculated on the basis of their combining ratios with oxygen, directly or indirectly determined.

2. The following atomic weights of the elements be adopted in practice, as they are probably the most correct values known at the present time.

These numbers are, as a rule, given only with so many decimals that even the last one may be regarded as accurate. In consequence, the atomic weights determined by Stas, in which the errors amount to from 3 to 6 units in the third decimal, are given with two decimals; the other atomic weights which have been more accurately determined are given with one decimal, and those less accurately determined are given without decimals. Exceptions to this rule have been made only in the cases of nickel, bismuth and tin, marked with an asterisk in the table.

In the case of nickel this was done in order to emphasize the difference between the atomic weights of cobalt and nickel, although in both values there may be possible deviations of ±0.2. The true atomic weights of bismuth and tin are not correct to a certainty, to within 0.1. The value of hydrogen is 1.008, correct to within 0.001, but the approximation of 1.01 has been regarded as permissible for the requirements of practice, as it involves an error of only one-fifth of one per cent. The values given for the elements marked in the table with interrogation points are not necessarily exact within whole units of the atomic weights assigned.

FERDINAND G. WIECHMANN.

JOHN CUMMINGS.

IN the decease of Hon. John Cummings, of Woburn, Mass., on the 21st of December, there terminated a life which has been noteworthy for the encouragement it has given to the study and teaching of science. In the early part of his manhood days Mr. Cummings acquired a reputation for honorable dealing and for his success in the manufacture of leather in his native town of Woburn. To that town he was always loyal and generous, but his intelligence and his activity led him into larger circles until he became favorably known and his influence was felt in a large and populous community. He became acquainted with the late William B. Rogers, for whom he always cherished an admiration and a profound regard. He also knew Louis Agassiz, Jeffries Wyman, Asa Gray and others, and he soon became a student as well as a lover of nature. The offices of trust and of business responsibility which he filled make a long and notable list, but his large affairs did not prevent him from cultivating a love for science, and they aided him in multiplying his gifts to the cause of education. Through his attachment for William B.

Rogers he was interested in the founding of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and he became one of its most substantial supporters, contributing to its financial needs and serving as its Treasurer for 17 years. It was through his generosity that the Boston Society of Natural History started its Teachers' School of Science,' and it was through his liberality that its botanical collection was developed and that it has received special care to the present day. He was actively and generously interested in the work of public instruction, and he extended his aid to the South after the close of the Civil War. In one instance he purchased a building and supplied teachers, urging them to work for the establishment of free public schools, and when this was about to be accomplished he donated the building to the cause. His gifts and his efforts were never calculated to attract attention to himself, and many of his good deeds were scarcely known even by his friends. He was one of a class of honorable and broad-minded business men who have been magnanimous in their support of science education, and who have found time to participate in the acquisition of knowledge, while aiding others to means for the prosecution of their studies or investiga

tions.

WM. H. NILES.

SCIENTIFIC BOOKS.

Matter, Energy, Force and Work. By SILAS W. HOLMAN, Professor (Emeritus) Massachusetts Institute of Technology. New York, The Macmillan Company.

Lovers of exact science are already indebted to Professor Holman for numerous important contributions to our knowledge of physics and especially for valuable suggestions as to the best treatment of the experimental solution of physical problems. His most pretentious work thus far is that on 'Precision of Measurements,' which is everywhere recognized as a standard and which ought to be in the hands of every

one who is preparing to do something in the way of experimental research. In the volume now under consideration he has entered a different field, and with such success as to deserve and, I have no doubt, to win the approval of all interested in the fundamental principles and concepts of physical science. In addition to an excellent review of current theories of the nature of matter, energy, force, etc., in which the vortex theory and Le Sage's theory of gravitation are exceptionally well presented, the work includes much that is new and original, a few proposed additions to the nomenclature of science and many extremely suggestive discussions.

'Con

Professor Holman departs from the usual practice in the very beginning when he defines matter as 'the inert constituent of substance.' By 'substance' he means 'that which is inferred as existing in space, and as endued with powers to affect portions of itself,' and it is made out of matter by the addition of something. tinuous, uniform and permanent occupancy of space' is the ultimate and sole property of matter. 'Mass' is defined as 'quantity of matter,' and as matter has really no significance until it becomes 'substance' the word 'mass' is practically banished.

Atoms are 'permanent aggregations of matter differentiated from matter by some mode of motion' (vortex motion), and they combine to make substance.' 'Bodies' are limited portions of substance.' The 'something' which distinguishes substance from matter is energy. "A designated quantity of substance consists of a definite quantity of matter in permanent association with a definite quantity of energy or motion." The two words or motion' render this statement somewhat obscure. What is meant by a 'definite quantity of motion?' Professor Holman's definition of 'motion' is that of nearly all writers, namely, 'change of relative position.' It is a curious but common practice to define it in this way and then to define its 'quantity' by associating with it something (matter, mass) absolutely unlike it in every respect. It is certainly not in this sense that he means to use it in the phrase above quoted.

To all 'substance' he attributes a 'capacity

for kinetic energy' and to this capacity he ap plies the term 'kinergety,' of which much use is made in all subsequent discussions. Mass is assumed to be proportional to kinergety and the latter thus affords a means of measuring the former or rather of comparing different quantities of it.

Quantities of substance may also be compared by means of the force called 'weight,' and a quantity thus determined by means of the equal-arm balance is called weightal.

The 'International Kilogramme' and the 'Imperial Pound' are spoken of as standards of 'Kinergety' and weightal is shown to be proportional to 'Kinergety.' What is commonly known as 'the ether,' the medium by which radiant energy is transmitted, is regarded as a kind of substance, and hence not the continuous uniform substratum of 'matter' from which all substance is evolved.

It is impossible in a brief notice to make extensive quotations, but especial attention ought to be invited to the author's remarks on the various forms of energy. They are extremely interesting and suggestive, and particularly so in the exhibit which is made of the importance of the energy of elasticity as an intermediate stage of all energy transformations. The definition of force' as related to energy will not fail to attract attention and possibly enable many readers to possess a reasonably satisfying concept of that much-abused word. Reference has already been made to the very full presentation of the vortex theory of matter, in the possibilities of which the author evidently has great confidence. The principal results of the splendid work of Professor J. J. Thomson in the application of this theory to chemical phenomena are here given in clear and simple language, without the mathematical backing upon which it leans. The singularly clear and satisfactory discussion of Le Sage's theory of gravitation as affected by the vortex theory of atoms would alone put the volume on the shelves of every physical library, but the more distinctly original portions of it, the nature of which has only been hinted at in this notice, will fully justify its careful perusal by students of physical science.

I think there can be no impropriety in a brief