not of faith is sin, that is, if it be not done with a persuasion that it is lawful. But if a man be persuaded that he may lawfully do any thing against which he knows no law, no commandment, no reason; this is not a doubting conscience, but a probable, and, therefore, need not to abate the action. But if this also turn into a doubt, the case is altered. For he that thinks he may not do it, or doubts whether he may or no do a thing for which he hath no command, or no positive and affirmative warrant, and that it is no sufficient reason or warrant for the doing it that he knows nothing against it, unless he also have something for it;-this man, thus persuaded or abused, may not proceed to action. For in this case he hath nothing for it, and one great thing against it, even this proposition, that a thing is not to be done in such a case,-which is the case of a privative doubt. But for the thing itself, the next rule gives an account of it.

RULE III.

A privative Doubt cannot of itself hinder a Man from acting what he is moved to by an extrinsic Argument, or Inducement that is in itself prudent or innocent.

1. "IT cannot of itself hinder," that is, abstracting from the circumstance of accidental doubting or not doubting. The reason is, because there being no law against it by which he is actually ruled, and no reason appearing in defiance of it, that is, there being no intrinsical dissuasive, the conscience is only left to be conducted or persuaded by the extrinsical.

For all actions are left indifferent, till, by a superinduced law, they are restrained; which superinduced law wants its publication, if inculpably I have no notice of it in my conscience. But this is to be allowed with this caution: That this entering upon actions, against which we know no reason or law, be not sudden, and violent, and careless, like the rushing of a horse into a battle without consideration; but that we consider according to our strength, and to our time, whether there be any reasons for or against the act in question, and if we find none, let us make none; that is, let

us not, by our unreasonable and impertinent doubting, place a snare for our own feet there, where none is placed by the prohibition.

2. If it be a matter that concerns the interest of another, let us always be the more wary, and remember, if there be nothing against it, there must be something for it either in the matter, or in the manner, either in justice, or in charity, or at least by the securities of the safer part, by which, if we find no reward, yet we are sure to find indemnity.

This whole advice is of great use in the circumstances of the duty that concerns the married pairs; in which the doctors of cases of conscience have spoken what they please, and in many things wholly by chance or fancy; and the holy state of marriage ought to be rescued from many of their snares and intricacies by which they have troubled it, as will appear when I shall speak to the rules of that affair.

RULE IV.

In Doubts of Right, or Law, we are always bound to inquire; but in Doubts of Fact not always.

THE reason is, because ignorance of our duty is always a sin; and, therefore, when we are in a perceived, discernible state of danger, he that refuses to inquire after his duty, does not desire to do it.

In matters of fact we are bound ordinarily to inquire, because we must not be ignorant of the state of our consciences, and what obligation there is to restitution, or repentance, which the more particular it is, the more perfect it is. But this I say, that though ordinarily it be true that we are obliged, yet in some cases it may happen, that it is safer to trust the event of things with a general repentance, than that the conscience of some men be tempted with a particular notice of the fact.

1. This happens in those that are weak-hearted, soft, and apt to every impression in too deep a regard. A Castilian gentleman being new recovered from the sad effects of a melancholy spirit, and an affrighting conscience, and being

entertained by some that waited on him with sports and innocent pastimes to divert his scaring thoughts; he with his company shot many arrows in a public field at rovers : at that time there was a man killed, whether by his arrows or no, he knew not, and is forbidden to inquire; and his case had in it reason enough to warrant the advice. The knowledge of it could not have done him so much good, as it would have done him hurt; and it was better he should be permitted to a doubting than to a despairing conscience, as in his case it was too likely to have happened. It is better to be suspected than to be seen.

2. This also is so to be advised, when the inquiry into the doubt of fact may be prejudicial to a third person. A priest going to the West Indies, by misfortune wounds one of his company, whom, with much trouble and sorrow, he leaves to be cured of his hurt, but passes on to his voyage, which he finished at a huge distance from the place of his misfortune. The merchants come the next year that way, and he is unwilling to inquire concerning his sick friend; desirous he was to know good of him, but infinitely fearful lest he be dead: consulting, therefore, with his superior in the case, was directed not to inquire, upon this account; because, if the man were dead, the priest would be irregular, and a whole parish unprovided for, and left without rites and sacraments, and public offices, which then and there could not easily be supplied.

But in matters of right or duty, inquiry must be made, ever, when the question is of the lawfulness or unlawfulness of what is to be done; because we enter upon danger, and despise our own safety, and are careless of our duty, and not zealous for God, nor yet subjects of conscience, or of the Spirit of God, if we do not well inquire of an action we are to do, whether it be good or bad. But when the act is done, and done with an actual persuasion that it was lawful, the conscience of that person is not easily to be disturbed, which is to be understood with these cautions:

1. When the question was probable on either side, and, at the time of action, was chosen with its just measures and provisions; then, although the complice or partner of the act do change his opinion, and think himself bound to repent, yet he is not bound to trouble the other. Antony, a gentle

man of Parma, being in love with Maria de Rupe, being moved with great interests of his person, and a great neces sity, consummates his marriage before publication, they both of them being persuaded that it is lawful. He afterwards changes his opinion, thinks it a sin, and repents and begs pardon; but being also in doubt whether he ought to tell his wife of it, was advised to the contrary, upon this, amongst many other concurrent reasons, because what was innocently done, cannot be condemned in that in which it was innocent for the man himself ought to be sorrowful for his being deceived (if he thinks he was), but he cannot be tied to repent of the act, which, supposing his then present persuasion, was lawful, because done according to a probable conscience: and, therefore, much less ought he to disturb the peace of his wife, whose persuasion remains the same as at first. What was not a sin at first, cannot, in that individual act, become a sin afterwards.

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2. This is also to be understood, when the act leaves no evil effect, or hath done no hurt to a third person; but if it do, then my peace is not to be bought at the expense of another's evil. No man is to be made better or left so, by another's detriment; and, therefore, if a child were begotten in that unripe and hasty consummation, and that child should be declared bastard, then the peace is to be disturbed, and the inquiry on all hands to be curious and busy, because in all such cases there is something of duty for the future concerned in it; sometimes restitution, but always repentance in particular.

3. This is also true when the fact that is past, is not introductive of more and new instances; for if it was the wrong side of the probability which was chosen, and the same kind of action is to return often, there the conscience, though heartily persuaded, must be awakened from its security by him that believes it to be a sin that was done, and then the interested party must inquire: the reason of this is, because this concerns the future, and all the world when they enter upon action, must inquire anew, when they have reason to doubt anew, and they may be called upon, and must be better informed by them, that can and are concerned. For the honour of God and the interest of his service is in this case concerned, which in the other is not,

when it only relates to a single and a past action, which was then lawful, and, therefore, will not afterwards be imputed.

4. When the person interested does of himself doubt, whether the past act was lawful or not, and desires to be satisfied, and that there will be no evil effect in the alteration of his persuasion, then it is fit he be complied with in that, which he judges to be for the interest of his soul, for this is certainly the better; the other way of concealing and not inquiring being only permitted in some cases, and with so many cautions and reservations as are before expressed.

RULE V.

In Doubts the safer Part is to be chosen.

WHEN the conscience is doubtful, neither part can be chosen till the doubt be laid down; but to choose the safer part is an extrinsical means instrumental to the deposition of the doubt, and changing the conscience from doubtful to probable. This rule, therefore, does properly belong to the probable conscience: for that the conscience is positively doubtful is but accidental to the question and appendant to the person. For the reasons on either side make the con science probable, unless fear, or some other accident, make the man not able to rest on either side. For in matters of conscience, it is as hard to find a case so equally probable that a man shall find nothing without or within to determine him, as it is to find that which the philosophers call tempera→ mentum ad pondus,' a constitution so equal that no part shall excel the other.' For if there were nothing in the things to distinguish them, yet in the man there is a natural propensity, which will make him love one sort of arguments more than another. What can be more indifferent than to see two dogs fight? and yet no man sees their cruelty, but he wishes better to one than to another: and although no opinions are so very even, yet if they were, the man hath an acquisite, or else a natural bias, or something of contingency that will determine him: and if the conscience remains undetermined, so that he may not, or dare not, venture upon