Thus, if we apply this reasoning to towns of less than 25,000 people, the results are as follows:

Mr. LIPSCOMB. The figures that you have given on the charts with regard to overall cost exclude land and equipment, again?

Mr. VORTMAN. They certainly do.

Mr. HOLIEIELD. And they are based on these figures of $300 per person and $525 per person.

Mr. VORTMAN. That is right.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. And that is for this particular type shelter?

Mr. VORTMAN. I am assuming that it is at least reasonable to associate presseure level protection with a given cost.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. And does this take into consideration the new type shelters that were tested in 1957?

Mr. VORTMAN. It does not include any of those because I have no cost figures from 1957.

(The following additional information was subsequently received:) Of two data points, one ($300 per person) was from 1955; and, one ($525 per person) was from 1957. The latter was for buried multiplate pipe which was not tested as a personnel shelter.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. I see. Well, this is important because I understand that there is a different set of cost figures for those. Different results. All right, proceed.

This refers to 1955.

Mr. VORTMAN. Yes.

Now, on the basis that we are providing only fallout protection for people in towns of 25,000 or less, the costs are reduced to 20, 30, 41 and 83 billion dollars.

Now, the estimated cost in dollars isn't the only consideration. Total new construction in the United States is approximately $50 billion annually.

This is a measure of our current capacity to construct shelters now, if no other new construction were undertaken.

The rate of $50 billion per year represents the most optimistic preemergency rate of construction.

If shelter construction was postponed until an emergency existed, it would have to compete for manpower and materials, with necessary emergency military construction. If only one-third of this capacity was available for personnel protection in a postemergency periodand this is based on the fact that construction volume in 1944 was about one-third of that in 1942-the time required to build shelters would be tripled, and this is probably an optimistic assumption. The time scales of such a program might look like this:

Mr. HOLIFIELD. We are going to have to answer the rollcall so we will have to adjourn at this time.

The committee will convene at 10 o'clock tomorrow morning to finish your testimony and take the next witness.

Thank you, gentlemen.

(Whereupon, at 12: 15 p. m., the subcommittee adjourned, to reconvene at 10 a. m., of the following day, Thursday, May 1, 1958.)

CIVIL DEFENSE

Part I-Atomic Shelter Tests

THURSDAY, MAY 1, 1958

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY OPERATIONS,

OF THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS,

Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met in room 1501-B, House Office Building, pursuant to adjournment, at 10:05 a. m., Hon. Chet Holifield (chairman of the subcommittee), presiding.

Present: Representatives Holifield, Garmatz, Fascell, Griffith, Riehlman, and Lipscomb.

Also present: Herbert Roback, staff administrator; Carey Brewer, senior defense specialist; Paul Ridgely, and Robert McElroy, investigators.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. The subcommittee will be in order.

When we adjourned yesterday, we had before us Mr. Vortman of the Sandia Corp., who was testifying on test data regarding the physical damage on shelter structures.

You may proceed, sir, where you left off, and we will finish with your testimony.

FURTHER STATEMENT OF LUKE VORTMAN, DIRECTOR, CETG

PROGRAM 34, SANDIA CORP.

Mr. VORTMAN. The table which appears on page 52 will show the time required to construct shelters if the assumptions that I made as to costs are followed.

If constructed during an emergency period, the $22 billion program would require 5 months. If this construction were not started until after a war was begun, or until there was a national emergency, approximately 16 months would be required.

We can note the time scales required for each of the other shelter programs assumed.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Now, this is under the assumption that you take all of the construction facilities of the United States and direct them to this one task?

Mr. VORTMAN. That is right.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. This is an unreal assumption because this would never happen, but it does give you something in the way of an evaluation of the time element, the total time element that would be involved under these two circumstances.

Mr. VORTMAN. That is correct.

If fallout shelters only were provided for urban residents in towns of less than 25,000 people, the results are those shown in the table below. The times required are somewhat less.

Note that the times required are reduced but again only slightly. It may be possible to reduce shelter costs somewhat below those cited. Existing mines could be used where they are suitably located if they have multiple entrances. Makeshift fallout shelters could be provided by using existing tunnels, large culverts, storm drains and subbasements. Percentagewise possible economies through such measures are relatively small. However, there is one other means of significantly reducing the financial burden of a shelter program-and here the surface has hardly been scratched-that is by shifting part of the cost of shelters to other new construction through the use of dual purpose structures. For example, dual purpose underground rooms might be designed, rooms which people would want as a part of their home and which would not be regarded as something tacked on as a costly afterthought.

Dual-purpose structures, of course, inevitably result in a compromise of one or both purposes. More emphasis should be placed on obtaining designs which would be both functionally and esthetically acceptable. Much might be gained from a nationwide architectural competition.

Now, in pointing out that our information on blast loading is adequate for proceeding with the construction of shelters, I did not intend to imply additional answers should not be sought.

We should know more about the blast environment inside those existing structures which must be used as makeshift shelters and for which blast doors cannot be provided. This work can and should be done in the laboratory with shock tubes and other simulating devices and not during full-scale tests.

Second, theoretical experimental work on neutron attenuation in the usual construction materials and in various shelter configurations should be pursued.

Third, since overlapping and possibly successive fallout patterns can keep people confined to shelters for long periods of time, further attention should be given to the physiological and psychological effects of confinement.

What, if anything, can be done in the building or the finishing or supplying of a shelter to provide a better psychological and physiological environment? Are survivors better off in family-size units or in the larger group type shelters?

Many more and better dual-purpose designs are needed, designs in which the shelter is functionally integrated with the main structure in a way which is not only acceptable that is, a minimum compromise of purposes but also appealing.

We would like designs which would have a utility in less troubled times which we hope will exist for coming generations. We would not want designs which a peaceful world might look back on as merely monuments to the current threat of war.

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my prepared statement. I have two other pieces of information.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Are there any questions of Mr. Vortman?

If not, before you leave the witness stand, will you give us briefly a biographical sketch of yourself?

Mr. VORTMAN. I am an architectural engineer. I have been working with Sandia Corp. since 1949 in their weapons effects Department and have participated in most of the full-scale tests including and since Operation Greenhouse.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Thank you very much.

Now, Mr. Corsbie, who is your next witness?

Mr. CORSBIE. We would like to continue with Dr. Harris followed by Dr. White and then finish with Dr. Thompkins.

FURTHER STATEMENT OF DR. PAYNE S. HARRIS, LOS ALAMOS SCIENTIFIC LABORATORY, AND DIRECTOR, CETG PROJECT 39.7

Dr. HARRIS. I would like to give testimony on my feelings insofar as radiation considerations of protective environments are concerned. Logically, the problem of radiation as it is concerned with design construction and occupancy of protective structures has many facets. These various items of concern are due to variations in all parameters from the source to the receiver.

I would like briefly to go over the contributing variations, pointing them out first and then going through what has been done and what should be done to improve our knowledge of these variations.

First things we should consider are variations in source. These include the type and yield of the weapon, the immediate nuclear radiations therefrom, and the conditions under which the weapon is detonated.

For this discussion we can divide weapons into two classes, or categories. These are fission weapons of low or medium yield and thermonuclear varieties.

The immediate nuclear radiations of interest are gamma rays and

neutrons.

One very important thing is that the relative importance of either type of radiation varies widely from one weapon to another. This is a consequence of design and does have some importance in the shelter field. This is because the protective conditions applicable for gamma rays are almost diametrically opposite those for neutrons. Iron, lead, and high density materials are good gamma-ray shields. For neutrons, water, concrete, and in general low density materials are good shields.

There is no direct relationship between the relative importance of these radiations and the weapon yield itself. For a sample, one