fectual in the attempt as the many others of the fame nature, which had been fo repeatedly foiled fince the commencement of the war. The friends of that nobleman vindicated his conduct, by aflerting the impracticability of blocking up a fleet in Breft, and by reprefenting the danger to which our homeward-bound convoys would have been expofed during the abfence of the western or Channel fleet, on fo fruitlefs a defign.

The combined fleets failed from Cadiz, with about 10,000 Spanifh troops, before the end of July. 'The French had been reinforced by the Majeftueux, of 110 guns, and fome other fhips of the line; and were commanded, befides the Count de Guichen, by Monfrs. de Beauffet and De la Motte Picquet. The Spanish fleet amounted to about 30 fail of the line, and was commanded by Don Lewis of Cordova, and Don M. de Gafton. The army effected its landing at Minorca, without oppofition, on the 20th of Auguft; and was not long after joined by fix regiments from Toulon, under the conduct of Major General Count de Falkenhayn, who was deemed one of the best officers in the French fervice. The garrifon was weak, confifting only of two English and two Hanoverian regiments; and, what was little to be expected in that healthy climate and dry rocky country, was exceedingly fickly, and particularly afflicted with the fcurvy during the fiege. It was, however, commanded by two diftinguished officers. Lieutenant-General Murray, formerly governor of Quebec, now held the dame rank in Minorca; and was

feconded by Major-General Sir William Draper, who commanded at the conqueft of Manilla in the last war.

The combined fleets were contented with feeing the troops fafe into the Mediterranean; and then, trufting them to a small convoy, returned with diligence, to the amount, as it was faid, of 49 fhips of the line, to craize at the mouth of the English Channel. Though this was an effectual means of pre-.. venting any fuccour from being fent to Minorca, the enemy had other objects in view they hoped to intercept fome of our great homeward-bound convoys, which were then every day expected; and a very large outward-bound fleet, which was on the point of its departure from Corke, in Ire, land, held out a fimilar temptation. Nor can it be fuppofed that the general alarm and confufion which it was expected their appearance in the Channel, at fo critical a feafon, would occafion. in these kingdoms, was by any means overlooked in the defign.

Our intelligence was fo exceedingly bad, that no information of this naval manoeuvre was obtained, nor was the defign even fufpected, until the combined fleets were arrived in the chops of the Channel, and had formed a line from Ufhant to the islands of Scilly, in order to bar its entrance; fo that Admiral Darby, who was then at fea with only 21 fhips of the line, was on the point of falling in with them, when the accidental meeting of a neutral veffel afforded him notice of their fituation. In thefe Aug. 24th. unexpected circumftances he returned to Torbay, [H2] where

where he moored his fquadron across the entrance, while he waited for inftructions from the admiralty to regulate his farther conduct. He was foon reinforced by feveral fhips from different ports, fo that his fquadron was incrcafed to 30 fail of the line, with which he was ordered to proceed to fea with the utmost expedition, in order to the prefervation of the expected Weft India convoy an object for which he was to encounter all hazards whatever; but fill with fuch a view to the vaft fuperiority of the enemy, as to avoid, fo much as it could confiftently with that be done, the being brought to a clofe and decifive engagement. The delay of waiting for reinforcement and inftructions, in the first inftance, and contrary winds afterwards, detained the fleet in Torbay, not withstanding the urgency of the occafion, until the 14th of September.

In the mean time, a great alarm was fpread in Ireland as well as England, with refpect to this unexpected movement, and to the apprehended defigns of the enemy. The great outward-bound fleet for America and the West Indies, was not only fuppofed to be in imminent danger in the open harbour of Corke, but that city itfelf, which is totally unfortified, and which was at that time ftored with immenfe quantities of provifion, was confidered as not being lefs fo. The regular forces in that kingdom were accordingly ordered to the fouthward, for the protection of that city and coaft; and the patriotic volunteers, who had gained fo much honour in fupporting and reclaiming the liberties of

their country, now fhewed no less patriotifm in their immediate offer to government of inftantly taking the field, and of marching whereever their fervices fhould be neceffary to its defence.

As foon as the commanders of the combined fleets had received intelligence of Admiral Darby's pofition in Torbay, and of the inferiority of his force in point of number, a council of war was held, on the question of attacking him while in that fituation. It feems they were under orders to fight if the occafion offered; but the inftructions were thought not to reach to the prefent cafe, which would have been an attack on the English fquadron, in a bay (though that was open) upon their own coafts. And, under this change of circumftance, which their inftructions had not provided for, it was fuppofed that they were thereby left at large, to the free exercite of their own judgment and difcretion.

The Count de Guichen is faid to have contended strongly for an immediate attack. He argued, that the English fleet would now be caught, as it were, in a net ; that fuch an opportunity of complete advantage over that nation night never again offer; that if, by good fortune and the valour of the combined nations, along with the powerful aid of fire-fhips (in a fituation where they were capable of producing the greatest poffible effect) that fleet was happily deftroyed, which they had every reaton to expect, the power of Great Britain on the feas would be at an end, and the war decided at a blow. Don Vincent Doz, the third of the Spanish commanders,

manders, ftrongly fupported this opinion: he afferted that the deftroying of Darby's fleet was fo very practicable, that it would be highly difficult to justify or excufe their not making the attempt; and to give the greater effect to his fentiments, he boldly offered to command the van fquadron, and to lead on the attack in his own fhip.

On the other hand, M. de Beauffet, a French officer of repute, held a totally contrary opinion, He faid, that all the advantage which the allies derived from their fuperiority of force and number, would be given up and entirely loft, by an attack upon Admiral Darby's fleet in its prefent fituation; that the whole of the combined fleets could not bear down upon him in a line of battle a-breaft; that of course, they must form the line of battle a-head, and go down upon the enemy fingly, by which they would run the greatest rifque of being fhattered and torn to pieces before they could get into their stations, by the fixed aim, and the angular fire in every direction, of fuch a number of great and well-provided fhips, drawn up to the greatest advantage, and lying moored and steady in the water. He therefore concluded, that as the attempt on Torbay would, in his opinion, be a measure unwarrantable in the defign, and exceedingly hazardous in the execution, fo, he likewife thought, that the allied fleets fhould direct their whole attention to that great and attainable object, of intercepting the English homeward-bound West India fleets. This was a meafure which, as they were now masters of the fea,

could fcarcely fail of fuccefs; and it would prove a blow fo fatal to England, as the could not recover during the war.

Don Louis de Cordova, with all the Spanish flag-officers, except Doz, coincided entirely in opinion with M. de Beauffet; fo that M. de Guichen being either brought over to or over-ruled by the majority, the idea of attacking Admiral Darby in Torbay was entirely renounced. It feems very probable, that a recollection of the repeated defeat which D'Estaing met with in his attack upon Ad. miral Barrington's fmall fquadron at St. Lucia, had no fmall influence upon the determination of this council of war.

It has fince appeared that the combined fleets were in fuch exceeding bad condition, that had there been any force then at home in England, which could, with any degree of propriety in refpect to number, at all face them, their ruin must have been inevitable, They were originally (the Spaniards in particular) very badly manned; and befides a great mortality, which had prevailed dur ing the whole voyage and cruize, and a prodigious number of fick in both fleets, a confiderable majority of the fhips were in fuch a ftate, that they fcarcely feemed capable of living at fea in any thing of a strong gale. But though the French fleet was in fufficiently bad condition, the Spanish was, in all refpects, much worfe. The former discovered upon this occafion, that their new vait fhips of 110 guns each (a conftruction which they had run much into of late) were exceedingly unmanageable, dangerous,

[H] 3

and,

and, in their prefent ftate, could be of very little ufe at fea.

The hard weather which came on in the beginning of September, accordingly frustrated all their views; and abandoning all hope of intercepting the British convoys, they were glad to get into port as foon as poflible. M. de Guichen returned to Ereft with his divifion, on the 11th of September, and was near loting one of his greatest fhips in the entrance of the harbour. Whether it proceeded from the particular etiquette of the French with respect to that great naval arfenal, or from what ever other caufe, the Spaniards were obliged to proceed directly home, though feveral of their fhips feemed fcarcely capable of reaching their own coafts. But the condition and circumstances of the combined fleets were little capable of fatisfying the people of France, with respect to the conduct of thofe commanders who had oppofed and over-ruled the opinion of Don Vincent Doz in the council of war. The coffeehoufe politicians of Paris had taught the people of that capital to believe, that the English fleet could not escape being either deftroyed or taken in Torbay; and fo flattering an illufion being eagerly fwallowed, they could now hardly brook the difappoint ment, and were particularly vicJent in their cenfure and invective. The Count de Guichen did not efcape his full fhare of thefe, being particularly blamed for fuffering any difcuffion to arife upon the question of obedience to his general inftructions for fighting; and the prejudice was fo ftrong, that the rank and popularity of

the Count d'Artois (the king's brother) who led him arm in arm into his own box at the playhouse, was fcarcely fufficient to fave hin from infult.

The arrival of the Weft India trade was fo much later than had been expected, that Admiral Darby kept the fea until the month of November; and it was probably his attention to that important object which prevented his falling in with a rich Spanish Pota, that in the intermediate time returned from America, and brought a large fupply of treasure to Spain, which was then not a little wanted. It feemed almost remarkable, that neither the combined fleets nor the British had taken a fingle prize during the long term they had been refpectively at fea.

The war had hitherto languifhed, in Europe as well as everywhere elfe, on the fide of Ho land. Their fleets were not only in very bad condition, but they aftonished the world by the dif overy of a weaknefs little thought of, confifting in a deficiency of feamen, and a total want of naval ftores; in both of which they had ever been held to abound beyond any other nation, England only excepted. The vicinity and fituation of their ports, along with that ftate of preparation which they were ftill capable of making, proved, however, a great check upon the naval operations of Great Britain through the course of the year, and prevented fome of thofe vigorous exertions which might have been otherwise made against her former enemies. was neceffary to keep a fquadron in the Downs, as well to watch their motions in general, as to

4

It

prevent

prevent their intercourfe with the fouthern parts of Europe. And it was still more effentially neceffary to have fuch a force in the North Seas as would be capable of ruming their immenfe commerce on that fide, and of effectually protecting our own, in cluding the farther great object of preventing the poffibility of reftoring their marine, by cutting off their only fources of every kind of naval fupply.

This very important fervice was committed to the conduct of Admiral Hyde Parker, a veteran commander of eftablished repute, who failed from Portimouth, in the beginning of June, with four fhips of the line, and one of fifty guns, for the North Seas. In the mean time, Holland strained every nerve for the equipment of fuch a force, as might, at least, be able to convoy their outward bound trade to the Baltic, and to protect it on its return, if not to intercept ours, and to become entirely masters of the North Seas. It was not, however, until fome days after the middle of July, that Admiral Zoutman and Commodore Kindfbergen failed from the. Texel, with a great convoy under their protection. Their force confifted of eight hips of the line, from 54 to 74 guns, of ten frigates, and five floops. Several of the frigates were very large, and earried an unusual weight of metal. The Argo carried 44 guns, and five more carried 36 guns each. They were joined by the CharlesTown, an American frigate of an extraordinary conftruction, fhe being as long and large as a fhip of the line, with feveral hundred men on board, and thirty-fix 42

pounders upon one deck: a weight of metal in fuch a compafs and fituation, which, it was thought, few fingle hips could Yong withftand. She took this opportunity of failing with the Dutch fleet, in order to go north about, on her way home.

Admiral Parker was on his return with a great convoy from Elfineur. He had been joined by feveral frigates ince he left Portfmouth, and by the Dolphin of 44 guns; and, in this molt critical and dangerous conjuncture, was very timely and fortunately reinforced by the junction of Commodore Keith Stuart, in the Berwick of 74 guns, who had been for fome time on the coaft of Scot land. The fquadron now confifted of fix fhips of the line, of which the Princefs Amelia carried So guns, the Fortitude (which was the Admiral's own fhip, and the Berwick, 74 each, the Bienfaifant 64, the old Buffalo 60, and the Prefton 50 guns; but the fuperiority of the enemy obliged the Admiral to take the Dolphin of 44 guns into his line. Of this force, the two feventy-fours were by much the best fhips. Princefs Amelia, though a threedecker, was fo very old and weak, that her metal had been reduced to the rate of a 50 gun flip, her lower-deck guns being only 24 pounders; and the Buffalo, befides being old, was of 1o bad a contruction, that he had fome years before been difcharged from the fervice, and employed as a ftore-ship in America.

The