Mr. HOLIFIELD. That is of FCDA structure?

Mr. HOEGH. That's right.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. In the ODM structure, will you answer the same question, Mr. Gray?

Mr. GRAY. I am not sure I know what your definition of "executive personnel" is, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. I am not sure either. I was not thinking necessarily of the rank and file workers, but men in professional positions, I would say grade 12 and above.

Mr. GRAY. If you make it that broad, I think an honest answer would say that I am unable to say that there won't be some peoplewhen you say eliminated, I don't mean liquidated. They may be transferred to other functions somewhere in the Federal Government, or related functions.

But I think that it is obvious that when two agencies are merged, that to the extent the resulting organization has duplicating functions, it is not in the interest of the Government to continue to perpetuate this duplication.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. The Chair is not suggesting that the worth of this plan would depend upon eliminating 10 people from Government positions or 15. I didn't mean to suggest that. Certainly my judgment of the plan would not necessarily depend upon it.

I am just asking from the standpoint of the record as to whether any reduction would take place. As a matter of fact, I think if the job is done that needs to be done, you would probably have to increase your personnel in both agencies.

Mr. GRAY. Mr. Chairman, as you know there has been a lot of public discussion and discussion upon the Hill, particularly on the Senate side, about the railroads. You occasionally hear talk about railroad mergers. When two railroads merge, there are two presidents, I don't know how many executive vice presidents, et cetera.

I suppose you don't end up necessarily with two presidents, you may end up with a president and a chairman of the executive committee. Just to take a single illustration-and I am sure neither Governor Hoegh nor I know who is going to be head of the new agency-it cannot have two directors.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. You both are very capable men. If it comes to the worst, you can pitch a coin, you know.

Mr. GRAY. That would suit me well.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. In the McKinsey study on page 5-13 of the second volume we have this language:

To direct and coordinate effectively the efforts of other Federal departments and agencies, it is necessary that the proposed Office of Civilian Mobilization have its offices in the District of Columbia or its environs and be symbolically identified as the Executive Office of the President. This will mean moving certain elements of the FCDA national headquarters in Battle Creek back to Washington, but not all of them. In our view the Battle Creek facilities make an ideal location for a national nonmilitary defense training center. We would propose leaving almost all public information and education and training activities at Battle Creek. In addition, it may be feasible to continue the nonmilitary defense research and development activity at Battle Creek.

Do you agree in principle with that part of the study, and I ask this on behalf of Congressman Johansen and Mrs. Griffiths, both of Michigan.

Do you care to comment on that part of it?

Mr. HOEGH. Mr. Chairman, our operations as of now, and I think in the past, have not in any way been hampered by having our headquarters at Battle Creek, Mich. As I mentioned, we have 57 people here and we have over 750 in Battle Creek, Mich.

We, of course, advocate dispersion. I think when you advocate something you ought to practice it. Second, we have good communications in Battle Creek, Mich. They are good. We spend a lot of money in perfecting them.

Third, it is well located for the Nation. We find from that standpoint that it has been helpful to the States and to the local governments. It does reduce some of the expenses that they must incur in order to come to our schools.

Of course, Congress has had foresight. It looks like they are going to provide additional funds so that we can have a training center on the west coast and also the east coast. That will further help the States and the local governments and make our schools more accessible to them.

So generally speaking, I say that maybe some of our key personnel will come down here to be closer to these other agencies of government. As to how many, I haven't determined yet. But I want to let the committee know, as I have others, that the operation now is effective. Mr. GRAY. Mr. Chairman, I don't know whether you addressed that question to both of us.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. I wasn't aware that you had any people up there.

Mr. GRAY. I can only speak to one point of it. No, we are not in any way concerned with Battle Creek. Certainly Governor Hoegh's judgment of the effectiveness of the operation would be absolutely controlling as far as I am concerned.

I do think, however, as to the first part of that sentence, that it is important for the locus of the Director to be in Washington and identified with the Executive Office of the President.

I am speaking only to the first half of that statement.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Riehlman.

Mr. RIEHLMAN. I have no questions.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Lipscomb.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. No.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Minshall.

Mr. MINSHALL. I have one question, Mr. Chairman. I noticed in the Governor's statement on page 7

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. HOLIFIELD. All right, go ahead, Governor. I think you had better read this because none of us has had a chance to see it.

Mr. HOEGH. Former Administrator Val Peterson has previously discussed with you proposals relating to the organization of civil defense and defense mobilization. As mentioned by Mr. Finan in his opening remarks, this committee, and especially its chairman, has conducted most important studies which have materially assisted in the development of this reorganization plan which will facilitate the improvement of the Nation's nonmilitary defense.

În the preparation of the plan a great deal of consideration has been given to the testimony developed during the committee hearings of the last 3 years.

These committee activities, which culminated in the issuance of the committee interim report in 1956, and the introduction last year of Chairman Holifield's bill, H. R. 2125, and companion measures, are important parts of the history of the President's proposal.

Both proposals are firmly founded upon the principle that modern weapons and the means for their rapid delivery require:

1. That the total nonmilitary defense activities of the Federal Government be given a priority commensurate to that established for our military preparedness measures.

2. That each proposal recognizes the inseparability of civil defense and the related nonmilitary defense activities presently being conducted by the Office of Defense Mobilization.

3. Both proposals recognize the essentiality of integrating many nonmilitary defense activities into the normal day-to-day functions of various departments and agencies of the Federal Government.

4. H. R. 2125 and the reorganization plan are both predicated upon the principle that the nonmilitary defense responsibilities of the Federal Government must be under the general supervision of a single organizational unit and that such unit must be given a position of stature and authority. Central guidance and supervision are essential to insure that the departments and agencies are adequately prepared to carry out their assigned emergency functions.

5. The basic concept of the reorganization plan goes even further than the previous proposals. The plan will vest the total nonmilitary defense responsibility in the President and will establish, in the Executive Office of the President, the Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization to assist him in the discharge of these responsibilities. Consistent with this basic concept, the reorganization plan transfers the functions vested in me as the Federal Civil Defense Administrator, under the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950, to the President.

This committee is familiar with the provisions of the Civil Defense Act, and it is not my intention to burden you with a detailed description of those functions. In general terms, the act authorizes me to prepare national plans and conduct programs designed to protect life and property in the United States from enemy attack.

More specifically, title II of that act provides authority for particular activities to be undertaken. This involves establishment of adequate civil defense communications, the development and maintenance of a national attack warning system, the conduct of civil defense studies and research, the training and instruction of civil defense personnel, the acquisition and maintenance of reserve stocks of equipment and materials for use during an emergency, the furnishing of financial assistance to the States and their political subdivisions for civil defense purposes, and the education of the population relative to civil defense measures.

Very briefly, these are examples of the preattack activities engaged in by the Federal Civil Defense Administration to develop the capability of the Nation to absorb the effects of modern war and survive if it should come.

As this committee is aware, the act, in title III, also contains many extraordinary emergency powers designed to permit the Administrator to carry out his responsibilities under attack and postattack conditions. These extensive powers, which by the terms of the statute

are exercised only during a civil defense emergency, and then subject to the direction and control of the President, would be transferred by the reorganization plan, directly to the President.

Since my appointment as Federal Civil Defense Administrator, I have become aware of the interrelationship of responsibilities discharged, on behalf of the President, by the Office of Defense Mobilization and many of the programs conducted by the Federal Civil Defense Administration. I have discussed this subject with Mr. Gray and our staffs have engaged in a continuing effort to delineate the appropriate areas of activity of the respective agencies.

To date, in my opinion these efforts have met with some degree of success; but as a result of extensive review of the problems, I have reached the conclusion that single direction of the total nonmilitary defense activities of the Federal Government is essential to the adequate development of the Nation's capability to protect life and property from attack. I believe this committee has gone on record as reaching a similar conclusion.

In addition to the civil defense functions, there is also vested in me, by Executive order, the responsibility to assist the President in administering Federal assistance to the States and cities to supplement their efforts in combating the effects of major disasters. This activity is known as the natural disaster program.

The similarity between many civil defense emergency activities and Federal action to alleviate suffering and hardship brought about by floods and tornadoes is apparent. Further, the use of State and local civil defense organizations in natural disaster work has substantially contributed to their effectiveness by providing an opportunity for the realistic testing of emergency plans.

Inasmuch as this responsibility is already vested in the President by statute, no transfer of this function would be made by the reorganization plan. It is assumed that the Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization would, by a subsequent Executive order, be charged with the responsibility of assisting the President in the administration of this program.

As a former governor, I am aware of the practical problems facing civil defense officials at the State and local levels. Since becoming Administrator, I have been even more convinced of the importance of the role that the States and the cities must perform if our Nation is to survive a nuclear attack.

I say without hesitation that the success or failure of the Nation's nonmilitary defense effort and I mean defense mobilization, including economic stabilization, resources management and other related activities as well as civil defense-will be determined by the way that our State and local governments operate under emergency conditions.

Further, the way that they react will be determined by the extent to which they have, during the preattack period, developed their capability to operate under such conditions.

Therefore, our total nonmilitary defense effort, including our Federal planning, must be predicated upon the development of the capability of governments, at all levels, to effectively continue to carry out their essential functions under emergency conditions.

This is why I have placed such a high priority upon the program that we call continuity of Government, as I explained earlier. This

program is designed to assist State and local governments to increase their capability to operate effectively under attack and postattack conditions.

In order that the States and their political subdivisions can effectively plan and organize their efforts to develop this capability to continue operating, it is essential that they know what is expected of them. It is equally essential that they be advised what they may expect, in the way of assistance, from the Federal Government.

There is, and always has been, some duplication and overlap in the activities of the Federal Civil Defense Administration and the Office of Defense Mobilization. Any mayor, industrialist, or governor will agree with that statement. Perhaps in these early days of nonmilitary defense planning such overlap has not always been disadvantageous.

I am certain that much valuable experience and knowledge was gained by both the Federal Civil Defense Administration and the Office of Defense Mobilization in connection with such activities, but the disadvantages of this duplication now far outweigh any benefits.

However, one of my first tasks upon becoming Administrator was to attempt to clarify the respective civil defense roles of the Federal, State and local governments. I determined that the best manner in which to accomplish this was the development of a new national civil defense plan.

To this end, and as a matter of urgent priority, my agency is completing a plan which establishes national courses of action and sets forth step by step how the mission is to be accomplished, and by whom.

It is, of course, essential that such a plan be completely coordinated within the executive branch of the Federal Government. It is equally essential that the States and cities review it, comment on it, and make such suggestions as are necessary to insure that it is a simple, practical and workable plan.

This task is nearing completion. The plan has been accepted and approved by various representatives of State and local governments, as well as the national associations of State and local civil defense officials. During recent weeks I have personally supervised the coordination of the plan within the Federal Government. I am happy to report that there is general agreement on its major aspects.

The preparation and coordination of the new national civil defense plan confirmed my earlier conclusion that all of the nonmilitary defense activities of the Federal Government should be placed under single direction.

I am convinced that the consolidation of these two agencies, and the elimination of artificial delineations of responsibilities, will result in a substantial increase in the effectiveness of the total nonmilitary defense activities of the Federal Government.

It will certainly eliminate much of the confusion that exists in the minds of State and local officials as to which Federal agency is in charge of particular areas of activity in the event of an emergency. These results alone would be adequate justification for the acceptance of the proposal to consolidate the two agencies.

I do not want to conclude my remarks without mentioning one other thing. There are, in addition to organization, other problems facing