because it is most pious, chooses his opinion out of consideration, and by the inducement of the love of God. That which causes more honour to God, that which happily engages men in holy living, that which is the most charitable, and the most useful,—that is to be preferred. But this is to be conducted with these cautions:

1. That the disposition to piety or charity be not made to contest an apparent truth. It is hugely charitable to some men, if it could be made true, to say that God is merciful to all sinners and at all times; and it is ten thousand pities to see a man made to despair upon his deathbed, upon the consideration of his past evil life; but this consideration must not, therefore, be pretended against the indispensable plain necessity of a holy life, since it is plainly revealed, that "without the pursuing of peace with all men, and holiness, no man shall see God."

2. If both the probabilities be backed and seconded by their proper relations to piety, to take one of them is not a competent way to determine the probability; but it must be wholly conducted by the efficacy of its proper reasons, or by some appendage in which one prevails above the other, when one opinion is valued because it is apt to make men fear, and not to be presumptuous; and another, because it is apt to make men hope, and never to despair; the balance is equal, and must be turned by neither of these. Scotus and Durandus, Gabriel and Almain, Medina, and some few others, taught, That the death of Christ did not make satisfaction to God for the sins of the whole world, by the way of perfect and exact justice, but by God's gracious acceptance of it, and stipulation for it.' This opinion does, indeed, advance the honour of God's mercy, but the contrary advances the dignity of Christ's suffering; and, therefore, it must be disputed and determined by some other instruments of persuasion. God the Father is on one side, and God the Son on the other; and though he who honours one, honours both, yet he that prefers one, may seem also to disparage both.

3. The relation to piety, and the advantages which come to it by the opinion, must not be fantastic, and relying upon a weak opinion and fond persuasion, but upon true reason or real effects. It is a common opinion among the ancients,

that Anna, the mother of the blessed virgin-mother of God, had been married to three husbands successively, and that the blessed virgin was the second wife of Joseph; they who think that the second and third marriages are less perfect than the first, think it more pious to embrace the other opinions, viz. that Anna was married to none but Joachim, and that Joseph was only married to the holy Virgin Mary : but because this is to take measures of things, which God hath not given us, and to reckon purities and impurities by their own fancies, not by reason and revelation from God, therefore this fantastic relation to piety is not weight enough to carry the question along with it.

In other cases the rule holds: and by these measures our conscience can be supported in a storm, and be nourished and feasted every day, viz. if we take care :

1. That we avoid every thing that we know to be a sin, whether it be reproached by its natural impurity and unreasonableness, or, without any note of turpitude, it be directly restrained by a law.

2. That we fly every appearance of evil, or likeness of sin b.

3. That we fly every occasion or danger of sin.

4. That we avoid all society or communication with sin, or giving countenance and maintenance to it. By these measures and analogies, if we limit our cases of conscience, we cannot be abused into danger and dishonour.

RULE VII.

It is not lawful to change our practical Sentence about the same Object, while the same Probability remains.

A MAN may change his opinion as he sees cause, or alter the practice upon a new emergent reason; but when all things are equal without and within, a change is not to be made by the man, except it be in such cases in which no law, or vow, or duty, or the interest of a third, is concerned; that is, unless the actions be indifferent in themselves, or

innocent in their circumstances, and so not properly considerable in the fears of conscience, in which cases a man's liberty is not to be prejudiced.

This stating of the rule does intimate the proper reasons of it, as appears in the following instances: Juan, a priest of Messina, having fasted upon the vespers of a holy day, towards the middle of the night hath a great desire to eat flesh; he, dwelling by the great church, observed that the clocks in the neighbourhood differed half an hour: he watches the first clock that struck midnight; and as soon as it had sounded, he ate his meat, because then he concluded that the ecclesiastical fasting-day was expired, and that, therefore, it was then lawful, by the laws of his church, to eat flesh. But being to consecrate the blessed eucharist the next morning, and obliged to a natural fast before the celebration of the holy sacrament, he changed his computation, and reckoned the day to begin by the later clock; so that the first day ended half an hour before the next day began, and he broke his fast because the eve was past, and yet he accounted that he was fasting, because the holy day was not begun. This was to cozen the law, and if it be translated to more material instances, the evil of it will be more apparent, but in this the unreasonableness is as visible. The like is the case of a gentleman living in the neighbourhood of Rome. Baptista Colonna happened to be in Rome on the three and twentieth of August, which is usually the eve of St. Bartholomew, but there it is kept on the twenty-fourth day: he refused to fast on the ordinary day of the vigils, as he used to do, because in Rome, where he then was, the custom was otherwise; he ate his meals, and resolved to keep it the next day : but on the morrow, being very hungry and desirous of flesh, he changed his sentence, and went out of Rome to the neighbourhood, and kept the feast of St. Bartholomew without the eves. This is to elude the duty, and to run away from the severity of the law, by trifling with the letter.

If the case be not complicated with a law, yet it is often infolded with the interest of a third person, and then is not to be changed, but remains invariable. Mævius promised to Sertorius to give him a servant, either Ephodius or Taranta, but resolves to give him Taranta; immediately after the

resolution, Ephodius dies, and Mævius tells his friend he is disobliged, because he hath but one, and resolves not to part with Taranta, and it was in his liberty to give him either, and because he will not assign his part in this, it is wholly lost in the other; but this is unfriendly and unjust. To this sort of instance is to be reduced a caution against fraudulency in the matter of vows.

Vitellescus vows to fast upon the last of February: but, changing his mind, believes he may commute his fasting for alms; he resolves to break his fast, and to give a ducat to the poor. But when he had new dined, he discourses the question again, and thinks it unlawful to commute, and that he is bound to pay his vow in kind; but the fast is broken; and yet if he refuses, upon this new inquest, to pay his commutation, he is a deceiver of his own soul. For in the present case, if to commute were not lawful, yet it is certain he is not disobliged; and, therefore, he is to pay his commutation, because it was decreed in the time of a probable conscience; and not being in itself unlawful, though it be now supposed to be insufficient, yet it is to be accounted for, upon the stock of the first resolution of the conscience, because the state of things is not entire; and advantages are not to be taken against religion from the account and stock of our errors or delusions; and if, after this, the conscience be not at rest, it is to be quieted by other actions of repentance and amends.

Quest. But here also is to be inquired, whether a man may, to several persons, to serve distinct ends, in themselves lawful and honest, discourse of and persuade both the parts of a probability respectively? Titius woos Orestilla for his wife; she being sickly, and fearful lest she shall have no children, declines it; he to persuade her, tells her it is very likely she will, and that it will cure her indisposition, Bu the interest of Titius is to have no children, as being already well stored, and therefore is dissuaded by them that have power over him, not to marry Orestilla. He, to answer their importunity, tells them, it is very likely Orestilla will be barren, and upon that account he marries her because she is sickly, and unlikely to become a mother. The question is, whether this be lawful?

I answer, 1. If he be actually persuaded of that part of

the probability when he urges it, and be changed into the other when he persuades the other, there is no question but it is as lawful to say both as one; for they are single affirmatives or negatives, and the time is but accidental to his, persuasion; yesterday this, and to-morrow its contrary are alike, while in both, or each of them, his persuasion is hearty and sincere..

2. If Titius urges both parts severally, and yet remains actually persuaded but of one of them, he may urge them as probable in themselves, disputable, and of indifferent argument and inducement, for so they are. But,

3. He must not imprint them by the efficacy of his own authority and opinion, nor speak that as certain which is at most but probable, and to him seems false; for so to do is against ingenuity and Christian sincerity; it is to make a lie put on the face of truth and become a craft; it is not honest nor noble, nor agreeing to the spirit of a Christian, and is a direct deception on one side, and an indirect prosecution of a lawful end.

RULE VIII.

An Opinion relying upon very slender Probability is not to be followed, except in the Cases of great Necessity, or great Charity.

THAT it is not ordinarily to be followed is therefore certain, because it cannot be supposed, but that its contradictory hath greater probability; and either he that follows this trifle, is light of belief, or unreasonable in his choice, or his reason is to him, but as eyes to an owl or bat, half-sighted and imperfect; and, at the best, not fit motive to the will, And if it could be lawful to follow every degree of probability, it were perfectly in any man's choice to do almost what he pleased, especially if he meets with an ill counsellor and a witty advocate. For, at this rate, all marriages may be dissolved, all vices excused, upon pretence of some little probable necessity; and drunkenness will be entertained as physic, and fornication as a thing allowed by some vicious persons whose wit is better than their manners; and all