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and then we are concluded by some pretences and pretty umbrages of things, which, for want of experiences, we think very well of; and we can then do no more; that is a demonstration to us, which must determine us: and these little things must then do it, because something must be done, and we must do it as wisely as we may, but no man is bound to be wiser than he can. As the thing seems, either in its own light or in our position, so we are to give our assent unto it.

2. A heap of probable inducements ought to prevail, as being then a moral demonstration, when the thing is not capable of a natural; for then probabilities ought to prevail, when they are the best argument we have. For if any man shall argue thus: 'It is not probable that God would leave his church without sufficient means to end controversies, and since a living infallible judge is the most effective to this purpose, it is therefore to be presumed and relied upon, that God hath done so.' This argument ought not to prevail as a moral demonstration; for though there are some semblances and appearances of reason in it, "Nihil est tam incredibile, quod non dicendo fiat probabile;" said Cicero in his Paradoxes; "there is nothing so incredible, but something may be said for it ;" and a witty man may make it plausible, yet there are certainties against it. For God hath said expressly, that " every man is a liar," and therefore we are commanded to "call no man master upon earth;" and the nature of man is weak, and his understanding trifling, and every thing abuses him, and every man that is wise, sees his own ignorance, and he that is not wise is easily deceived, and they who have pretended to be infallible, have spoken pitiful things, and fallen into strange errors, and cannot be guarded from shame without a whole legion of artifices and distinctions, and, therefore, it is certain that no man is infallible; and where the contrary is certain, the probable pretence is but a fallacy and an art of illusion.

3. There can be no moral demonstration against the word of God, or Divine revelation. He that should flatter himself with thinking the pains of hell shall not be eternal, because it is not agreeable to the goodness of God to inflict a never ceasing pain for a sudden and transient pleasure, and that there can be no proportion between finite

a Præf. ad Par. §4. Wetzel, page 240.

and infinite, and yet God who is the fountain of justice will observe proportions; or if there could be ten thousand more little things said to persuade a sinning man into confidences of an end of torment :- -yet he would find himself deceived, for all would be light when put into the balance against these words of our blessed Saviour, "Where the worm never dies, and the fire never goeth out."

4. Where there is great probability on both sides, there neither of them can pretend to be a moral demonstration, or directly to secure the conscience: for contradictions can never be demonstrated; and if one says true, the other is a fair pretender, but a foul deceiver; and, therefore, in this case the conscience is to be secured indirectly and collaterally by the diligence of search, the honesty of its intention, the heartiness of its assent, the infirmity of the searcher, and the unavoidableness of his mistake.

5. The certainty of a moral demonstration must rely upon some certain rule, to which, as to a centre, all the little and great probabilities, like the lines of a circumference, must turn ; and when there is nothing in the matter of the question, then conscience hath, ev uéya, one great axiom to rely upon, and that is, that God is just,' and God is good, and requires no greater probation than he hath enabled us to find.'

6. In probable inducements, God requires only such an assent as can be effective of our duty and obedience, such a one as we will rely upon to real events, such as merchants have when they venture their goods to sea upon reasonable hopes of becoming rich, or armies fight battles in hope of victory, relying upon the strength they have, as probable to prevail; and if any article of our religion be so proved to us as that we will reduce it to practice, own all its consequences, live according to it, and in the pursuance of it, hope for: God's mercy and acceptance, it is an assent as great as the thing will bear, and yet, as much as our duty will require; for in these cases no man is wise, but he whose ears and heart are open to hear the instructions of any man who is wiser and better than himself.

7. Rules of prudence are never to be accepted against a rule of logic, or reason, and strict discourses. I remember, that Bellarmine, going to prove purgatory from the words of

our blessed Saviour, "It shall not be forgiven him in this world, nor in the world to come;" argues thus, If this shall not be forgiven in the world to come, then it implies that some sins are there forgiven, and, therefore, there is a purgatory; because in heaven there are no sins, and in hell there are none forgiven. This (says he) concludes not by the rule of logicians, but it does by the rule of prudence.' Now this to all wise men must needs appear to be an egregious prevarication even of common sense; for if the rules of logic be true, then it is not prudence, but imprudence that contradicts them, unless it be prudence to tell, or to believe, a lie. For the use of prudence is to draw from conjectures a safe and a wise conclusion, when there are no certain rules to guide us. But against the certain rules it is folly that declares, not prudence; and besides that this conjecture of Bellarmine is wholly against the design of Christ, who intended there only to say, that the sin against the Holy Ghost should never be pardoned;' it fails also in the main inquiry, for although there are no sins in heaven, and in hell none are forgiven, yet, at the day of judgment all the sins of the penitent shall be forgiven and acquitted with a blessed sentence: but besides this, the manner of expression is such as may with prudence be expounded, and yet to no such purpose as he dreams. For if I should say, Aristobulus was taken away, that neither in this life, nor after his death, his eyes might see the destruction of the Temple, does it follow by the rule of prudence, therefore, some people can see in their grave, or in the state of separation with their bodily eyes? But as to the main inquiry, what is to be the measure of prudence? For some confident people think themselves very prudent, and that they say well and wisely, when others wiser than they know they talk like fools: and because no established reason can be contradicted by a prudent conjecture, it is certain that this prudence of Bellarmine was a hard shift to get an argument for nothing, and that no prudential motives are to be valued because any man calls them so, but because they do rely upon some sure foundation, and draw obscure lines from a resolved truth. For it is not a prudential motive, unless it can finally rest upon reason, or revelation, or experience, or something that is not contradicted by any thing surer than itself.

RULE III.

Of two Opinions equally probable, upon the Account of their proper Reasons, one may be safer than another.

THAT is more probable, which hath fairer reasons; that is more safe, that is furthest distant from a sin: and although this be always considerable in the matter of prudence, and in the whole conjunction of affairs, yet it is not always a proper ingredient in the question. The abbot of Lerius hath the patronage of some ecclesiastical preferments in the neighbourhood; he, for affection, prefers to one of them an ignorant and a vicious clerk. But, afterwards being troubled in conscience, inquires if he be not bound to restitution. He is answered, No; because it is in the matter of distributive justice, which binds not to repair that which is past, any other ways but by repentance to God, and provisions for the future yet he being perplexed, and unsatisfied, does restore so much fruits to the next worthy incumbent, as the former unworthy clerk did eat. This was the surer course, and it procured peace to him; but the contrary was the more probable answer. It is safer to restore all gains of usury; but it is more probable that a man is not obliged to it. In which cases the advantage lies not on that side, that is more probable, but on that which is more safe; as in these sentences that oblige to restitution. For although either part avoids a formal sin, yet the safer side also persuades to an action that is materially good, such as restitution is; but not to restore, although in these cases it may be innocent, yet, in no sense, can it, of itself, be laudable.

To which also in these cases it may be added, that on the safer side there is a physical, or natural and proper certainty, that we sin not: on the other, though there is a greater probability, that there is no obligation, yet, at most, it can make but some degrees of moral certainty. But how far this course is to be chosen and pursued, or how far the other is to be preferred, will afterwards be disputed.

RULE IV.

An Opinion that is speculatively probable, is not always practically the same.

a

IN a right and sure conscience the speculative and the practical judgment are always united, as I have before explicated; but in opinions that are but probable, the case is contrary. It is in speculation probable, that it is lawful to baptize in the name of the Lord Jesus; but yet, he that shall do this practically, does improbably and unreasonably. If the opinion of the primitive Christians had been probable that it is lawful to communicate infants, yet it were at no hand fitting to be done in the present constitution of affairs; and it were highly useful, if men would consider this effectually; and not from every tolerable opinion instantly run to an unreasonable and intolerable practice.

For a speculation considers the nature of things abstractedly from circumstances physically or metaphysically; and yet when it comes to be reduced to practice, what, in the head, was innocent, will, upon the hand, become troublesome. and criminal. If there were nothing in it but the disorder of the novelty or the disturbance of men's minds in a matter that is but probable, it were highly enough to reprove this folly. Every man's imperfect discourse or half reasons are neither fit to govern the actions of others or himself. Suppose it probable (which the Greek church believes), that the consecration of the blessed eucharist is not made by the words of institution, but by the prayers of the holy man that ministers, the bishop or the priest;-yet when this is reduced to practice, and that a man shall omit the words of institution or consecration, his practice is more to be reproved than his opinion could be possibly allowed. Some think churches not to be more sacred than other places: what degree of probability soever this can have, yet it is a huge degree of folly to act this opinion, and to choose a barn to pray in, when a church may be had.

For there are, in actions, besides the proper ingredients of their intrinsical lawfulness or consonancy to reason, a

a Chap. 2.

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