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the chairman replied that the committee had authorized Mr. Fish to invite such witnesses as he desired "as minority witnesses.” The wit nesses suggested a committee invitation and stated that they preferred to be heard in executive session.
General Marshall, Chief of Staff, wrote a letter to Hon. Hamilton Fish, furnishing a carbon copy to Chairman Bloom, which read a follows:
JANUARY 24, 1941. Hon. HAMILTON Fish,
House of Representatives, Washington, D. C. MY DEAR MR. Fish: With reference to your invitation for me to appear befa the Foreign Relations Committee in connection with H. R. 1776, I was informe by the chairman of the committee last night that my presence had not be requested by the committee.
In view of the fact that my testimony would be that of the Chief of Staff the Army rather than that of an individual, I would prefer to appear on thi request of the committee. I take the liberty of suggesting that if my present is desired by the committee, the hearing be in executive session in order that might make complete and frank replies to the questions that probably would ! asked. Faithfully yours,
(Signed) G. C. MARSHALL,
Chief of Staf. In view of the above facts, the majority members of the committe have met this morning and unanimously agreed to extend and har extended to Admiral Stark, General Marshall, and General Brett invi tations to appear and testify before the committee. In deference t the expressed wishes of the distinguished officials, they have been assured that their testimony will be heard by the committee in execu tive session,
Mr. Fish. I would like to make a motion.
Mr. Johnson. I object to the member making any motion in execa tive session.
The CHAIRMAN. Motion sustained.
Mr. Fish. You have not heard the motion. You do not know what it is.
The CHAIRMAN. I am ruling, Mr. Fish, on the objection made by Mr. Johnson.
Mr. Fish. I will appeal the decision of the Chair.
Mr. Johnson. I move the committee recess until 1:30, at which time Mr. Fish can present such witnesses as he cares to.
The CHAIRMAN. The committee recesses until 1:30 at this sam place.
The committee met again at 1:30 p. m., following the recess, Hon Sol Bloom (chairman) presiding.
STATEMENT OF WILLIAM R. CASTLE, FORMER UNDER SECRETARI
OF STATE AND FORMER UNITED STATES AMBASSADOR TO JAPAN
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Castle, have you a prepared statement you wish to read from?
Mr. CASTLE. Yes; I have, Mr. Chairman, a short one.
The CHAIRMAN. Have you copies of that statement that you wish give to the press? Mr. CASTLE. Yes; I have given them copies. The CHAIRMAN. Can the committee have copies of that statement? You may proceed, Mr. Castle. Mr. CASTLE. The bill just now under discussion seems to me early a war measure. It does not empower the President to declare ar. It does empower him to make war. And it is seldom in these lys that war is formally declared. For example, most of us have It for a long time that war has been going on between China and pan, although neither nation made any formal declaration. The esident, however, does not appear to think so, as he has never applied e terms of the Neutrality Act to the conflict in the Far East. This ry, fact gives pause. If all aid is given to England, even such forms aid as actually constitute acts of war under international law, it is it going to be any consolation to those whose sons are killed that ere has been no formal declaration. In the year 1776 the Declaraon of Independence led to war. Is bill 1776, which may some time
called our renunciation of independence, also going to lead us into ir? The bill purports to be a bill to help Britain in its fight against ermany. This is sound policy so long as it does not militate against finitely American interests. When I spoke, then, of renunciation
independence, I meant that the bill might well be interpreted as Ithorizing the President to grant whatever aid Britain demands. If is is true, we renounce our freedom of choice. It is true, of course, at we theoretically leave discretion in the hands of one man as to hat he will or will not give; but we all know that if he refuses anying, he will be furiously attacked by all the interventionists in the untry who seem to fear that America cannot defend itself and efers to have others defend us at our expense. These people are ry vocal and can bring great influence to bear. In fact, it seems to e unfair to place the burden of such grave decisions on the shoulders
any one man. Or the bill can be taken to have quite the opposite interpretation. gives the Executive such power that in practice he could dominate ritain, while the war continues, as well as the United States. He one could say what supplies were to be sent and when and where. hrough his control of the supplies flowing out from what he pleases to ll this "arsenal of democracy," he would become supreme in all lilitary matters, British as well as American. At home, Congress ould be impotent; and, in Britain, fear, rather than gratitude, would ring the British Government to the feet of the American President. Ve should have two world dictators, one for the totalitarians and ne for the democracies.
Because there is little middle ground between these two unhealthy nd totally un-American conditions, both of them utterly opposed to ll our traditions, is one reason why I hope the bill may be defeated. t purports, as I said before, to be a bill to help Britain. Actually,
is a bill which signs away our freedom, creates a dictatorship, does ot enable us to help Britain more than we are doing now except asofar as it permits the President to ignore such laws as he pleases nd thus to make war. Many Americans believe that this country an be of greater help to Great Britain as a neutral than as an ally.
Proponents of the bill claim that it will enable the President more speedily to get aid to Britain. The only way to get aid to Britain is to send planes and guns and ships. The amount of this depends wholly on the capacity of our factories and the rapidity of increase depends on our ability to expand production, not on the orders of the President. We are then reduced to the supposition that what the authors of this bill mean is that aid will go more quickly if the Congress is eliminated. We are not now at war. Britain is at war But, even so, the British Parliament functions as effectively as ever It is not the nature of an Englishman to surrender his liberties. He knows that Parliament is his mouthpiece and he insists that it power to restrain and to criticize and to initiate shall be unimpaired. It is very probable that members of the British Government are sometimes irritated with this restraint on their authority, but I am certain that the power of effective debate in Parliament, the direction as well as the restraint that comes from Parliament, is infinitely safer and of greater importance for the nation than unrestrained dictatorship could ever be. Because it is Britain's war, a war supported by the people speaking through Parliament, it is not a war of the overlords. In Italy, for example, where the people have had no say, they fight, if they fight at all, with apathy. The United States is not at war. Yet, through this bill, we should confer such power on the Chief of State as no democratic nation has done, even during the course of a war. As no Englishman would want to do away with Parliament, so no American should want to do away with Congress. I for one am certain that the Congress of the United States is just as patriotic and works just as intelligently for the good of the country as does the Parliament of Great Britain.
As it stands now, this bill gives unlimited power to the Executive not only at the moment but forever. There is not only no apparent check on this authority; there is no time limitation on the exercise of that authority: The supporters of the bill claim that its purpose is to assist Britain to win the war; yet there is nothing to indicate that the powers conferred on the President will terminate with the war. If such powers should ever be given to a chief magistrate, which I hope may never be the case, they should at least be given for short periods since conditions change in this modern world with almost inconceivable rapidity. Surely we are not planning, throughout an indefinite future, to authorize the President, in the varied matters enumerated in the bill, to do what he pleases, "notwithstanding the provisions of any other law."
This country wants to give such aid to Britain as can legally be given without involving the United States in the war. That resolve was in the platform of both political parties. It is being reiterated in the various polls which have been taken since the election, but it must be remembered that these polls show just as overwhelming a majority against American participation in the war as they do in favor of aid to Britain. It seems clear, then, that if the Government is to act as representing public opinion, it must give aid in accord with recognized international law if for no other reason in order to avoid actual involvement in the war. I have no use for those who say that because Hitler has broken the rules of international law we are free to do the same. There is no reason why we should copy the methods of international criminals any more than the methods of local thugs. The bill before us does not mean that the President must ignore the rules
of international law; it only permits him to do so. He says that he will not. He authorized the press to quote him as saying, in answer to the question whether he might give away part of the Navy, that it was "all cow-jumped-over-the-moon stuff, all Mother Hubbard stuff.” Yet not long ago he gave away 50 American destroyers. To receive a quid pro quo for them in the shape of naval bases did not affect the legal principle. It is dangerous to give any man in the world unlimited power. One remembers the remark of Representative Cordell Hull when there was discussion of giving certain rather unimportant powers to President Hoover that no good man would be willing to take them and no bad man should be permitted to have them.
It is never wholly satisfactory to oppose a measure and suggest no alternative. Yet, in the case of a bill, the real purpose of which seems to be to create a dictatorship, nothing is necessary except opposition. The country is neither ready nor willing to give up its republican form of government, and it is certainly the duty of every one of us to see that this does not happen under the cloak of some other purpose. In this case, aid to Britain is the cloak, even though such aid does not in any way necessitate the grant of unlimited power to the President. To take, then, the ostensible purpose of the bill, it may be said that if we honestly want to aid Britain without involvement in the war and as speedily as possible, we can do so only by enlarging with all speed our facilities for production, by permitting the British to purchase all such output of our factories as our technical, military, and naval authorities certify is not necessary for national defense. By "technical authorities," I mean, of course, the ranking officers of the Army and the Navy, who know what is necessary as others cannot possibly know it. Some laymen refuse to admit that, whatever happens in the war, we are in no immediate danger of invasion, but our military and naval authorities know it to be true. Beyond this, Congress can, if it wishes, lend or give money to Britain when it has reason to believe that British financial resources are at an end. Congress, furthermore, would keep a stern check on the amounts so given, or, if loaned, on the security therefor. But, in any case, let us be sure that purchases are solely in the hands of the British, not of the President of the United States. If he were responsible for what should be sent, we should become inevitably an integral part of the war and the President would become the arbiter of Britain's fate.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Fish?
Mr. Fish. Mr. Castle, what positions have you held in the Federal Government?
Mr. CASTLE. I was in the State Department for about 16 years. I went into it when Mr. Wilson was President. I was Chief of European Affairs; “Western European Affairs” it was called then. Later I was Assistant Secretary of State and then I was Ambassador to Japan and then I was an Under Secretary of State.
Mr. FISH. You have some 16 years of experience in the State Department under various administrations, both Republican and Democratic?
Mr. CASTLE. Yes.
Mr. Fish. Did you agree with Secretary Hull that as a result of war international law is a dead issue?
Mr. CASTLE. No; I do not. I think we have to help bring international law into life again.
Mr. FISH. And do you think that if international law is to survive it must survive in this country?
Mr. CASTLE. I think it must.
Mr. Fish. Do you make any discrimination, Mr. Castle, between aggressor nations such as Soviet Russia that invaded Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, and Nazi Germany which invaded the countries to the west such as Holland, Belgium, and Denmark?
Mr. CASTLE. It seems to me much the same sort of thing. In both cases it was plain aggression.
Mr. Fish. It is certainly the same sort of thing for those countries which are invaded, is it not?
Mr. CASTLE. Right.
Mr. Fish. And it is certainly the same sort of thing for those countries which are invaded and who lose their independence and sovereignty and nationality?
Mr. CASTLE. Yes.
Mr. Fish. Mr. Castle, you are familiar with the Kellogg-Briand Pact? In fact, you were in the State Department at the time it was written, is that not right?
Mr. CASTLE. Yes.
Mr. Fish. When Mr. Hull testified before the committee, he said there was some duty on our part to take affirmative action when that pact was not adhered to or lived up to. Do you know the details of the pact so far as that is concerned?
Mr. Castle. No; I have never agreed with that interpretation of the pact. It was suggested at the time the pact was formulated, and there was great opposition to it. And I have always felt that if that were in the pact the Senate would never bave ratified it.
Mr. Fish. Was not that pact discussed in the Senate of the United States?
Mr. EBERHARTER. I did not hear the Secretary of State say that.
Mr. EBERHARTER. I do not think he said there was an affirmative duty, in my opinion.
The CHAIRMAN. It was Secretary Stimson who answered that question.
Mr. Fish. I do not recollect anything in the pact. I was asking you, Mr. Castle, if you think there is anything in it to compei us to take any affirmative action.
Mr. ČASTLE. No; I think there is nothing.
Mr. Fish. Do you not believe if there had been it would not hare been acceptable to the Senate of the United States ?
Mr. CASTLE. I do.
Mr. Fish. The Secretary of War, I think, testified, or it was the Secretary of State, testified that our Government had received-it was Secretary Stimson who was then Secretary of State-testified at the time of the pact that he as Secretary of State had received the fullest cooperation from the British Government when they protested the invasion of Manchukuo by Japan. Can you tell us something about that?
Mr. CASTLE. Well, the two Governments worked pretty close together. That was, of course, solely in the hands of the Secretary. I did not have very much to do with it except to follow it at the time.