STATEMENT OF COMDR. G. B. HOWE, UNITED STATES NAVY, HEAD, PASSIVE DEFENSE BRANCH, OFFICE OF CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

Commander Howe. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee: The Navy's protective construction policy includes the protective measures of dispersal, duplication, strengthening and underground construction. It is designed to protect personnel, equipment, and facilities against the effects of nuclear weapons. This policy, developed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and coordinated by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Properties and Installations, is aimed at increasing the survival probability of weapons systems essential for the conduct of combat missions.

The Navy does not have a shelter program, per se. Shelters are provided only to those personnel essential to the operation of highly classified essential facilities in the same manner as protection is afforded to the equipment and facilities these personnel operate.

The Bureau of Yards and Docks has overall technical cognizance of protective construction, including shelter design and actual construction. Design projects and studies are performed by the Bureau of Yards and Docks and its Naval Civil Engineering Research and Evaluation Laboratory, and also for BuDocks by the Naval Research Laboratory, the Naval Radiological Defense Laboratory, and private engineering firms.

The Navy feels that the state of the art of shelter design is well developed. Continuing emphasis is being put on lowering the cost of shelters and other protective construction.

A variety of studies on shelters and other protective construction measures have been sponsored and conducted by the Navy. One of these studies completed in 1956 was for the purpose of determining the total protective construction requirements of the naval shore establishment. This completed study is in fact the Navy's long-range plan for protective construction.

The Navy intends to pursue this plan.

Individual protective construction items will be considered in the annual military construction program in accordance with the priorities assigned.

These projects will, of course, compete with other military construction projects for the funds available.

I purposely kept my statement short because my supporting witness, Commander H. L. Murphy, has the details which I think you would like to hear concerning the shelters tested.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. All right, we will proceed to his statement. Commander Murphy.

STATEMENT OF COMDR. H. L. MURPHY, CIVIL ENGINEER CORPS, UNITED STATES NAVAL RESERVE, DIRECTOR, PASSIVE DEFENSE DIVISION, BUREAU OF YARDS AND DOCKS

Commander MURPHY. Chairman Holifield and members of the subcommittee: It is my purpose to supplement the Navy general statement with additional data, requested by this subcommittee, dealing with engineering and related technical matters.

Specifically, such data include discussion of two Navy Bureau of Yards and Docks-sponsored structures (shelter) projects in the 1957 Plumbbob tests in Nevada, and a summary of selected studies performed by or for the Bureau of Yards and Docks bearing upon the problems of shelter against nuclear weapons effects.

Because it was written for informative purposes similar to the aims of this statement, an article being published in the forthcoming issue of the BuDocks Technical Digest is incorporated herein and will be amplified by additional data and figures.

In a continuing search over many years, the Bureau has considered many structures offering promise of low-cost shelter against atomic, biological, or chemical warfare attack. This search has turned up excellent shelters constructed or precast thin-shell concrete sections (bolted into dome or gable structure), or of corrugated steel plates (circular arch structure.) The latter, commonly known as an ammunition magazine and manufactured as a stock item by several firms, has been detailed with or without earth cover, including several cover configurations. The significant change over earlier versions is that the earth cover is now extended horizontally to a plane through the structure base at approximately 45 degrees, then sloped to natural grade (Figure 2 is for balanced cut-and-fill), thus reducing the sensitivity of the arch structure to the (asymmetric) blast drag (wind) loading.2 Figures 1 and 2 show the latest concepts of this buried shelter tested both with and without the steel ribs indicated.

More recently, consideration has also been given to use of standard sewer conduits and cattle-pass sections for shelter, the concept involving 2 to 4 parallel "runs" (50 to 200 feet long) connected by a crosshead structure with entranceway (s), decontamination spaces and equipment. Figure 3 depicts the test configuration used for evaluating the conduits only.

3

With careful construction techniques, in dry cohesive soils, 1957 tests using kiloton-range weapons showed no significant deformation of the corrugated metal shelters and conduits, shown herewith, under the following approximate blast peak overpressures: Corrugated metal arch shelter, without ribs-50 to 60 psi; with ribs-90 to 100 psi; reinforced concrete sewer and circular corrugated metal pipes-130 to 140 psi; corrugated metal cattle-pass-150 to 160 psi. It is highly probably that all of these structures would satisfactorily withstand much higher peak overpressures, for example, conduits to 200 psi or more, whether from kiloton or megaton range weapons. Various soil types could, of course, modify these structural resistance values. Protection against all comparable initial and residual (fallout) radiation effects is incorporated by varying the thickness of earth cover and sandbagging details.

Detailed discussion of protective shelters' is inappropriate here; however, a few comments to augment the figures may be of interest. Conduits tested were 8 ft. precast concrete sewer (ASTM C75-55) and 8 ft. corrugated steel plate (10 gage) pipes, and corrugated steel plate (10 gage) cattle-pass 7'8'' x 5′10′′. In figure 2, the plan is varied to suit use-mass shelter, operating center, sickbay—and whether to be a pressurized, nonmask shelter or one requiring individual protective masks. Entrance details are also varied; others might include a steep, narrow-tread, shipboard-type "ladder" in a slightly larger conduit and hatch, or one similar to that of the standard FCDA (100 pounds per square inch) industrial shelter, figure 4. A trapdoor-and-sand emergency exit should be provided at the other end. Vents should include blast closures— possibly sliding steel door in the concrete "box" or high-pressure valve in the 8-inch, extra-heavy steel pipe-closed manually, or automatically by light, thermal or blast from the explosion. Floor should not be tied to the foundation, to allow the structure to "punch" downward slightly with the blast. Concrete shield walls could be used in lieu of sandbags, but the latter are easier to remove and replace, if necessary for equipment movement.

The "ribs" referred to in the article in connection with the modified ammunition magazine are 6-inch I-beams weighing 121⁄2 pounds per linear foot (6112.5). It should be made clear that the ammo magazine

1 NavDocks TP-PL-8, Personnel Protective Shelters, June 1953 (under revision).

2 The Effects of Nuclear Weapons (GPO), sec. 6.13.

* Classified reports by Lt. (jġ.) G. H. Albright, CEC, USNR.

shelter shown is complete when erected without such "ribs," due to the corrugations running circumferentially.

In contrast the so-called quonset-type structure is essentially_a ribbed structure with a lighter gage corrugated metal covering. In fact, the ammo magazine corrugated steel plates in the arch are not in contact with the "ribs" as erected; contact is made only after the structure receives a very heavy load causing general deflection in the arch.

The ammo magazine shelter version without ribs was used by the Naval Radiological Defense Laboratory in their Plumbbob (1957) radiological shelter test which was discussed by Dr. Paul Tompkins in earlier testimony before this subcommittee. The earth cover and the entrance detail were, of course, differently designed due to the comparatively low blast pressures expected and received. This design version without ribs has been in BuDocks publications for several years, as is indicated by the article. The significant advance through 1957 tests has been in what we have learned about earth cover configurations.

Sheets 1, 2, and 3 provide supplementary sketches and data to those provided by the article. Sheet 1 includes technical details on the corrugated steel plates. Sheet 2 provides further information on the conduits. Sheet 3 shows one concept for using the pipe conduits in a large personnel shelter.

The plan shown in figure 2 includes biological and chemical warfare protection. Capacity might be 30 to 80 persons, depending on use, whether for one or both sexes, and the quantity of supplies to be stored inside the shelter. The "30" figure might be valid for such working spaces as control or communications centers. The "80" figure is considered approximately correct as an upper figure for personnel shelter and is based on approximately 10 square feet per person, a figure already cited several times to the subcommittee.

An engineering estimate of cost, prepared by BuDocks personnel in 1957, for construction of the ammo magazine shelter shown in figures 1 and 2, totaled $26,000 excluding land and any operating equipment and supplies, as well as emergency power and potablewater tanks. This estimate was for construction in the Norfolk, Va., area, but the estimate can be related to various areas in the world through use of our published cost index.

Table I shows the aforementioned blast peak overpressures related to distances from ground zero for contact surface burst of several weapon yields; the latest known unclassified graph of pressuredistance data-reprint of talk on October 16, 1957, at A. S. C. E. annual meeting, New York City, by Capt. Ferd E. Anderson, Jr., Corps of Engineers, U. S. Army, Blast Division, AFSWP-has been used.

Concerning the matter of selected studies performed by or for the Bureau of Yards and Docks and bearing upon the problems of shelter against nuclear weapon effects:

The bulk of information in this area is embodied in table II. We have excluded studies such as radiological decontamination and that sort of thing as not bearing on shelter. I should point out also that many of these projects are jointly supported, with 2, 3, or 4 agencies chipping in.

In summary, these investigations include such things as design of entranceways, air filtration systems, roof washdown systems, and investigation of the response of structures and structural elements to atomic blast effects. Some other items include a current engineering design and prototype fabrication contract ($41,385) for a blast-closure device capable of withstanding at least 50 pounds per square inch blast peak overpressure. The design stage is about 95 percent completed.

Another item is a study of the potentialities of monolithic reinforced concrete shear wall structures, one-story initially, for resisting atomic blast effects. Study is by DuDocks structural engineers, utilizes electronic computer facilities to handle the large number of repetitive calculations involved, and is nearing completion. This study has been extended to arches and domes; this phase is approximately 50 percent completed.

I would like to insert a comment on duplication, if I may, sir. Duplication is unavoidable, but I think it is largely avoided in these areas through the many interagency committees that we have, through the very detailed and searching budget procedures that we must go through, and through formal and informal liaison.

As an example of a related matter outside of the Government, the American Society of Civil Engineers has a committee on structural dynamics that is preparing a Manual of Engineering Practice to be entitled "Design of Protective Structures To Resist Nuclear Weapons Effects."

While the membership of that committee is chosen on the basis of individual members of the society, it so happens-I feel sure by prearrangement more than accident-that all of the agencies concerned with this field and the college professor types that are specialists in the field, are on this committee; and the committee manual, aimed at enlarging the capability of consulting engineers in this country to design protective structures, will represent the benefit of studies undertaken by all these different agencies. These include specifically my own Bureau, the Army Engineers, AFSWP, FCDA, and on down the line.

Technical data and information developed by the Bureau of Yards and Docks to meet its responsibilities to the Navy are published in early stages in the BuDocks Technical Digest, later in formal technical publications and other directives such as instructions and notices.

The Technical Digest goes to all Civil Engineer Corps officers, to most activities of the Navy Shore Establishment, to more than 150 repository libraries, and to selected addressees.

The Technical Publications are distributed to specific lists to meet user requirements and are available on request by libraries, public bodies, Government contractors, and so forth.

The Technical Digest and those technical publications of mutual concern are routinely furnished to the Federal Civil Defense Administration, which reciprocates by furnishing copies of all FCDA publications to the Bureau.

I might say that, finally, the Bureau has adopted and distributed one or more publications, for our own use, of the Army Engineers, Federal Civil Defense Administration, Atomic Energy Commission, and so on.

That completes my prepared statement, Mr. Chairman.

(The tables and figures referred to in the prepared statement by Commander Murphy are as follows:)