made on a thoroughly disinterested basis and if the facts are fully developed and interrelated by experienced and competent analysts, the conclusions usually are unmistakable. The unprejudiced and sound exercise of these judgments requires a board rather than an administrative head of the organization, and a nonpartisan composition of that board.

Since its establishment 20 years ago the Tariff Commission has organized a corps of experienced economists and technical experts, and developed a technique of assembling and analyzing tariff information. The problems with which it is concerned are exceedingly complex and each year's experience adds materially to the effectiveness of the staff and of the Commission itself.

Whatever party and administration may be in power, and whatever may be the future vicissitudes of tariff policy, there will be no lessening of the need for a reliable and an unbiased factual basis for tariff making. The Commission is convinced that, in order to continue to supply such a factual basis, it must be assured of a continuance of its present independent status, of its control over its personnel, and of its right to report directly to the Congress and the President without the intervention of any political official.

The statements and conclusions set forth in this letter represent the views of every member of the Tariff Commission.

Very respectfully yours,

RAYMOND B. STEVENS, Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Ryder, do those letters set forth your views with reference to this bill?

STATEMENT OF OSCAR B. RYDER, COMMISSIONER, UNITED STATES TARIFF COMMISSION

Mr. RYDER. They set forth not only my personal views, but they set forth the unanimous view of the Tariff Commission.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there anything you desire to add other than the views set forth in those letters?

Mr. RYDER. I might state this: The Tariff Commission's functions are quite different from that of any other commission that I know of. It has no regulatory functions as such. It has no functions in the way of administration, external administration, such as the Customs Bureau administering the tariff, collecting the duties, and all that sort of thing.

The Tariff Commission was originally established in order to enable Congress to have unbiased and objective information on tariff questions. Congress had found it very difficult to get such information. It usually had to act upon facts, or alleged facts, supplied by interested parties.

The Tariff Commission was organized unlike any other commission. It was provided that not more than one-half of its members would be of one political party. It was given an even number of members. We feel strongly that the Congress, and the President, for that matter, could not obtain the unbiased and objective information required on tariff matters except from an independent organization that does not have to function through a political official of any sort. The CHAIRMAN. What do you mean by "political official"?

Mr. RYDER. I mean such as a cabinet officer, who is, frankly, a political official.

The CHAIRMAN. He is appointed by the President?

Mr. RYDER. He is appointed by the President.

The CHAIRMAN. By whom are the Tariff Commissioners appointed? Mr. RYDER. They are also appointed by the President.

The CHAIRMAN. And you say they are appointed because of their politics, one-half of each party?

Mr. RYDER. The provision is that not more than three of the six should be in more than one political party.

The CHAIRMAN. Then they must have some political views?
Mr. RYDER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And they are appointed by the President?

Mr. RYDER. They are appointed by the President, but they are not appointed at one time, they are appointed for staggered terms. It is not usually that we have a commission composed entirely of appointees by one President. I should add that the tendency, particularly under the present administration, has been to appoint people who are more or less nonpartisan. Not that they do not have political affiliations, but they have not been actively engaged in politics, and are appointed because of their special knowledge of tariff questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Ryder, we are very glad to have had you present your views. Mr. Madden.

STATEMENT OF J. WARREN MADDEN, CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Madden, you were asked by Senator Robinson, the former chairman of this committee, for your comment upon S. 2700. You were asked by reason of your position as chairman of the National Labor Relations Board, to present your views. You submitted a letter under date of July 2. Did you submit any other communication to him?

Mr. MADDEN. That was the only one.

The CHAIRMAN. I want to put into the record the letter you wrote with reference to the bill.

(The letter referred to is as follows:)

Hon. JOSEPH T. ROBINSON,

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,
Washington. D. C., July 2, 1937.

Chairman of the Senate Select Committee,

Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR SENATOR ROBINSON: In reply to your letter of June 24, 1937, requesting the Board's views on any provisions affecting it in S. 2700, being a bill to provide for reorganizing agencies of the Government, extending the classified civil service, establishing a General Auditing Office and a Department of Welfare, and for other purposes, I am pleased to write you concerning those portions of the bill which seem of particular importance as affecting the work of the Board.

S. 2700, by section 2 (a), authorizes the President to transfer, regroup, abolish, and designate the functions of any agency, subject to the limitations of subsection (b) which, among other things, excludes from the power granted the authority "to abolish any of the functions of any independent establishment, or to transfer to any other agency any of the functions of any independent establishment except as provided in subsection (c)."

The National Labor Relations Board is clearly an independent establishment and is expressly recognized as such by section 5 (2) of the bill. This independent status was conferred upon the Board by Congress after extended hearings and in full recognition of the necessity of such a status if the Board were successfully to discharge its functions. The conference report on S. 1958 (the National Labor Relations Act) which approved a House amendment eliminating the designation of the Board as an independent agency in the executive branch of the Government described in the situation when it said:

"The Board as contemplated in the bill is in no sense to be an agency of the executive branch of the Government. It is to have a status similar to that of the Federal Trade Commission, which, as the Supreme Court pointed out in the Schechter case, is a quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative body.'

Being an independent establishment, section 2 (b) of S. 2700 makes it clear that neither the Board nor its functions can be abolished. By section 2 (c), however, the President is authorized to transfer to an executive department any of the routine administrative and executive functions of any independent establishment which are common to other agencies of the Government, such as the preparation of estimates of appropriations, the appointment of personnel and maintenance of personnel records, the procurement of material, supplies, and equipment, the accounting for public funds, the rental of quarters, and related matters. It is clear, therefore, that there might be taken away from the Board under this provision both the selection of its personnel and the preparation of its estimates of appropriations, as well as such matters as the procurement of supplies and quarters. In view of the nature of the National Labor Relations Act and the Board's duties in administering it, could this be done and still leave the Board its concededly necessary independent status?

It is easily conceivable that there might be many instances in the governmental structure where this would be so. Given a statute or set of departmental regulations clearly defined as to jurisdiction and definite and fixed as to detail, there might well be left only a ministerial application of rules to facts. In such instances, the administrative officers could easily perform their functions with little regard to the identity or characteristics of the personnel presenting the matters for decision, and might be equally little concerned with the extent of appropriations made available to such personnel.

The National Labor Relations Act, however, lays vastly different duties upon the Board charged with its administration. The act is entirely new to our Federal, political, and industrial economy. In the first place, the jurisdiction which it confers upon the Board is not explicit, but must rather be determined in each individual case after careful inquiry into often complicated factual situations. Moreover, the act itself is general in its terms and requires constant interpretation and exposition. For example, it does not specify what shall constitute "coercion," "restraint," "interference,' or "discrimination." Nor does it define definitely the nature of an appropriate bargaining unit, or indicate exactly the circumstances under which elections should be held among workers to determine disputed questions of representation. Furthermore, the very nature of the act in offering protection to workers in the exercise of their rights of self-organization makes it mandatory that the Board should maintain its agents and organization at many convenient places throughout the country. It is clear that it would be physically impossible for the three Board members personally to receive all charges of violations and petitions for certification of representatives under the act (now reaching some 1,400 a month), inquire into the question of whether interstate commerce were so involved in each case as to give the Board jurisdiction, and then to investigate the merits of each case all preliminary to the exercise of their quasijudicial function of fact finding and order making. Such work must of necessity be done by regional directors, attorneys, and examiners, carefully selected by the Board for their special aptitude for such work. And yet, such personnel is constantly and of necessity reflecting Board policy in all that it does. So long as that personnel is selected by the Board and responsible to it, the Board is in fact independent in its application and interpretation of the law.

The moment that personnel is selected by and responsible to another, it is the policy of that other which will prevail, and the Board will have lost the power impartially and freely to administer the law. It would therefore appear clear that the National Labor Relations Act having been enacted under an administration favorable to the protection of labor's right to self-organization, the complete independence of the Board should be so protected as to prevent the possibility of subsequent control of the Board by indirection at the hands of a less favorable administration.

It would seem equally true that unless the Board is left free to estimate and present its own needs for appropriations, its independence will in fact have largely been taken away. Possible future control of the Board's estimates of appropriations by an executive officer not in sympathy with the purposes of the act would obviously place in the hands of such an executive officer a life and death power over the scope of the Board's operations and hence over the degree of enforcement of the act.

Section 204 of S. 2700 would apparently apply to all Board personnel other than the Board itself, save only such positions as might be found by the President to be policymaking in character. Here again, the nature of the National Labor Relations Act, coupled with its newness in the Federal system, makes it essential that the Board have real freedom of choice of personnel. Social and economic

outlook, as well as personality, are perhaps even more essential elements for consideration in selecting its personnel than are the more easily calculable matters of education and experience. Here again, there is a very real difference between the problem wnich confronts the Board in selecting its nonclerical personnel and that which is involved in the administration of a statute which is well defined and clear-cut in its application. It may be that after the Board has developed the precedents under the existing act over a period of years there will be less difficulty in obtaining personnel by resort to civil service. However, the unique nature of the social problem dealt with by the Board is such that individual outlook and personality will always remain a very heavy element in determining the adequacy of personnel for use as attorneys, directors, and examiners.

It is therefore the view of the Board that section 2 (c) of S. 2700, especially in relation to appointment of personnel and preparation of estimates of appropriation, would in its present form seriously impair the ability of the National Labor Relations Board to function as the independent establishment which it is recognized to be in section 5 (2) of the bill. It is likewise the view of the Board that its efficient operation would be impaired by the effect of section 204 of S. 2700 in providing that hereafter its regional directors, attorneys, and trial examiners could be selected only from persons having civil-service status.

Respectfully yours,

J. WARREN MADDEN, Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. If you have any further comment that you desire to make at this time the committee will be glad to hear you.

Mr. MADDEN. I think I have nothing further. That letter of July 2 still represents the views of the board, and unless there is some question about it I will let it stand.

The CHAIRMAN. If you have no further comment to make other than those set forth in the letter, Mr. Madden, you will be excused. The Government Printing Office, Mr. Herrell.

STATEMENT OF R. H. HERRELL, COMPTROLLER, GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Herrell, the Public Printer was requested by the former chairman of the committee, Senator Robinson, to submit any comment that he desired to make in his capacity as Public Printer, with reference to the provisions of Senate 2700. I have in my hand a letter dated July 3 addressed by him to Senator Robinson. Did he submit any other communication?

Mr. HERRELL. No, sir. That is the only submission.

The CHAIRMAN. I wish to put into the record then the letter submitted by the Public Printer to Senator Robinson with reference to the bill.

(The letter referred to is as follows:)

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE,
Washington, D. C., July 3, 1937.

Hon. JOSEPH T. ROBINSON,
Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Government Reorganization,
Senate Office Building.

MY DEAR MR. ROBINSON: Receipt is acknowledged of your letter of June 24, 1937, transmitting to this Office a copy of Senate bill 2700, providing for reorganizing agencies of the Government, extending the classified civil service, establishing a General Auditing Office and a Department of Welfare, and for other purposes, and requesting my views on such provisions of the bill as affect the Government Printing Office.

While, insofar as I am able to determine, the bill does not directly affect the Government Printing Office, it does jeopardize its status as a part of the legislative branch of the Government in that it makes possible, without further legislative action, a transfer of the Government Printing Office from the legislative branch to the executive branch and a consolidation of its duties with the duties of any agency of the executive branch now existing or hereafter to be created.

In view of the facts (1) that the Government Printing Office was established primarily to handle the printing for Congress, which includes, of course, the Congressional Record, hearings, bills, committee reports, private prints for Members of Congress, etc.; (2) that it functions under the Joint Congressional Committee on Printing which acts as its board of directors; and (3) that all of the laws and decisions governing it duties, functions, and management were enacted or rendered with the idea that it was a permanent part of the legislative branch of the Government, it is believed that the best interests of the Government as a whole would be served by continuing to carry the Government Printing Office as a part of the legislative branch of the Government under the close supervision and control of its Joint Committee on Printing. This can only be assured by deleting from the bill the reference to the Government Printing Office which will be found in section 5, page 7, beginning with the word "and" following the comma in line 15 and ending with the word "Office" which precedes the comma in line 16, the matter to be deleted reading "and the Government Printing Office." With this deletion, the term "agency" will not include the Government Printing Office, and the power to control the said Office will still remain in Congress. With the Government Printing Office remaining in the legislative branch of the Government, Congress may depend upon a continuance of the service which it has received from the Office for the past 77 years, and the Government Printing Office would be in a better position to serve the various executive departments and agencies impartially.

For these reasons, and as stated above, it is believed that the best interests of the Government as a whole would be served by eliminating the Government Printing Office from consideration in connection with the reorganization bill. If I may be of further service to you in this or any other matter, please advise. Respectfully,

A. E. GIEGENGACK, Public Printer.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you any further comment that you would like to make?

Mr. HERRELL. I would like to amplify some of the statements in the letter.

The CHAIRMAN. We will be very glad to hear you.

Mr. HERRELL. To supplement to some extent the Public Printer's letter of July 3, 1937, he has instructed me to add that the history of the Government Printing Office shows it was established in 1860 primarily to handle the congressional work and it still does more work for Congress than it does for any other one agency. Its history going back over the 77 years shows that as a result of many and costly mistakes, numerous changes in the laws, and regulations governing the operation of the Office have been made until today it is functioning smoothly under a head reporting jointly to the President of the United States and to Congress.

In view of the unusual status of the Office created primarily to do the work for Congress, but yet serving all other branches of the Government, this is believed to be the best possible arrangement from a managerial standpoint. The reason upon which this conclusion is based is that Congress, through the control exercised by its Joint Committee on Printing, is assured that its work, which includes, of course, the Congressional Record, hearings, bills, committee prints, and private prints for Members of Congress and miscellaneous other matter will be gotten out on schedule and in the form desired by it without interference from any other branch of the Government. The other departments and establishments of the Government can be assured that as the Public Printer reports direct to the President, each and every one of them will receive equal consideration and attention. They have a further assurance that they will receive fair treatment through the fact that they have the right to appeal to the Joint Committee on Printing from any action of the Public Printer which in their opinion is unfair or unjust.