and action in the moral world, are directed by immutable laws fo that, while those laws remain in force, not the fmalleft link in the chain of caufes and effects, can be broken, nor any one thing be otherwife than it is. That, as man muft act with consciousness and spontaneity, it is neceffary, that he should have fome fenfe of things poffible and contingent. Hence the Deity has wifely implanted a delufive fenfe of liberty in the mind of man, which fits him to fulfil the ends of action to better advantage, than he could do, if he knew the neceffity, which really attends him. Lord Kaims obferves, that, in the material world, it is found, that the representations of external objects, and their qualities, conveyed by the fenfes, differ fometimes from what philosophy discovers thefe objects, and their qualities, to be. Were man endowed with a microscopic eye, the bodies, which furround him, would appear as different from what they do at prefent, as if he was tranfported into another world. His ideas, upon that fuppofition, would be more agreeable to ftri&t truth, but they would be far lefs ferviceable in common life. Analogous to this, in the moral world, the Deity has implanted in mankind the delufive notion of liberty of indifference, that they may be led to the proper exercise of that activity, for which they were defigned. The Baron de Montefquieu, in his Perfian Letters, obferves, that, as God makes his creatures act juft according to his own will, he knows every thing he thinks fit to know. But though it is in his power to fee every thing, yet he does not always make use of that power. He generally leaves his creatures at liberty to act, or not act, that they may have room to be guilty or innocent. In this view, he renounces his right of acting upon his creatures, and directing their refolutions. But when he chooses to know any thing, he always does know it; because he need only will, that it shall happen as he sees it, and direct the refolutions of his creatures according to his will. Thus he fetches the things, which fhall happen, from among thofe, which are merely poffible, by fix ing, by his decrees, the future determinations of the minds of his creatures, and depriving them of the power of acting, or not acting, which he has bestowed upon them. If we may prefume to make comparison of a thing, which is above all comparison, a monarch does not know what his ambassador will do, in an affair of importance. If he thinks fit to know it, he need only give him direction to behave fo and fo; and he may be affured, he will follow his directions. President Edwards makes the following diftinction between his and Lord Kaims' ideas of neceffity. I. Lord Kaims fuppofes, that fuch a neceffity takes place, with respect to all men's actions, as is inconfiftent with liberty. Edwards maintains, that the moral neceffity, which univerfally takes place, is not inconfiftent with the utmost liberty, which can be defined, or conceived. II. Kaims feems every where to fuppofe, that neceflity, properly fo called, attends all men's actions; and that the terms, unavoidable, impoffible, &c. are equally applicable to the cafe of moral and natural neceffity. Edwards maintains, that fuch a neceffity, as attends the acts of men's wills, can, with more propriety, be called certainty; it being no other, than the certain connexion between the fubject and predicate of the prepofition, which affirms their existence. III. Kaims fuppofes, that, if mankind could clearly fee the real neceffity of their actions, they would not appear to themselves, or others, praise-worthy, culpable, or accountable for their actions. Edwards maintains, that moral neceffity, or certainty, is perfectly consistent with praise and blame, rewards and punishments. Lord Kaims agrees with Prefident Edwards, in fuppofing, that praise or blame refts ultimately on the dif pofition, or frame of mind. The Rev. Mr. Dawson, in a late pamphlet, entitled, "The Neceffarian, or, the Question concerning Liberty and Neceffity stated and difcuffed," endeavours to prove, that and action in the moral world, are directed by immu laws fo that, while those laws remain in force, not smallest link in the chain of caufes and effects, ca. broken, nor any one thing be otherwife than it is. That, as man muft act with consciousness and spon ity, it is neceffary, that he should have fome fenfe of t poffible and contingent. Hence the Deity has wifel planted a delufive fenfe of liberty in the mind of which fits him to fulfil the ends of action to better a tage, than he could do, if he knew the neceffity, really attends him. Lord Kaims obferves, that, in the material worl found, that the representations of external object their qualities, conveyed by the fenfes, differ fom from what philofophy discovers thefe objects, and qualities, to be. Were man endowed with a micre eye, the bodies, which furround him, would appear ferent from what they do at prefent, as if he was ported into another world. His ideas, upon that fition, would be more agreeable to strict truth, b would be far lefs ferviceable in common life. Analogous to this, in the moral world, the De implanted in mankind the delufive notion of lil indifference, that they may be led to the proper of that activity, for which they were defigned. The Baron de Montefquieu, in his Perfian Let ferves, that, as God makes his creatures act just a to his own will, he knows every thing he think know. But though it is in his power to fee eve yet he does not always make use of generally leaves his creatures at libe that they may have room to be this view, he renounces his ri tures, and directing their chooses to know any thing, cause he need only will, tha and direct the refolutions of Thuhe fetches t hofe, whi his will. pen, from an - 201 well as every othigh he agrees with eneral mode of reat, he differs from notives, which are echanically, which, edom of the will. ical operation of molity of the foul. If ufion is, that motives eration. This con v from the doctrine s Illuftrations of Phiy thing belonging to t, an argument for quently, the doctrine a materialifm." that mechanical netural neceffity, coerefore confiders as enHence he exprefsly Vill, that motives act on the scale, by a mealvinifts maintain, that ral, and not by a mehey allow, that moral produce moral effects, echanical effects; yet inical neceffity are the to be obferved, that mechanical operation of alvinifts fuppofe muft oral freedom. tical Hiftory, vol. v. p. 24. that the will is determined by motives. He accounts, however, every act, which proceeds not from mechanical force, a voluntary act. Every voluntary act he calls a free act, because it proceeds from the will-from the man himself but calls that voluntary act neceffary, in conformity to their idea of neceffity, who, on fuppofition of the will's being determined by motives, will not allow it to be free, though voluntary. Having eftablished this fpecies of neceffity, he endeavours to fhew, that free will leaves no foundation for attributing merit or demerit to the agent; and that, on the contrary, the doctrine of neceflity does that, which the doctrine of free will does not. By leaving the foundation of morality fecure, it leaves a foundation for merit and demerit, viz. the moral nature of actions. The morality of an action is its motive. That, which gives the action its moral quality, gives it, at the fame time, its worth, or merit. But on the doctrine of free will, there can be no foundation for attributing merit or demerit to the agent, because it deftroys all diftinctions between actions; good and bad being terms without a meaning, when applied to actions without a moral motive. manner, As, in the account of Dr. Prieftley's fentiments, the in which that celebrated author diftinguishes his fcheme of philofophical neceffity from the Calvinistic doctrine of predeftination, is inferted, perhaps thofe, who are fond of fpeculating on this fubject, will be gratified, by being prefented, on the other hand, with the following diftinction, which the Rev. Dr. Emmons, of Franklin, has made between the Calvinistic idea of neceffity, and Dr. Priestley's. It has long been a fubject of controverfy among Arminians and Calvinifts, whether moral agents can act of neceffity. Upon this fubject, Dr. Priestley takes the Calviniftic fide, and labours to prove the doctrine of neceffity upon the general principle, that no effect can exift without a caufe. His train of reafoning runs very much in this form: Every volition must be an effect; every effect must have a caufe; every cause must neceffarily produce its |