2. He further recognizes that needs for nonmilitary defense have been changed by advances in military technology; the threat now confronting the Nation necessitates reconsideration of assumptions underlying legislation and Executive orders which created existing organizational arrangements. 3. He considers the Nation's nonmilitary defense to be of vital importance and he proposes to ask the Congress to vest in him certain responsibilities and authorities now vested by statute in other officials of the executive branch. 4. He believes it is essential to the safety of the Nation that the Federal Government have an effective, dynamic organization for nonmilitary defense. The organization must be one to which all may look for guidance and one which will insure that the coordinated might of the Federal, State, and local governments is at all times ready to cope with emergencies that enemy action might create. 5. He has directed that studies of existing organizational arrangements be made and that, when these are completed, he will suggest to the Congress such legislation as may be required. The inclusion of such a statement in a Presidential message implies that it will be essential to establish, within the Executive Office of the President, an agency to aid him in formulating policies and in coordinating planning for the whole gamut of nonmilitary defense functions. Further study is needed to determine the role of such an Executive Office agency. Additional study is also required to identify the operating or specialized functions that must be carried out by Federal departments or agencies in accordance with policies set by the President, and to ascertain where such functions can best be performed. Four alternative organizational assignments of these functions warrant consideration: 1. To a separate nonmilitary defense operating agency (such as, or similar to, FCDA). 2. To other existing departments and agencies. 3. To an Executive Office agency. 4. To a combination of two or more of the above. OBJECTIVE OF SECOND PHASE OF STUDY Analyses completed during phase I have laid the bases for developing concrete proposals for improving the organizational arrangements for the conduct of the Federal Government's defense mobilization and civil defense functions. We plan: to develop, in the course of phase II of this study, a series of memorandums that will include such proposals. These memorandums will— 1. Analyze in detail the major areas of defense mobilization-civil defense activity and determine for each of these areas (a) The nature of the function to be performed. (b) The most appropriate distribution of these functions (1) to the existing departments and agencies, (2) to an Executive Office agency, or (3) to a separate agency such as, or similar to, the present FCDA.; 2. Describe the role and basic internal organization of an Executivę Office agency to assist the President in formulating policies for defense mobili zation-civil defense programs, and in coordinating the activities of and in: providing leadership to Federal departments and agencies. 3. Describe the role of a separate civil defense agency, if one is found to be necessary, including the general contour of its internal organization structure. 4. Set forth the relationships that should prevail in the field among Federal departments and agencies having defense mobilization-civil defense responsibilities. In developing these memorandums we will seek the advice and suggestions of members of the staffs of ODM, FCDA, other Federal departments and agencies, and the Bureau of the Budget. We look forward to the opportunity of developing, with their aid, recommendations that will serve to facilitate their accomplishment of vital governmental functions. Respectfully submitted. MCKINSEY & Co., INC. A FRAMEWORK FOR IMPROVING NON MILITARY DEFENSE ORGANIZATION-BUREAU OF THE BUDGET CONTENTS The problem: Division of responsibilities. Problems created by present arrangements. Developing and testing master plans. Planning for continuity of government. Planning for mobilization and utilization of resources. Reducing urban and industrial vulnerability. Coordinating activities of Federal agencies. Summary of problems. Causes of the problem and solutions proposed: Revolution in technology of warfare. Impact on nature of nonmilitary defense. Recognition of need for change. Proposals for realining ODM-FCDA responsibilities. Proposals for centralizing certain responsibilities. Guiding principles. Appraisal of alternative concepts. The executive-department concept. General conclusions developed to date. Vesting responsibilities in the President. Establishing a central agency in the Executive Office. Recommended course of action. APPENDIX List of officials interviewed in connection with phase I of study. A ́ FRAMEWORK FOR IMPROVING NONMILITARY DEFENSE ORGANIZATION-BUREAU OF THE BUDGET 1. THE PROBLEM DIVISION OF RESPONSIBILITIES The major responsibilities of the executive branch for developing policies and coordinating planning in nonmilitary defense1 fields are distributed between two agencies-the present Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM), established in the Executive Office of the President by Reorganization Plan 3 of 1953, and the Federal Civil Defense Administration (FCDA), created as an independent agency by the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950 (Public Law 920). Both agencies were created shortly after this Nation had suffered the experiences of World War II and the Korean war. QDM is primarily responsible for directing and coordinating all mobilization activities of the executive branch of the Government, including those related to production, procurement, manpower, stabilization, transportation, and telecommunications activities and resources. The Director is also charged with advising the President on the coordination of the mobilization of all resources to meet civilian as well as military needs." FCDA is primarily responsible for the development, coordination, guidance, and leadership of a national program of civil defense designed to protect life and property in the United States from attack. Public Law 920 vests in State and local governments primary responsibility for civil defense activities within their political jurisdictions. During an emergency declared by the President or "Nonmilitary defense" is used in this report to depict the broad sweep of civilian activities which are conducted for preparedness, defense, or survival, and recovery. 2 See Reorganization Plan 3 of 1953 and Executive Orders 10461 of June 17, 1953, and 10480 of August 14, 1953. Congress, the Administrator of FCDA is authorized to procure by condemnation or other means any materials needed for civil defense; to coordinate and direct, for civil defense purposes, the relief activities of other Federal depart ments and agencies; to employ personnel without regard to civil-service laws; and to provide financial and other assistance to State and local governments and individual citizens.3 ODM and FCDA both necessarily utilize other departments and agencies in carrying out their responsibilities. Hence, each makes delegations to or establishes working agreements with these other agencies. ODM's delegations are made directly; FCDA's require approval of the President. Each is also responsible for providing these agencies with continuing policy guidance and for coordinating their respective assignments. In addition, ODM seeks to coordinate the activities of Federal departments and agencies in the field through representatives in 10 regional areas; FCDA similarly coordinates the activities of Federal departments and agencies in the field, and stimulates civil defense planning by State and local governments through personnel assigned to seven regional offices. PROBLEMS CREATED BY PRESENT ARRANGEMENTS With increasing frequency Federal officials and observers alike have questioned the effectiveness of the present organizational arrangements for conducting these nonmilitary defense tasks-mobilizing the economy and protecting the lives and property of our citizens. Nearly all officials with whom we consulted feel that the simultaneous efforts of ODM and FCDA to provide policy guidance and to coordinate defense mobilization and civil defense activities impede the effective achievement of an adequate nonmilitary defense for this country. This unfortunate result accrues from the fact that ODM and FCDA in carrying out their respective responsibilities simultaneously perform similar or integrally related autivities and place duplicating or conflicting assignments on other Federal departments and agencies. Five major areas have been identified in which ODM and FCDA activities overlap. These areas involve the 1. Developing and testing of master emergency nonmilitary defense plans. 2. Planning for the continuity of Government activities and services. 3. Planning for the mobilization and utilization of resources. 4. Reducing vulnerability of urban areas and industrial facilities. 5. Coordinating nonmilitary defense activities of other Federal agencies. DEVELOPING AND TESTING MASTER PLANS Under Reorganization Plan 3 of 1953, a primary objective sought by the President was to "enable one Executive Office agency to exercise strong leadership in our national mobilization effort, including both current defense activities and readiness for any future national emergency.' In fulfilling these broad responsibilities, the Director of ODM must develop, with the assistance of other Federal agencies, planning assumptions and general mobilization plans. Illustrations of these assumptions and plans are found in mobilization plans assuming massive attack, and, alternatively, assuming limited warfare, and in plans for the establishment of temporary Federal agencies to be created in an emergency. FCDA, however, has been vested by law with equally broad responsibilitiespreparing national plans and programs and sponsoring such plans for the civil defense and the rehabilitation of the United States after attack. FCDA must maintain close-working relationships with State and local government officials, as well as with other Federal agencies to discharge its responsibilities. In dealing with State and local governments, it cannot divulge ODM's plans because they bear security classifications. Hence FCDA must develop unclassified planning assumptions to guide State and local officials. Furthermore, it must also prepare general civil defense or nonmilitary defense plans (and is presently developing a national plan) because the duty to take steps for protecting life and property comprehends all sectors of our Nation and economy except military operations. See the Federal Civil Defense Act, Public Law 920, 81st Cong. See Civil Defense for National Survival, 24th intermediate report of the House of Representatives Committee on Government Operations, July 27, 1956; Report of Project East River, July 1952, and the 1955 review of this project; A Program for the Nonmilitary Defense of the United States, a study issued by the National Planning Association, May 1955. See the message from the President of the United States transmitting Reorganization Plan 3 of 1953 to the Congress under date of April 2, 1953. Both ODM and FCDA must test plans for their adequacy and completeness and more particularly must test the capability of Federal agencies to function effectively in an emergency. ODM is responsible for promoting and monitoring the planning and execution of integrated tests or the Operations Alert for this purpose. It does so through an interagency test group chaired by an ODM representative. FCDA, among other Federal agencies, participates in the work of this group. In the conduct of these tests, it has been found necessary for ODM to have direct relations with representatives of the State civil defense directors. Some of the other difficulties experienced by ODM and FCDA in the activities generated by these tests of emergency plans are described in succeeding sections. In day-to-day planning, however, lack of uniform, consistent, and comprehensive guidance leads to confusion that prevents the concerted action required by all levels of government. This is illustrated by a finding of the House of Representatives Committee on Government Operations: 6 "The FCDA guide manuals for the studies outlined 19 proposed areas of inquiry relating to evacuation. The New York and California groups, whom the subcommittee queried in some detail, had reorganized these proposed study areas. Thus the California group added categories which were omitted or only implied in the FCDA manual, such as studies of shelter availability in the target areas, food resources, industrial resources, medical aid, and military plans and organizations. "Both the New York and California studies added a category on nuclear weapons effects. "These things are necessary,' said William L. White, director of the California project, 'both to build the planning assumptions and also to test plans which might be made.' "Apparently, then, different projects are developing their own planning assumptions without any assurance that they will conform to those made elsewhere or with the relevant military intelligence and weapons technology." These inconsistencies occurred because civil defense planning to protect lives and property must comprehend the mobilization of resources and nearly all facets of the economy. However, with two agencies of the executive branch having mandates requiring them to prepare comprehensive planning assumptions and nonmilitary defense plans, unnecessary overlap, duplication of effort, and inconsistencies cannot be eliminated, and gaps in needed nonmilitary defense plans and programs inevitably result. PLANNING FOR CONTINUITY OF GOVERNMENT Until 1956 officials of both ODM and FCDA felt their respective agencies were responsible for taking steps to facilitate continuity of government activities at local levels in event of an emergency. After discussion of the problem by members of both agencies, FCDA agreed to accept responsibility for assisting State and local governments and ODM agreed to continue sponsorship of such a program for the Federal Government." Consequently, each agency develops and carries out similar programs affecting different levels of government. This division of responsibility has created, or will create, such problems as the following: 1. It has consumed staff time in coordinating plans and testing their feasibility and effectiveness. For example, ODM is responsible for having identified and for cataloging essential functions to be performed by Federal agencies in an emergency and staff requirements therefor. FCDA delegates postattack (as well as preattack) functions to other agencies. It must assure itself that delegated functions are adequately provided for because it is ultimately responsible for all civil defense activities. Therefore, the staffs of FCDA and ODM must continually work together in time-consuming collaboration in relating their own plans and those of other agencies. 2. Divided responsibility can result in conflicts between Federal and State or local agencies over the selection of their respective relocation sites. No major eonflicts have occurred because FCDA's plans for carrving on its State and local programs were not finalized until September 19, 1957, when it issued Advisory Bulletin No. 216. In the future, if a local government agency desires a relocation site that has been selected by a Federal agency, the conflict must be resolved • Civil Defense for National Survival, 24th intermediate renort of the House of Representatives Committee on Government Operations, Julv 26. 1956, n. 36. FCDA's responsibilities with respect to State and local governments were formally delegated to it by ODM by its Defense Mobilization Order (DMO) I-18, January 11, 1956. with two Federal agencies. This triangular relationship will be confusing to State and local officials and will delay decisions. 3. It will not insure that adequate provisions will be made for the most effective integrated working relationships between all levels of government that must exist in an emergency. For example, relocation sites of Federal and State agencies may be so situated as to create complicated communications problems because no single agency is responsible for insuring that ideal locations are chosen by all levels of government. Another illustration of the need for better integration is suggested by ODM's current consideration of how the broad police power of State governors may be utilized for maintaining law and order while at the same time making available the resource mobilization authorities, manpower, material, and services of the Federal Government at the points of need. PLANNING FOR MOBILIZATION AND UTILIZATION OF RESOURCES 9 Uncertainties in the extent of ODM's authority for carrying out programs to mobilize resources-manpower, goods, and production facilities—and particularly to authorize their use in an emergency resulted in the so-called basic responsibilities paper or agreement. Fundamentally this paper is premised on the assumption that planning for the (a) military, (b) civil defense, relief, and rehabilitation, and (c) resource mobilization (logistical support) problems resulting from a massive attack on the continental United States is separable and can be carried on simultaneously by separate agencies. The agreement assigns to FCDA responsibility for directing the efforts of Federal, State, and local governments, as well as national relief organizations, in all civil defense, relief, and rehabilitation matters. In addition to directing police, fire, sanitation, and similar protective activities, FCDA is responsible for providing and distributing or rationing food, clothing, shelter, and medicalcare items or services, and for restoring public facilities and utilities basic to the resumption of commerce and industry. On the other hand, ODM's role under the basic responsibilities paper is to provide logistical support to military and civilian agencies. It will “(a) mobilize resources and direct the production required to meet military requirements * ** essential civilian requirements * **, and nonmilitary requirements for foreign areas *** (b) direct economic stabilization programs; and (c) in order to accomplish the objectives set forth under (a) and (b) will direct programs for allocation of resources, including the adjudication of conflicting claims for manpower, production, energy, fuel, transportation, telecommunications, housing, food, and health services." ODM's foregoing logistical support responsibilities exclude, among other things, "civilian use items presently existing in the civilian economy, in civil defense stockpiles, in the possession of civil defense units, and in the civilian distribution system which can be directly utilized for civil defense, relief, and rehabilitation purposes without further processing." Experience of ODM, FCDA, and the delegate agencies, since the basic responsibilities paper was issued, has demonstrated that the distribution of responsibilities provided for is unworkable. This conclusion is testified to by officials of both agencies. It is, as well, demonstrated by (a) the conflicting responsibilities that remain and (b) duplication in day-to-day operations. 1. Conflicting responsibilities.-Should a devastating nuclear attack on this Nation occur, the major task would be to pick up the pieces. Is this FCDA's responsibility? Yes, but ODM's broader responsibilities, that cannot be abdicated by the informal agreement registered in the basic responsibilities paper, comprehend the duty to take appropriate actions for mobilizing and authorizing the use of all available resources in any emergency." 8 Sec. 101 (a) of Executive Order 10480 of August 15, 1953, authorizes the Director of ODM to direct, control, and coordinate all mobilization activities of the executive branch. See memorandum to heads of departments and agencies from the Director of ODM, January 31, 1957, transmitting among other items, Basic Responsibilities After Attack on the United States, as revised with explanatory footnotes. January 12, 1957. This division of responsibilities was originally agreed upon and approved on January 3, 1956. for planning purposes by the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Director of ODM, Administrator of FCDA, and the President. "Planning purposes" is defined to include, among other things, making delegations and assignments of functions insofar as current legislative authority will permit. 10 See Reorganization Plan 3 of 1953 and Executive Orders 10461 of June 17, 1953, and 10480 of August 14, 1953. |