00 program elements which constitute the R.D.T. & E. have had to choose among them the ones which we cont best the criteria of potential military need, technical nd effectiveness, and minimum cost. While we cannot. indeed do not need, to try all of them, we certainly must explore at least the most promising prospects, and this continuous initiation of new research and development well as the continued support of promising lines of investied in previous years. ess of determining which potential new projects are actu⚫ of initiation, and which existing lines of investigations are worthy of support, is complex and often rather painful. feasibility, the validity of the requirement, and cost/effecnsiderations are all involved. An element of uncertainty, ore of risk, is nearly always involved in each of these deterDevelopment generally must be well underway before iveness studies can be undertaken with any degree of cerso, technical feasibility in new system development areas olves a projection of the state of the art which may not be vithin the expected time frame. Continuing project reviews y and eliminate developmental deadwood from our programs fore essential. lowing this approach we have been able to initiate many and promising projects during the past 3 years. k it would be well at this point, because of the concern shown Committee last year with respect to the initiation of new develprojects to provide you additional information on this subject. ull development cycle on major programs in the strategic and purpose areas averages about 6 years. Therefore, we can > only a few programs which have gone all the way through it ast 3 (or any other 3) years. However, we have moved some developmental programs which existed 3 years ago along h that cycle. We have canceled others. We have begun a numnew ones, in all areas. We believe we have initiated the most ing and important. In the strategic area, new weapons systems e the MINUTEMAN II (or WING VI MINUTEMAN) and KE X. These are so different in capability from their predecesto provide major changes in our offensive and defensive capacThe penetration aids program, growing from in 1961 requested for fiscal year 1965, has produced a variety of vare which has already entered the inventory (this is one of the xceptions to the 6-year rule). The POLARIS B-3 is still in the phase but if carried out it will constitute a major improvement rategic offensive systems. And the F-111 will not be without gic capabilities. general purpose forces, the major new full-scale developments ted in the past 3 years are the F-111, the LANCE missile, the RBM which congressional action this year places this under a dark cloud, but it is a program which we did initiate-the VAL aft, the main battle tank, the Sea Hawk, which is intended to new approach to surface-mounted ASW, the WALLEYE airarface missile, and a dozen others. 1 the military space program, we have begun (and are halfway ough the development of) the TITAN III standardized space booster. We have initiated a standardized space guidance system. Numerous special payloads have been fully developed. The Manned Orbital Laboratory is a promising new start. In counterinsurgency development, the hardware items are meas ured in the tens or hundreds, and can in many cases move into inventory in a short time. A good measure of what we have accomplished is this list of counterinsurgency developments which I would like to submit for the record, and the fact that funding on this area has increased from less than $10 million per year to the $103.4 million requested for fiscal year 1965. Mr. FLOOD. What are you going to submit for the record? Dr. BROWN. I am going to submit a list of weapons and equipment developments for counterinsurgency. Mr. FLOOD. You are speaking now of the woman I love. I wondered about the nature of it. Could you tell us without going into detail? Do not give us details but in two or three sentences tell us what it is. Dr. BROWN. This is a long list of firepower, intelligence, logistics, mobility items, and these range over the entire spectrum. I think you might want to peruse it now. (Classified information was submitted to the committee.) Dr. BROWN. We must be certain that we are always covering the most critical areas of new technology. The extended time it took us to catch up with the Soviet Union in the development of large space boosters is but one example of what can happen when we fall behind in any major areas. Fortunately, we appear to be generally ahead of our competitors in the fields most important for our security, but we will be able to stay ahead only if we continue a broad, well-balanced, and vigorous research and development effort, an effort which is sufficiently comprehensive and challenging to retain the interest and support of the most capable technical talent available. During 1961, in preparation of the fiscal year 1963 budget request, the research, development, test, and evaluation program was divided into six general categories. These are research, exploratory development, advanced development, engineering development, operational systems development, and management and support. The subdivisions which have been described to you a number of times, represent in a simplified way the evolutionary process by which ideas are converted into useful military hardware. RESEARCH AND EXPLORATORY DEVELOPMENT The research category may be thought of as the realm of ideas, including both theory and experiment, but aimed at knowledge for its own sake which is the base from which advanced devices and inventions must emerge. Exploratory development is the regime of inventions and devices which will, some day, become the advanced components and subsystems of major weapons or supporting systems. Program and budgetary decisions in both research and exploratory development are appropriately made more on the basis of the overal! "level of effort" than on detailed program content. The Department of Defense request in the research category for fiscal year 1965 shows an increase of about 8 percent per year from fiscal year 1962. This is slightly more than enough to maintain the fiscal year 1962 level of effort; though the salaries of research scientists and engineers have climbed at 8 percent per year in the past, other costs of research have risen less, and a reasonable estimate for the overall cost rise is 5 percent per year. Furthermore, increasing complexity of new researches will require additional funding. The requested level of funding will permit us to maintain those vital contacts required with the most creative research people-particularly those in universities people who in the past have been responsible for some of the radical improvements in the technological equipment now employed in our military forces. For fiscal year 1965 in the exploratory development category a slight decrease is being made below what was initially programed in fiscal year 1964. We are convinced that substantial increases in the effectiveness of exploratory development dollars are possible which may well more than compensate for this small decrease in budgetary support. During this coming year one of our primary concerns will be to seek out and identify those management conditions which have in the past proven to be highly productive of militarily useful results. We then intend to initiate new policies which will make these favorable conditions more widespread than they have been in the past in the expectation that this will result in more defense for each exploratory development dollar expended. I would like to discuss briefly some of the more important development programs proposed in our fiscal year 1965 request. I intend to summarize our proposed activities in the general areas of strategic systems, space, nuclear test detection, and nuclear weapon testing, and limited war. Proposed work in these areas involves all of the categories mentioned earlier. STRATEGIC SYSTEMS In strategic offensive systems, important questions are the proper level of development effort of missile and aircraft delivery systems and the nature of future developments in each category. Our experience has clearly shown that we should initiate new longer range missiles or major changes in existing ones with extreme care. Expensive qualification test programs are needed for new systems, and any changes unless carefully controlled can delay assurance of systems reliability. The corresponding improvement in capability represented by such changes must therefore be quite large in order to offset the interim degradation and justify the special qualification tests. MISSILE RELIABILITY Missile reliability has been the subject of substantial discussion recently, and the Secretary of Defense has reported at length on the subject of mechanical reliability and overall operational dependability. I would like, therefore, to confine my prepared remarks to the research and development aspects of the question, together with an updating of the information given you on the results of the operational reliability tests and a discussion of their significance. Missile reliability has been of special development concern since our earliest missile systems were first conceived. Reliability considerations must begin in design. Components and subsystems must have designed into them inherently highly reliable parts for the total sys tem to be eventually highly reliable. The payoff of such a design philosophy comes in missile flight. We have improved design reliability in our ballistic missile programs as we learned from our early experience. Results of our development tests indicate that our missile systems today are more reliable than early ones. MINUTEMAN has demonstrated increased reliability factors over early ATLAS and TITAN, mainly because we were able to profit from the earlier system difficulties and make predicted component reliability a primary program objective in design. Also, we have larger MINUTEMAN force levels, already operating on a full-time, aroundthe-clock basis which provides a greater statistical data base to increase our confidence that these component reliability factors are valid. In the MINUTEMAN program, the Air Force and industry have prescribed parts and components supply criteria which require them to meet special MINUTEMAN program specifications. The objective of this requirement is to insure that only components with the highest design reliability, proven in severe qualification test, will be used in the MINUTEMAN program. As our MINUTEMAN missiles have stood alert in SAC during the period through January of this year, we have amassed for MINUTEMAN, on the electronic parts in the missile and ground environ ment, over 23 billion operational component-hours. The results of this component reliability program have gone so far beyond what has previously been done that the Department of Defense has undertaken a program to make technical data on reliability tests of components widely and readily available throughout industry and the DOD through the interservice data exchange program (IDEP). With respect to mechanical in-flight reliability, it may seem that a small sample-5 or 10 flights-can give little or no confidence of such reliability. However, the problem is a well-known one in statistics and the situation, when analyzed, gives an answer quite different from that which might have been expected before the analysis. A substantial program exists to improve the reentry systems for ballistic missiles. This work is being conducted on each of our national test ranges by the Air Force, the Navy, and the Advanced Research Projects Agency. This work is fully coordinated with the complementary aspects of ballistic missiles defense developments, and a satisfactory degree of information exchange exists between these opposing elements of the hypothetical duel. Techniques are being developed to improve accuracy and command and control, and reduction in basing vulnerability, as well as improvements in capabilities of penetration through antimissile defenses. There are two major strategic missile developments for approved systems currently being pursued. The A-3 POLARIS, to be deployed in the summer of 1964. will provide increased range/payload capabilities over the POLARIS A-2. An improved fire-control system being fitted into the POLARIS submarines will provide the capability to select targets anywhere within range for either the A-2 or A-3 missiles. MINUTEMAN II (formerly Improved MINUTEMAN) to be incorporated into Wing VI and subsequent wings, and retrofitted into earlier ones, will incorporate a new second-stage booster The accuracy will be improved as compared to the earlier model. MINUTEMAN II will be able to fire at any one of a greater number of predetermined targets, than the earlier design [(IIV) and I in WI]. Concurrent with this missile change are a number of other improvements to the missile, to the launch equipment, and to the command and control system which guard against unauthorized use, and improve safety and flexibility as well as target damage potential. For POLARIS, however, it is proposed, in fiscal year 1965, to conduct a project definition for the largest POLARIS missiles that could be launched from the submarines under procurement million of the would allow us with more million in POLARIS fiscal year 1965 R.D.T. & E. is for this purpose. The next step would be to initiate the development of the propulsion system required for such a missile Beginning propulsion system development in to have the first operational capability in required for the POLARIS force to be so equipped. If an extensive anti-ballistic-missile deployment is carried out by the Soviets, this further POLARIS development would certainly be a very useful response. Had we decided to go ahead in fiscal 1965 with it, to begin the propulsion development, there would have been an extra cost, perhaps, of $25 or $30 million more than is in the budget and this would have saved perhaps a year in the development. (Discussion off the record.) STRATEGIC AIRCRAFT Although missile system developments constitute a large proportion of our current and prospective effort in strategic systems, strategic aircraft have now and for the rest of this decade will continue to have a significant place in the force structure. Possible future functions of strategic aircraft cover a wide range. Previous analyses of the RS-70 have shown that for some of these functions, projected capabilities of the RS-70 were very limited. In order to insure against uncertainties and possible errors in our present estimates of future strategic wars, continued systems studies of alternative manned aircraft systems are warranted. Under study are two. alternative operational modes. One of these is an aircraft used as a basing system for long-range missiles which provides a different kind of target to an attacker. The other concentrates on missions complementary to the CONUS or sea-based long-range missiles, such as postattack reconnaissance, command and control, "mopup" or unanticipated target problems, etc. Such an aircraft would probably use short-range missiles in an attack role. Five million dollars is included in the proposed fiscal year 1965 budget to permit initiation of such new aircraft studies as may appear to be necessary. We are continuing the XB-70 program despite the delay-now estimated to be at least 18 months-in first flight, resulting from technical problems. This has caused an increase in estimated cost so far of about $200 million, and further cost increase will follow any further slippage in schedule. Ninety-two million dollars of the estimated total cost of $1.5 billion is required in fiscal year 1965, and will sup |