Mr. HORTON. So the question is, I think, whether or not there was any sense of urgency to get this system up. General GLASSER. Well, I was not going back- General GLASSER. I was not reopening the question of whether it was a wise decision to transfer from the Atlas-Agena to the Titan III. Mr. HORTON. I am not, either. I am accepting that decision. But I am pointing out this question of whether or not there was any compromise with regard to the number of satellites that were put up on the first launch. General GLASSER. Let me try to explain it this way. Having determined that we would go on a Titan III, and starting from that point, the number of satellites that we were able to put up at that time was eight. To have required more would have necessitated a redesigned shroud which could not have been done on that schedule. So the number selected is eight. One of those is a gravity gradient experiment, and that allows you to get seven communications satellites on orbit. So those seven go up. Now, it is true that we could have planned to put a second Titan up much sooner. But that would not have been prudent either from the development of the Titan III booster or from the evaluation of the on-orbit satellites that went up on the first launch. We are currently scheduled to put up a second group later this month, and I would submit that that is a reasonable program. I would say that it is quite an urgent program, to put up one group on the 16th of June and another on the 24th of August. There would not be any reasonable basis for having put more than that 15 up as an initial investment. ADVANCED PROGRAM CONTRACTS Mr. ROBACK. Colonel Gibson, are you also the project officer for the ADCSP? Colonel GIBSON. We expect to be; yes, sir. Mr. ROBACK. That hasn't matured into a project office yet? Colonel GIBSON. No, sir; not yet. Mr. ROBACK. What contract obligations, that is not money but what contract responsibilities in that field are passed to your office-feasibility studies? Colonel GIBSON. Yes, sir; we participated in the evaluation of the feasibility studies. Mr. ROBACK. Did you contract for them? Colonel GIBSON. No, sir; we did not. Mr. ROBACK. Who did? Colonel GIBSON. DCA. Mr. ROBACK. DCA is going to contract for the contract definition studies? Colonel GIBSON. It is my understanding, sir, that the responsibilities for contracting for the contract definition studies will be assigned to the Air Force. Mr. ROBACK. Did you have anything to do with a bidders' conference on the original studies? Colonel GIBSON. Yes, sir; we did. Mr. ROBACK. You remember the bidders got a lot of literature telling what they expected in the ADCSP. Colonel GIBSON. That is correct. Mr. ROBACK. And do you recall that there came a time when there was a big flap because somebody got excited that the ADCSP might have a little bit more capacity than some people considered was desirable and so you had to change the specifications? Are you familiar with that? Colonel GIBSON. No, sir; I am not. Mr. ROBACK. You are not familiar with any part of that? Mr. ROBACK. You didn't have anything to do with the specifications for, the specifications for the bidders' conference? Colonel GIBSON. No, sir. Mr. ROBACK. When do you expect that you will get an assignment on the ADCSP? Colonel GIBSON. It would only be speculation, sir, if I told you. Mr. ROBACK. You don't think that that would contribute to the record? Colonel GIBSON. No, sir. Mr. ROBACK. Do you think that it will be a belated decision? Mr. ROBACK. Do you think that this decision you are speculating about is tardy? Mr. HORTON. I assume the witness doesn't want to characterize it, either. Mr. ROBACK. We never force anybody to answer who doesn't have full responsibility for the decision. [Laughter.] Mr. DAHLIN. Could Colonel Gibson tell us whether there are any significant problems with respect to materials priorities, priorities in the defense materiel system, as between the Titan III program or any of these R. & D. loads? Is that affecting the program at all? Colonel GIBSON. I can't comment for the Titan III. We haven't had any problem with materials on the satellite procurement. Mr. DAHLIN. So far it is not a problem? Colonel GIBSON. So far it is not. Mr. DAHLIN. The level of priority hasn't given you any trouble so far as the project office? Colonel GIBSON. Not to date. AIRBORNE TERMINAL RESPONSIBILITIES Mr. DAHLIN. Is the Air Force now concerned or contracting for both voice and teletype needs with respect to the airborne terminal equipment that you are responsible for? Colonel GIBSON. Are we now Mr. DAHLIN. Are you now in specific programs? Colonel GIBSON. For the tactical communications satellite? Mr. DAHLIN. You spoke about your responsibility for aircraft terminal equipment in the program. Colonel POLIO. The only contract we have underway right now is for teletype communications in the early Lincoln Laboratory experiments. The rest of the terminal programs are in study as of the moment. There are no contracts. Mr. DAHLIN. The experiment you mentioned with the Syncom satellite was that special hardware, R. & D. hardware, or was this a modification of existing equipment? Colonel POLIO. I might go back to that one, the Leapfrog program as we referred to it, is a flying laboratory which is looking into many techniques and propagation problems. It is not in any way characteristic of what the operational type hardware will look like. It is just for investigative purposes. Although we did have a voice contact on that particular link, we are treating this as exploratory develoment rather than advanced development for conceptual type testing of the type we plan to do on the Lincoln Laboratory satellite. Mr. DAHLIN. Are there any research and development areas with respect to aircraft terminal equipment for which there has been insufficient attention or money? That is, is the technology in any part of the area not up to the state of the art required or is this straightforward equipment development within the state of the art? Colonel POLIO. The program we currently have on contract is pretty straightforward; it is modifications of existing equipment but there are many problems we face in the future which require insight and more technical evaluation. These are currently under study. MAC ROLE IN TRANSPORTING GROUND STATIONS Mr. DAHLIN. Does the Military Airlift Command now have responsibility for moving the movable or transportable terminals for IDCSP as they become available or being ready to do so? General GLASSER. I have to assume the answer to that question based on normally assigned responsibilities for channel movement. Yes, they would. In theater movement, it is unlikely that they would have that responsibility. Mr. DAHLIN. Have there been any problems in the growth of terminal size or weight or shape that have caused any difficulty for the Air Force in planning for aircraft to transport terminals? General GLASSER. I am not qualified to answer that. Mr. DAHLIN. Will you provide it for the record? General GLASSER. Yes, sir; I will. (The information referred to follows:) AIRLIFT PROBLEMS CAUSED BY TERMINAL GROWTH The first four terminals were shipped by surface means, based on economy considerations and the need date. (Airlift was not needed for the first four.) For the fifth terminal, the Army had arranged for a C-133B aircraft to airlift the terminal from Long Beach, Calif., to South Vietnam on June 30, 1966. When it became evident that site preparation at South Vietnam had slipped beyond the program date, the Army decided to ship the terminal by surface means: thereby negating the need for airlift. In summary, it can be stated that the lack of military aircraft in no way had an impact or effect on the delivery of the Army ground terminals. SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS-AIRCRAFT TO GROUND Mr. DAHLIN. Let me ask once again on the kind of communications there have been between aircraft. The Syncom experiment and the data transmission that was done in the private area-have these experiments explored all of the possible modes of transmission between aircraft and the ground? That is, have all frequencies now been explored initially or are there many more left to be studied by your program? T General GLASSER. There are many more experiments to do. I would characterize these as isolated incidents. AIR FORCE ROLE IN NATO COMMUNICATIONS Mr. DAHLIN. In the Electronic News of Monday, August 15, there is an article concerned with the effect of NATO changes on U.S. communications. In the article it states that the Air Force Electronics Systems Division held a meeting to wrestle with the problem of revamping the European communications complex. Is that part of Air Force responsibility? Is that part of all the services and DOD, or what kind of studies do you have to undertake in that area? General GLASSER. The Air Force, and the Electronic Systems Division in particular, are involved in this, but they are not the organizations responsible for the requirements for communications capability in the European area. This, again, is a DCA responsibility with the various services participating. Mr. ROBACK. Why do you suppose they mentioned your old divi· sion in this connection? General GLASSER. Because the Electronic Systems Division does much of the development, procurement, installation and checkout of the actual equipments and they would be involved. Several of the programs that they are responsible for doing, for the DCA, are being seriously affected, by this action on the part of the French. Mr. ROBACK. Maybe we are digressing a minute, but does MITRE have people on assignment to NATO still on communications problems? General GLASSER. I am not personally aware of any in connection with the communications problem. I recall some that were in the European area previously in connection with the air defense ground environments. Mr. ROBACK. Is MITRE involved at all in this NATO interest in communications which Mr. Rogers adverted to; namely, possible interest in military communications satellite communications program? In other words, is there any MITRE offshoot on this? General GLASSER. I think not, but I am not sure. Mr. ROBACK. With NATO? General GLASSER. Although I have been away from ESD for a year now and I am not current, I would rather doubt that they are. We can investigate that. (The following information was furnished for the record :) MITRE AT NATO We presently have six MITRE people supporting the U.S. NATO delegation, U.S. Regional Office (USRO). The primary purpose for sending these people to Europe was to prepare studies and plans on NATO Air Defense ground environment compatibility with program 412-L and to participate in the formulation of command, control and communications plans. Studies and plans in the communications area extend to all possible techniques including satellite communications. This latter area currently involves approximately 3 man-years of the effort. Mr. ROBACK. You don't have any information on the point Mr. Dahlin raised? General GLASSER. As regards ESD's involvement or the Air Force's involvement? STUDIES OF FREQUENCY NEEDS Mr. DAHLIN. The article also notes that communication capacity in Europe is highly saturated and that trying to duplicate communications lines in other areas is a problem. Do you have Air Force studies or Air Force responsibilities for investigating frequency problems for military uses and are you conducting, is your command conducting that? General GLASSER. There are Air Force people involved, but, again, they are operating as members of DCA or under the delegated responsibilities of DCA. In the case of the French pullout, they are a focal point of many communications links that run up from lower Europe into the United Kingdom and thence across the North Atlantic. The pullout would require some alternate routes. Some of these alternate routes already exist but they will be saturated with traffic so there will have to be overbuilds, a whole variety of things, that will have to be done. This is a responsibility of the DCA, but it will require Air Force people to do much of the work. Mr. DAHLIN. Was there a late change with respect to the June shot in the means of dispensing and dispersing the satellites and getting the differential velocity required between these satellites as they went around the earth? Was there a late change in the method of doing that? Colonel GIBSON. No, sir. Mr. DAHLIN. That was planned from the beginning? Colonel GIBSON. Yes, sir; that was planned from the beginning. Mr. ROBACK. I think we can excuse the Air Force. I just want to add a few items to request on Colonel Forbes, if he will come forward again. Mr. HORTON. Before you leave, General, I have two areas that I haven't covered with you. First of all, I want to ask again about the despun antenna technique. I noted that on page 5 of your testimony you have indicated that it is scheduled for on-orbit testing next year. Is there any reason why it couldn't be used in one of the earlier launches? General GLASSER. The satellite will not be available. Mr. HORTON. The satellite itself will not be available? General GLASSER. Yes, sir; it will not be available. SEPARATE TACTICAL SYSTEM Mr. HORTON. The other question has to do with the tactical system. Is it contemplated that this will be a separate system? General GLASSER. Separate from IDCSP? |