tion which he had sworn to observe and maintain; but, on the other hand, I believe that he sincerely endeavoured to make the constitution work, and that his coup d'état was not resolved upon until the inherent weakness of the constitution itself had brought the machine of government to a dead lock, and the folly and unreasonableness of the contending factions by which he was surrounded had left no choice but anarchy or despotism. The promptitude of his measures and the adherence of the army have saved France from a sanguinary civil war, and have perhaps for the present suppressed a general European outbreak, which would have followed upon the success of the Reds; but that this has been owing to the army is a fact calculated to excite no little anxiety for the future.

That Louis Napoleon should wish, having secured his term of ten years (which means life unless overthrown by another revolution), to establish himself as a constitutional sovereign is hardly to be supposed; and, if he had the wish, I doubt whether France possesses the materials for working a constitutional government; and I presume that he will frame, and they will accept, just such a scheme as shall give them the appearance of freedom, while he retains all the real power in his own hands. But then he must retain it by the support and at the good pleasure of the army. Will he, and can he, obtain this and still maintain a pacific policy? If he can, and if he will; if he applies himself to increasing the physical comforts and promoting the material prosperity of his country, while he devotes his great military powers to the control of the turbulent spirits which infest it, his usurpation will have been a fortunate event for Europe, and he will merit the title of a general benefactor; and towards this course, so far as he can be in any way influenced by the language held on this side of the water, he should be in every way encouraged. A friendly tone should be taken with respect to the part which has been forced upon him, and his government should be acquiesced in, not only on general principles of non-interference with the purely internal affairs of another country, but as the only escape for the time from evils and dangers which could not have been confined to France had they been permitted to explode. But if, for the purpose of conciliating the army, he finds it necessary to adopt a warlike policy, I should look upon him as the most dangerous neighbour we could have-far more so than either

the old French Republic or the Empire, because, though at the head of a nominal "republic," there would be nothing in his propagandism which could alarm or shock the absolute governments of Europe; and, confident in the support of Russia, who will see with pleasure his success in the cause of "order," he may turn his arms against countries on whose behalf we should certainly interfere, and we might find ourselves, especially under the present Government, involved in a war of principle, in which our allies, though against a soi-disant republic, would be looked for in the revolutionists of Europe.

I firmly believe that, with the great bulk of the French people, nothing would be so popular as a war with England; but the end of a war once kindled in Europe no man living can foresee. We must only hope that the President, or the Emperor, as I suppose he will be before long, who has hitherto played his cards with great prudence, though, in truth, his adversaries have played them for him, may have sense and firmness to see and act upon the real interests of his country, in which case I shall for one cordially rejoice in his success, and heartily wish him a continuance of his power; and I am quite sure that a hostile tone taken towards him now, such as the Times is taking, is more likely than anything else to drive him to lean yet more and more on the army and the Russian alliance, which I should think most dangerous to the peace of the world.

You must excuse this very crude and hasty expression of my feelings, written in a hurry to save the post, after a day's shooting, to which I was summoned shortly after beginning my letter. As I see by your letter to the Duke of Rutland that your appetite, though not very good, may be tempted by game, I send off by rail to-morrow four pheasants and three woodcocks, part of our chase of to-day. And, with every good wish,

Cheer up; you have fifteen good years yet; many more than I can look to. The low pulse, I am told, is really

nothing, and a little freer living, which I do not think a punishment, whatever you may do, may set all right again. Work less and laugh more. But I am afraid you cannot do without work, which I am glad to say I can. Your second letter and the account which Strangford gave us of his visit, dissipated in some degree the sadness which came over us here at your first letter. Though we see you seldom, there is nobody can spare you less than Lady L. and myself, to say nothing of what the good cause would suffer by the loss of so chivalrous a champion.

We are down very low here, in consequence of the protracted illness of our little girl, but our prospects in this respect are improving, though we shall still pass our Christmas in London. Pray at your leisure dictate to us a little note to say how you are going on.

Lady L. desires to be most kindly remembered.

Yours very sincerely,

LYNDHURST.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

1852-53.

The Conservative Party in 1852-Its Return to Power-Lord Derby's First Administration Previous Discouragements of the PartyMr. Disraeli-Mr. Croker's Anticipations-His Belief that the Country was Conservative - His Advice to the Ministry— The Mistake of a Budget before Christmas". - Mr. Croker's Criticisms upon the Budget-Lord Derby's "Raw Troops"-Irish Difficulties-Mr. Disraeli's" Powers of Speech "-Lord Hardwicke on Party Prospects— Downfall of the Derby Ministry Mr. Croker's Retrospect of its History Opinion of Mr. S. H. Walpole - Presumed Attack upon Mr. Croker in Mr. Disraeli's Budget-Lord John Russell's anomalous Position-Lord Lonsdale's Review of the Derby Ministry-His Account of a Conversation with Disraeli-Mr. Drummond and Conservative Principles-His Opinion that "all is up"-Death of the Duke of Wellington-Notes by Mr. Croker of his Last Interview with the Duke - The Cloak worn by the Duke at Waterloo-“Up Guards and at them"-The Duke's Version-Letter from Lord Hardinge on the Funeral Car Prince Metternich to Lord LondonderryDr. Johnson's Letter to Bennet Langton-Mr. Panizzi on the Readers in the Museum Library-Letter from Mr. Hallam—M. Guizot on French Politics-Lord Raglan's Account of the "Three Days" in June (1815) Correspondence with Lord Palmerston-Lord Russell's 'Memoirs of Moore'- Mr. Croker's Article in the Quarterly — Lord Strangford's Opinion of it-Lord Lonsdale on Mr. Disraeli-Correspondence with Sir J. Graham-Letters from Lord Strangford-Lord Aberdeen and the Emperor Nicholas.

It seemed probable, in the early part of 1852, that the Conservative party was at length about to recover from the paralysis which had smitten it on the desertion of its leader in 1846; and, as a matter of fact, its recovery actually pro

ceeded so far as to admit of its return to power under the leadership of Lord Derby. But the total disintegration which had been the fatal bequest of Peel was still going on; the old Tory party was practically dead; the new Conservative party had not yet been formed. It required a generation at least to restore the shattered remnants of the organization, and to impart confidence to the rank and file who knew that they had been betrayed, and who saw no hope of finding a leader in whose capacity and good faith they could repose confidence. Ever since 1846, their weapons had been turned against each other. The Protectionists were determined, at all hazards, to keep the Peelites out of office, and the Peelites were equally resolved to guard the door against the Protectionists. Each section acted with the Whigs whenever it was necessary to carry on its own private vendetta. But the Protectionists were at the greatest disadvantage immediately after the repeal of the Corn Laws, for they were left completely without a head, whereas Sir Robert Peel was still present to guide his followers. There ensued, as it has been shown, the brief interval of promise opened up by Lord George Bentinck, under whom there was again seen in the House a compact body worthy of being called the Conservative party. After his death there was no one to look to but Lord Derby, for not even Lord Derby himself, at that time, seriously thought of Mr. Disraeli as a leader. But when Lord John Russell was overthrown by a clever move of Lord Palmerston's in February, 1852, and it was found that a coalition of the Whigs and Peelites could not possibly be formed, Lord Derby was required to form a Ministry, and to Mr. Disraeli, much to the surprise of many old members of the party, was assigned the office of Chancellor of the Exchequer.

Mr. Croker was among those who had no faith in Mr. Disraeli. But he trusted implicitly in Lord Derby, and he