mortes agunt, medicoque tantum occidisse impunitas summa est." It is hard that a physician should grow wiser at no cheaper rate than the deaths of many patients. Now to do the thing directly is intolerable, but to do that which is not our best, and which is not safe, when we have by us that which is safe, and which we know is useful, -is directly against charity, and justice, and prudence, and the faithfulness of a good man.

But 2. When a physician hath no better, he may take that course which is probable, for that is his best; he cannot be required to more, and he is excused, because he is required to minister. And this is yet more certain, if the sick person shall die without physic; but it is a venture whether the medicament may prevail for his cure or no. For then all the hazard is on the favorable side, and if it fails, the event is no worse; and it is charity to offer at a cure that is uncertainly good, but is certainly not evil.

3. When the opinions are on both sides probable, he may take that which is in any sense safer, or in any degree, or by any means more probable, that is, for the community of the opinion, or the advantage it hath by the learning and reputation of them that hold it: so that he may leave his own opinion which is overcome by the greater argument, or the greater authority of another, though both the authority be less than that which binds, and the argument less than that which is certain.

RULE XII.

He that inquires of several Doctors until he find one answering according to his Mind, cannot by that Inquiry make his Conscience safe; but according to the Subject-matter, and other Circumstances, he may.

SAINT Paul remarks the folly of such men who❝ heap up teachers of their own," that is, such who preach what they desire, and declare things lawful which God never made so; and he that hath entertained an opinion, and is in love with it, and will seek out for a kind and an indulgent nurse for it,

cannot ordinarily be the more secure for the opinion of his guide, because the intrinsic motive of his assent is not his guide, but his own purposes and predisposing thoughts and resolutions; and the getting of a learned man to say so, is but an artifice to quiet the spirit, and make it rest in the deception, if it so happens to be. This determination from without may, possibly, add a fantastic peace, but no moment to the honesty of the persuasion or conscience; because the conscience was not ready to rely upon the authority, but resolved to go somewhere else for an authority, if here it could not be had: and therefore the conscience could not be made probable by the authority, because the resolution of the conscience was antecedent to it.

This is true ordinarily and regularly, and there are usually many appendant deceptions; as an impatient desire to have that true which I desire, a willingness to be deceived, a resolution to bring our ends about, a consequent using means of being pleased and cozened, a concealing some circumstances and a false stating of the question, which is an infallible sign of an evil conscience, and a mind resolved upon the conclusion, desirous of a security or sleepy quietness, and incurious of truth. But yet there are some cases in which this changing of guides and inquiries is not only innocent, but an instrument of a just confidence.

1. When the inquirer hath very probable inducements for his opinion, and remains really unsatisfied in the answers and accounts of the first doctors.

2. When he hath an indifferency to any part that may appear true, but it falls out that nothing does seem true to him, but what he hath already entertained.

3. When the assent to our proposition is determined, so as to avoid a real doubt or perplexity, but a scruple remains, that is, some little degrees of confidence are wanting, which cannot be better supplied than by an extrinsical argument, the authority of a wise man.

4. When the inquiring person is under a weakness and temptation, and wants some to apply his own notices to him, and to make them operative and persuasive upon his spirit ; as it happens to very many men always, and to all men sometimes.

5. When the case is favorable and apt for pity and relief,

as in the dangers of despair; then the inquirer may, and ought to, go, till he find a person that can speak comfort to him upon true grounds of Scripture and revelation.

6. When the purpose of the inquirer is to be landed upon any virtue, and pious state of life or design, he may receive his encouragement and final determination from him, whom he chooses for his opinion's sake, and conformity to his own pious intentions.

The reason of these exceptions is this: Because the matter being just, favorable, and innocent, the man goes right,and by being confirmed in his way, receives no detriment to his soul or his duty; and because they are tendencies to duty, it is to be presumed that the inquirer intends honestly and piously and now since the way is secure, and the person well intending, if the instrument of establishing this good course were very incompetent, it might be an imperfection in nature, but not in morality.

RULE XIII.

He that is asked concerning a Case that is on either Side probable, may answer against his own Opinion, if the contrary be probable and more safe, or more expedient and favorable.

THE reason is, because he that holds an opinion which himself believes only to be probable, knows also there is no necessity in counselling it to another than follow it himself, because himself is already determined, which the other is not, but is indifferent.

But why he should rather do so than counsel his opinion, there is no reason in the thing, but something relating to the person inquiring; as if the opinion which he maintains not, be more agreeable with the other circumstances and necessities. Codrus inquires if he be tied to restitution of all the fruits of a field, which he held in a dubious title. The curate thinks it to be a probable opinion, that he is bound; but because Codrus is poor, or apt to break the bridle of religion if it holds him too hard, he may counsel him according to the opinion of them, that affirm that he is not bound to restitution.

If he be asked what his own opinion is, he must not speak contrary to it but when the question only is asked in order to a resolution, he may point to go that way, where by his own sentence he may be safe, and by reason of the other's necessities, he may be more advantaged. The reason of this is, because when two opinions are equally probable, the scales are turned by piety, or charity, or any good thing that is of collateral regard, and, therefore, makes a greater degree of artificial probability, and is, in such cases, sufficient for determination. For in direct reason, the case is equal, and, in the indirect, there is great advantage on the side of charity, or accidental necessity, or compliance with any fair and just interest. Christian religion is the best natured institution in the world.

The like case it is, when the opinion of the curate is such, that the inquirer will probably abuse it to licentiousness and evil mistake; for then the curate may prudently conceal his own sentence, and borrow his brother's candle to light a person that is in danger.

RULE XIV.

When the Guide of Souls is of a different Opinion from his Charge or Penitent, he is not bound to exact Conformity to his own Opinion that is but probable, but may proceed according to the Conscience of the Penitent.

THAT is, supposing the opinion of the penitent to be probable, and that he did the action' bona fide,' and as an act commendable or permitted; he is not to be troubled with what is past, lest that be turned into a scruple which was no sin, and lest the curate judge unrighteous judgment, and prescribe afflictions for that for which God shall never call him to judgment; for in this case it is, that no man can be the judge of another man's conscience.

But if the opinion of the penitent be certainly false, or the parent, or protector, or the occasion of a sin, the guide of his soul must not comply at all with it, but discover the error and the danger. He that kills his brother because he is zealous in another opinion, and thinks he does God good

service, must not be permitted in his erring conscience, and criminal persuasion; for the matter hath altered the case, and in the relations of duty, the error is always vincible, and, therefore, intolerable: and, therefore, Peter Lombard's mother, upon her death-bed, was admonished to confess her sin in having three children by illegal mixtures, though she was foolishly persuaded it was no sin, because her sons did prove to be such excellent persons, and instruments of divine glory.

RULE XV.

The Sentence and Arbitrement of a prudent and good Man, though it be of itself but probable, yet is more than a probable Warranty to Actions otherwise undeterminable.

"SICUT vir prudens definierit," is the great measure, which Aristotle and all the moral philosophers assign to very many cases and questions. If two cases, that seem equally probable, have in them different degrees of safety, that the safest is to be chosen is certain; but oftentimes the sentence and opinion of a good man is the only rule by which we judge concerning safety. When piety and religion are in competition for our present attendance, sometimes piety to our parents is to be preferred, sometimes an action of religion in its own season; but what portion of our services is to be allowed to the one and the other, is "sicut vir prudens definierit," "according as a good and a prudent man shall determine." To bury the dead is good, to relieve the living poor is ordinarily better; but yet there was a time in which there was a proper season for that, and not for this; and our blessed Saviour commended Mary's devotion and choice in so doing; but when we also may do one or the other, depends upon circumstances and accidents, which are not immediately the subject of laws, but of prudent consideration. Human laws bind the conscience of their subjects, but yet give place to just and charitable causes; but which are competent and sufficient is not expressly and minutely declared, but is to be defined by the moderation and prudence of a good man. That we are to be careful in the conduct of our temporal affairs, in paying of our debts, in