I want to read to you at this time a paragraph from our 1956 report on page 23:

Besides evacuation, FCDA has found another way to avoid an expensive shelter program. Let each individual build his own, providing he can afford it, and has a basement or a backyard. Administrator Peterson and other FCDA officials have attributed this individual shelter approach to the refusal of Congress to appropriate the large sums necessary for group shelter construction. It turns out, however, that for the whole term of his office, Administrator Peterson has not proposed a group shelter construction program.

Recognizing the difficulties under which you work and the fact that you have to have any plan that you present accepted at higher levels, this committee, beause of its knowledge in this field, must go on record—at least the Chair goes on record at this time-as saying this, too, is a very feeble step toward the Federal Government accepting the responsibility of protecting the lives of the American people in the nuclear age.

It is a futile and inadequate step and will not give protection to the people of America, such as I wish that it would.

Mr. MINSHALL. Mr. Chairman, will you yield at that point?
Mr. HOLIFIELD. Certainly.

Mr. MINSHALL. Are you in favor then of putting in a $20 billion air-raid shelter construction program right now?

Mr. HOLIFIELD. The recommendations of this committee are very clear. I stand behind them today as I did 2 years ago. If you will read section 4 of it, the master plan for civil defense should be pointed toward the establishment of an integrated, nationwide civil-defense system based on the key civil defense measure of shelter protection against the blast, heat, and radiation effects of nuclear explosion, and there can be no Federal civil defense program in America of any consequence or of any successful result unless the key measure of shelter protection is given to the people of America.

Twenty billion dollars doesn't scare me at all. I voted $38 billion for highways this year. I will vote some $40 billion for military defense, and if the cost be $20 or $30 or $40 billion, it can't be spent in 1 year. It will have to be spent over a period of time. But there could be a program which the Federal Government is constitutionally responsible for, by the way, and that is the protection of the people of America from enemy attack-there could be a program started which would give hope to the people of America.

This shelter program which the administration has offered here will not do the job.

Mr. RIEHLMAN. Mr. Chairman, if I might be recognized. I certainly cannot agree 100 percent in your observation that this isn't something that will give protection to our people. I think that they the administration and Governor Hoegh-have outlined a constructive approach, one that I think the people should at least be willing to participate in, our own States and our own individual people.

I don't back away from our recommendations that the Federal Government should take a stronger position. I do say this-and I say it, I think, with some knowledge of the attitude of the Congress itself, and I think you would have to concur in my position-for us to present to the Congress today a proposition for the construction of shelters in the way of $20 to $40 billion is an impossible thing. I don't think the Congress is going to accept it.

I do think there is an opportunity for us here to bring this to the attention of the American people and let them start in a minor way to protect themselves. We should use the facilities we now have and start on a program. As an alternative to what we have in the way of a complete construction program of shelters throughout the Nation, I think that somewhere along the line my colleague suggested, that we have a uniform program instituted and that certain relief in the way of taxes be given to the individual who puts it in his home. Every Federal building that is constructed should include some shelter.

Every school that is constructed from now on should include a shelter, and some provision should be made for the cost for that type of construction. Then we will get something underway.

But I just don't feel that we want to say, and I can't concur with my good chairman, that this is completely a futile attempt. I think it is an honest attempt on the part of the administration. It is a presentation of at least an approach to this thing, although not as far as I would like to see it go, and I would say that as of today. But in view of what I have said about our own legislation, Mr. Chairman, I just don't feel that we are going to be able to get everything that

we want.

My first hope is if we can't get our bill, then we will take the reorganization plan. It is a step in the right direction.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Mr. Chairman, I feel a great deal as Mr. Riehlman does. We have been at a halt as to a national policy on shelters. At least this is a step. I don't think it goes far enough. I don't believe the complete picture has been looked at. I think there are many incentives you are going to have to give to homeowners if you are going to get them to cooperate. At least it is a recognition of the problem, which we have needed. At least we are doing something, although it is not enough.

If I may go one step further, the national plan that you have been working on and we are just talking about evacuation-I think this should be reevaluated in the light of this national shelter policy. I don't think you should hold out so much hope to people to evacuate and not recognize the danger of radioactive fallout.

You can't hide from it. You can't evacuate from it because you don't have any plans to evacuate to a shelter.

Mr. HOEGH. Of course we are not holding to it. We say you should prepare plans to execute it should the time be sufficient to permit you to do it.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. It isn't only time, Governor. The time has nothing to do with it. Time to evacuate doesn't mean a thing. You get the people out in the country where the radioactive dust falls and it kills them just as well as if you had left them in the city.

Mr. HOEGH. I know that.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Time to evacuate-this is a concept of the past unless you evacuate to prepared shelters where food and water and medical supplies and other things are offered. I have no desire to argue the details of this.

Of course what you have offered here is merely a commonsense start toward what we ought to have. But if we are spending $40 billion a year on the basis of a possible nuclear war, the reason we

are spending that $40 billion is to protect our people and the continuity of our institutions. The administration fails to come up and face this issue and recommend an effective shelter program. I am not saying that the Congress would follow such recommendations. I don't know.

But certainly the Congress will not take this matter under serious consideration unless it does have leadership from those who are charged with discharging the responsibility of protecting the American people. That is in your organization. It will be in the new organization.

Mr. HOEGH. That's right.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. And the new organization will place it in the Office of the President, and the President will be directly responsible to the American people when this plan goes through if there isn't an effective plan, a plan which has been approved by every responsible study group. The Gaither group, the Johns Hopkins group, the Rockefeller group, and other responsible groups that have studied this program, have said that the key feature of a manageable civil defense system is a shelter program.

You are not going to get a shelter program for the people in this way by advising them to build their own shelters, no more than you can get an army or a navy or an air force by advising each one to buy himself a jetplane. You can't do it that way.

It has got to be done not only with Federal leadership and guidance, but with Federal funding as a constitutional responsibility to protect the lives of the American people. This is the only way it is going to be done, and that type of leadership has to come from those that are responsible for the protection of the lives of the people.

When it is offered to the Congress and then the Congress turns it down, then I say the blood will be on the head of the Congress. But, until it is offered, until that leadership is given, the blood is on the hands of those responsible under the Constitution for the protection of the lives of the people in case of war.

Mr. HOEGH. Mr. Chairman, let me say this: In my opinion, this is a most realistic and practical approach. I am convinced that we will attain effective protection from radioactive fallout upon the adoption of this program. This policy is now a fixed, national policy.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. I am glad to see that step taken. It is a recognition of the facts of life. It is, at least, a recognition of the facts, as far as that goes.

Mr. HOEGH. Let me point this up. I believe people will respond. They have been waiting for a definite policy, Federal policy. It is established here.

Secondly, they want Federal leadership, guidance, and, above all, they want example. And it is provided here. I have the utmost confidence that, with the support of people like you and with others who are interested in this problem, we can have protection from radioactive fallout by this method. One hundred and fifty years agoMr. MINSHALL. Mr. Chairman?

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Just a minute, until he finishes.

Mr. HOEGH. One hundred and fifty years ago, our mission and our obligation was laid down for all people, and that is to provide for the common defense. I am confident the people will respond and will

provide for this fallout protection now that we have the policy, the leadership, guidance, and example.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Minshall.

Mr. MINSHALL. Mr. Chairman, at the outset I want to say that I have the highest regard for you as a chairman, and, if I differ with you on matters of detail, I think it is my right and prerogative.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. It certainly is.

Mr. MINSHALL. I would like to associate myself with the remarks made by Mr. Riehlman and Mr. Lipscomb, and I should also like to point out that the report that you referred to, of the 84th Congress, I should like to make it clear that at the time that report was made I was not a member of this committee.

But there is one thing that occurs to me on this federally financed massive shelter program that you advocate. I am just as much interested in the welfare of the citizens of this country as you are, Mr. Chairman, But I sometimes wonder if the boys in the Kremlin don't clap their hands and say, "Well, there they go, spending themselves to death into bankruptcy," which is what they have been hoping for and which we will do if we get into too many of these tremendous, federally financed programs.

I think the proper place for a program like this is to put sufficient money in a public-relations program and have the States and the individuals do it, and give them some kind of tax relief as an incentive. But to go along with a federally financed program that would involve initially $20 billion is ridiculous. We had testimony here the other day what one program would cost just to put a fancy goldplated shelter under the city of New York; that program, alone, would have cost close to $5 billion.

I certainly cannot in my good conscience go along, at least at this time, with any such kind of thinking that the Federal Government should jump in and spend billions of dollars when the status of our economy is such as it is today. Especially when the burden on the taxpayers is already far too heavy.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. The gentleman is entitled to his opinion.
Mr. Lipscomb has a question.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Governor, you mentioned in part of the conversation-I don't know whether it was prepared or just off the cuff-about the warning system that you had set up.

How do you envision the warning system working in the reorganization plan?

Mr. HOEGH. The existing warning system, as we have it today, does this

Mr. LIPSCOMB. I know what it does, but what are you going to do? Who is going to run it? Who is going to operate it? Who is going to direct it?

Mr. HOEGH. I don't envision a change there. There may be. That would be the prerogative of the new Director. But I feel that the system we have today is sound. We sit right there with the military, and have simultaneous access to the warning information. We immediately and simultaneously notify 200 critical points, and then the responsibility is for the State governments to send it to the local government and the local government to the people.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Is the warning system, in your definition, an operating function or a coordinating function, or what?

Mr. HOEGH. It is a function-no question about that. It comes close to what I would consider an operating function, because it is part of operation, and the people must know.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Mr. Gray says the role of the Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization, at best, will be one of direction, coordination, and stimulation. Under which one of these titles or duties does the warning system come?

Mr. HOEGH. I imagine under direction. That would be his interpretation. What was that again?

Mr. LIPSCOMB. The role of the Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization, at best, will be one of direction, coordination, and stimulation. There is nothing said, at least in this definition of the Office, about operating.

Mr. HOEGH. Let me say again, I think the way that we do warn now is effective. The general channel is good. We disseminate it to the States in the critical-target cities. They have the responsibility, the State governors, of disseminating to the local communities, and the local government disseminates it to the people. I think that is a good channel.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Have you had the opportunity to look at the chart of recommended organization for civilian mobilization?

Mr. HOEGH. Yes, sir.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. In that chart—I haven't had any specific information on it, because we haven't been able to get it-but under the delegation of duty to the Department of Defense, No. 1 is warning. Do you agree that this delegation of duty should be given to the Department of Defense?

Mr. HOEGH. I have said that I was very satisfied with the way that we are now doing it. This is a recommendation, Mr. Congressman, that we, of course, would evaluate. I have not come to a conclusion whether I would shift from the old position, because it has been working effectively.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Excuse me. It is divided into two parts-your military part and then your civilian obligation of distributing the warning. So, it is a combination function now, isn't it? You get your early warning from the military.

Mr. HOEGH. Yes. Our officials sit with the North American Air Defense Command in Colorado Springs.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. That's true. But I am talking about the warning that comes in to Colorado Springs. That comes from the military. Mr. HOEGH. Oh, yes; they still have that responsibility, and should. Mr. HOLIFIELD. From that time on you take over the function for the continental United States?

Mr. HOEGH. Insofar as the civilians are concerned. They alert their military.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. To be responsive to Mr. Lipscomb's question, is it envisioned that all warning will be delegated to the military under this recommendation? I am not saying you are going to accept it. Mr. HOEGH. I think that that is included in one of the recommendations, one of the plans.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Would this carry through right down to the local community? Would the military warn the local community then and take over your function that you now perform from Colorado Springs?