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Now just a few words about cotton dust, the other major problem. The present OSHA regulations for cotton dust exposure set the exposure level at one milligram per cubic meter of total dust. Additionally, the standards require that administrative or engineering controls be implemented, wherever feasible-feasible again being divined by OSHA as possible attainment without regard to costs.

Whenever these controls are not feasible, protective equipment, respirators, et cetera, should be used. In almost all textile plants, there are dust levels in excess of 1 milligram per cubic meter, with respirable dust levels decreasing with subsequent steps in the process. The original research done on dust cotton, was done in England and basically concerned itself with the measurement of and the effects of respirable dust. Respirable dust consists of microscopic particules too small to be seen with the naked eye, as opposed to total dust, which is made up of both respirable dust and visible cotton lint which is harmless.

However, when OSHA established existing dust standards, it turned away from the original concept and published standards based upon total dust with a completely different technique for its measurement. Much of the present problems that OSHA is creating for the textile industry revolves around that decision on OSHA's part regarding total dust. One milligram of respirable dust is one thing and over a long period of time, it is probably serious for some individuals, but 1 milligram of total dust, most of which is harmless cotton lint, is a completely different matter.

OSHA is taking the latter, the total dust-an approach far more difficult to comply with. The original measurement was made with instruments which principally measured respirable dust. Those instruments were placed throughout the work area. But OSHA adopted a total dust measurement method, whereby the worker wears a little dust collection device. Take a situation where there is a big box of cotton-if the worker moves an arm full of cotton, as part of his assignment and gets it anywhere near that little collection instrument, he loads that instrument with harmless cotton lint, but that action throws the plant out of compliance. There is no engineering technique to resolve this problem because it involves personal, individual habits of the worker, although OSHA now is issuing citations based on that kind of measurement.

There is medical evidence that a comparatively small percentage of individuals react to cotton dust. It is possible and it is practical, with medical surveillance to identify these people and to move them out of that area into another assignment. There is no medical evidence that establishes a threshold limit value for the quantity of cotton dust that will cause the respirator problem.

Senator NUNN. Mr. Fitzgerald, we have other witnesses that will have to leave shortly. This has been an excellent presentation, if you could conclude.

Mr. FITZGERALD. Sir, may I say just three more things? The industry strongly supports the Senator's bill to improve the congressional oversight of Federal agencies such as OSHA. We feel it would be imperative that this headlong rush into further capital spending at least be checked until the problems can be understood. In our view this can lie only in the hands of the Congress. Thank you.

Senator NUNN. Thank you very much. We appreciate you all being here. You have done an excellent job of presenting the textile's concern in this area and we appreciate your presentations.

[Prepared statement of Mr. Fitzgerald follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF L. K. FITZGERALD, DEERING-MILLIKEN SERVICES CORPORATION, SPARTANBURG, S.C.

Existing OSHA regulations specify that employees shall not be exposed to noise in excess of 90 dBA for an eight hour time weighted average. The regulation further provides that wherever noise levels exceed this standard, feasible engineering o radministrative controls be applied to reduce levels to this standard. Should those controls fail to bring the noise level to a 90 dBA, personal protective equipment (ear plugs/muffs) must be provided.

Time will not allow more than a brief comment on the existing noise levels in the industry. At least half of all textile employees are concerned with the operation of looms and spinning frames, and each of these broad machinery classifications is substantially above a 90 dBA noise level.

Consider looms. More than 95% of the 360,000 looms in place operate at a sound level of 102/103 dBA. There are no conversion parts to lower this level, there is no retrofit kit; there is nothing the industry can order or buy, at any figure, to reduce this level. OSHA does not know how to bring this sound level down, nor does the textile industry, nor do the machinery manufacturers, who have so testified under oath. There are no mechanical means known. Nor is there today even a design concept of an outright new loom that would meet a 90 dBA standard. And this says, most importantly, that nobody can estimate costs for bringing existing looms into compliance, or estimate costs for building a new loom for which not even a concept exists.

Consider the 19,000,000 spinning spindles now in place. They operate at a noise level in the 90/96 dBA range, with the vast majority at 93/96 dBA. The machinery manufacturers, who built this equipment originally, and who supply parts for it, believe that 2 of the 19 million spindles can be brought into compliance for $24/spindle. Of the remaining 17 million spindles, an expenditure of twice the foregoing amount per spindle will still not bring the noise level more than part way to the 90 dBA. Or to say it differently, anywhere from half to three quarters of a billion dollars could be spent on a non-productive hodge podge remedy, that would not meet the standard, and would serve no useful purpose. Employees would still be required to wear hearing protective devices, just as though no expenditure had been made.

The Occupational Safety and Health Administration is in process of proposing a new noise standard, which may result in the retention of the present 90 dBA standard, or may come to be the Environmental Protection Agency's proposed 85 dBA standard, either of which will require medical surveillance.

OSHA is required to provide an economic impact study regarding this proposed new standard, and has done so. The textile industry presented its views on this OSHA study last July, and both OSHA and the contractor who made the study admitted the study to be inadequate. Whereupon OSHA ordered the contractor to remake the study. The contractor has done so, and even though his work is not published, I have a draft copy of it. If anything, it is a poorer factual rendition than the earlier version-at least, wherein it deals with the textile industry. Let me tell you what it says. "Note that costs are based on the assumption that industry at present is in total compliance with a 90 dBA regulation." We are not in compliance with the 90 dBA standard. We don't know how to get into compliance with the 90 dBA standard. We don't know what it would cost to get into compliance were it to be possible-nor do the machinery suppliers know-nor does this contractor-nor does OSHA.

But the study then goes on to say that an 85 dBA standard in the textile industry, which is 5 dBA lower than the 90 dBA standard, can be achieved for $1.4 billion. And that figure, too, is so much poppycock. Just to replace the looms alone, with the best loom that has ever been built, anywhere on earth, but which will not come even close to 90 dBA-would be $20 billion.

And so we go our way with OSHA thrusting these decisions down our throats, without even the remotest idea of what they're doing to the industry. However, this study made at OSHA's direction, without factual foundation as it is and woefully inadequate as it is makes an interesting point.

It concludes that the economic impact of the textile industry being forced to meet an 85 dBA noise standard would be much greater, upon the South Atlantic States, than that of any other industry, in any other part of the nation. What does the textile industry recommend?

It recommends that the term "feasible" in the regulation refer to economics as well as to technology. It does not want any part of the OSHA interpretation of feasibility, which is "possible of attainment" without regard to cost.

The industry wants to spend no capital in partial remedies, which will not attain the standard. It serves no constructive purpose to spend blank dollars to reduce the noise level of a machine from a 99 to a 97 dBA. It does serve a useful purpose to reduce from a 92 to a 90 dBA, if that be the standard, and if the expenditure be economically justifiable.

The industry wishes to be deemed in compliance with the standards if it protects the hearing of its employees with protective devices wherever feasible engineering controls are not available.

The industry wants a realistic standard based upon a demonstrated medical need, and not a standard requiring irresponsible capital expenditure.

COTTON DUST

At present, the OSHA regulations for cotton dust exposure set the exposure level at 1 mg/M3 of total dust. Additionally, the standards require that administrative or engineering controls be implemented whenever "feasible," with feasible again being defined by OSHA as "possible of attainment" without regard to cost. When these controls are not feasible, protective equipment (respirators) or other protective measures shall be used to keep the exposure of employees to the 1 mg limit.

In almost all textile plants the opening, picking and carding areas have dust levels in excess of the 1 mg/M3 standard, with respirable dust levels decreasing with the subsequent steps in processing.

The original research done in the establishment of a cotton dust standard was done in England, and basically concerned itself with the measurement of, and effects of, "respirable" dust. Respirable dust consists of microscopic particles, too small to be seen with the naked eye, as opposed to "total dust" which is made up of both respirable dust and visible cotton lint, which is harmless. However, when OSHA established th existing dust standard, it turned away from the original concepts, and established standards based upon total dust, with a completely different technique for the measurement of it.

Much of the present problem that OSHA is creating for the textile industry revolves around this original decision.

1 mg/M3 of respirable dust is one thing, and over a long period is probably serious for some individuals, but 1 mg/M3 of total dust, much of which is harmless cotton lint, is a completely different matter. OSHA is taking the latter far more difficult of compliance approach.

The original measurement of dust was made by instruments which principally measured respirable dust, being hung about in the work area. But OSHA adopted a total dust measurement method, whereby the workman wears a little dust collection device. Here also is a serious bone of contention, since the personal, individual habits and practices of the workman so tremendously affect the amount of dust collected. If he moves an armful of cotton, which is part of his assignment, and gets it near the collection instrument, he loads the instrument with cotton lint, which is harmless, but which throws the plant out of compliance. There is no engineering technique to resolve this personal practices problem, although OSHA is issuing citations based upon this kind of measurement.

There is medical evidence that a comparatively small percentage of exposed individuals do react to cotton dust. It is possible, and practical, with medical surveillance, to identify these people, and to move them to other assignments. There is no medical evidence that establishes a threshhold limit value for the quantity of cotton dust that will cause the respiratory problem known as byssinosis.

There is no evidence which defines the byssinosis causative agent in cotton dust.

There is no known technique or device which will reliably measure the levels of respirable cotton dust to which textile employees may be exposed.

With these underlying and basic unknowns, the textile industry, through its trade association, the ATMI, presented to OSHA, in 1973, a study known as

"Work Practices for Cotton Dust," which will provide protection to employees exposed to cotton dust. This document recommends procedures for determining dust levels, recommends a medical management program, and recommends measures for the protection of exposed employees.

However, OSHA is now embarked upon drafting a new standard for cotton dust exposure. We are told that the new standard will be .2 mg/M3, for all textile processes.

There is a somewhat different problem of technology here than was the case with noise. There are, in existence, technologies which could conceivably reduce cotton dust to virtually any desired level, if cost be disregarded. A nation which can create literally dust free space capsule work areas, can control cotton dust. The problem is that the ultimate cost to the consumer would be great indeed.

OSHA does not have in hand an economic impact study of the effect on the industry of their new proposal. A contractor for such a study has been selected, and hopefully he will be able to produce factual data.

In the meantime, the textile industry itself, with the help of consulting engineers, and with the help of all of the domestic firms which manufacture cotton dust control equipment, has put together a completely documented study dealing with the costs involved. Neither OSHA, nor the selected contractor, has at its disposal the necessary factual data from hundreds of textile plants, to be able to create an economic impact study based upon fact.

When the industry originally put its study together, OSHA had indicated that the most severe standards anticipated would be .2 mg/M3 in yarn manufacturing, and .75 mg/M3 in subsequent processes such as weaving, knitting, and so on. Differing levels, for different processes, are proper since respirable dust, which is the culprit, is basically removed in the early processes. Consequently, the industry studied the costs of .2 mg/M3 in the early processes, and .75 mg/M3 in the late processes. Now OSHA comes back indicating that it is considering a .2 mg/M3 level for all processes, regardless of the amount of respirable cotton dust involved in the late processes.

At this point, I can only give you the capital and the operating costs for meeting OSHA's earlier conclusions. It will cost the industry $920 million in capital to meet this standard, with an annual operating cost of $254 million. It is interesting to note that nearly two-thirds of this annual operating cost is for electric power, in an energy hungry nation.

To put these costs into context for you, the capital expenditure is at least equal to one and one-half years of the industry's total annual expenditure for new plants and equipment. And the added operating costs will simply pass on an added quarter of a billion dollars to the consumer.

What does the industry recommend? Simply that the health of all employees exposed to cotton dust be protected, as it can be, by adhering to the ATMI's "Work Practices" document, at least until the basic factors which pertain can be studied and understood, to see if there be any overall better road to protection from cotton dust.

The industry further points out that no useful purpose is served by expending capital on partial solutions. A reduction in cotton dust, from 1.2 to 1.1 mg/M3, at a cost of blank dollars, serves no purpose, since employees must be protected by other means at hand.

The industry strongly supports Senator Nunn's bill to improve the congressional oversight of Federal Agencies, such as OSHA. It is imperative that this headlong rush into further capital spending at least be checked, until the problems, can be understood. This can lie only in the hands of the Congress. Senator NUNN. Our next witness, Mr. Inman Allen, the Inman Co., Atlanta.

TESTIMONY OF INMAN ALLEN, PRESIDENT, THE INMAN COMPANY, ATLANTA, GA.

Mr. ALLEN. In this day of overrides, it seems to me this morning you have been suffering through what you might call time overrun. We assure you we will give you a time underrun.

I have a prepared statement that I want to read.

I am sure this hearing has been convened in order that you may receive some specific examples of the impact of Federal regulations and thus become better educated. Let me recall one definition of education; "education is what is left over after you forget all the facts." With this in mind, I want to address myself realistically to the impact of Federal regulations on a company that I own. It is not the Inman Co., the company with which I am generally associated as president and chief executive officer. If anyone is sufficiently curious about the identity of the company to which the following points refer, the Federal identification number is 58-1135695.

The company I am using as an example sells carbon dioxide gas in a solid form, generally known as dry ice or hot ice. The company's sales in 1975 were $316,701; it generated a pretax profit of $40,004 which produced roughly $27,000 as an after-tax figure, or 8.6 percent of sales. Within many business circles this percentage is perfectly reasonable, and, to me, it represents an adequate return on invest

ment.

The company employs six people; of these six, one is the general manager, one fulfills a secretarial and bookkeeping function, three are routepersons, and one is a warehouseperson. The company is a stock corporation and was organized under the laws of the State of Georgia in June 1972. In many respects, it is very similar to a significant number of small proprietorships, partnerships, and corporations which, I believe, constitute part of the economic stability of this country. A specific reason for this belief is that the company's sales, gross margins, and profits increased in 1974 over 1973 and did so again, significantly, I might add, in 1975 over 1974. These results do not seem to parallel the economic trends of the recession we have been going through during the past 2 years.

At this point, I trust you have sufficient background for me to make two points that I think are tremendously relevant to your subcommittee's investigations.

The first point is that we are not a visable company. That is, we are small, not large: we don't advertise; we hire only by reference; we go about our jobs competently and quietly, selling a product to a small. specialized market. As a result, neither are we subjected to EEOC complaints such as Southern Bell, certainly a more visable company, has been, nor are we subjected to OSHA investigations such as Georgia Power Co. has been. Of relevance here is that there may be specific Federal regulations of which we are in violation; however, we have never been caught.

Let me give you an illustration. I suspect that the way our warehouse is ventilated is a violation of the law. As mentioned previously, we handle dry ice which is carbon dioxide gas in a solid form. When the ice sublimates, or evaporates, it does so in the form of carbon dioxide gas. This gas makes certain warehouse processes impossible to sustain for more than short periods of time. The way we ventilate the building is, simply, by opening the warehouse doors. The employees accent this condition, work within the limits that it dictates, and get the job done. An inquiry as to what occupational or safety hazards being caused has not been made due to a lack of time, resources, and expertise to seek out, understand, and finance any improvements.

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