accountability, control, access, storage, transmission, and marking) and for ensuring that such procedures are systematically reviewed; and those which are duplicative or unnecessary are eliminated.

[44 FR 34913, June 18, 1979, as amended at 45 FR 3888, Jan. 21, 1980; 48 FR 5890, Feb. 9, 1983; 53 FR 41318, Oct. 21, 1988]

§ 1203.203 Degree of protection.

(a) General. Upon determination that information or material must be classsified, the degree of protection commensurate with the sensitivity of the information must be determined. If there is reasonable doubt about the need to classify information, it shall be safeguarded as if it were classified pending a determination by an original classification authority, who shall make this determination within 30 days. If there is reasonable doubt about the appropriate level of classification, it shall be safeguarded at the higher level of classification pending a determination by an original classification authority, who shall make this determination within 30 days.

(b) Authorized categories of classification. The three categories of classification, as authorized and defined in "the Order," are set out below. No other restrictive markings are authorized to be placed on NASA classified documents or materials except as expressly provided by statute or by NASA Directives.

(1) Top Secret. Top Secret is the designation applied to information or material the unathorized disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to the national security. Examples of exceptionally grave damage include armed hostilities against the United States or its allies; disruption of foreign relations vitally affecting the national security; the compromise of vital national defense plans or complex cryptologic and communications intelligence systems; the revelation of sensitive intelligence operations; and the disclosure of scientific or technological developments vital to national security.

(2) Secret. Secret is the designation applied to information or material the unathorized disclosure of which could

reasonably be expected to cause serious damage to the national security. Examples of serious damage include disruption of foreign relations significantly affecting the national security; significant impairment of a program or policy directly related to the national security; revelation of significant military plans or intelligence operations; and compromise of significant scientific or technological develpments relating to national security.

(3) Confidential. Confidential is the designation applied to that information or material for which the unauthorized disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause damage to the national security.

[44 FR 34913, June 18, 1979, as amended at 48 FR 5890, Feb. 9, 1983]

§ 1203.302 Combination, interrelation or compilation.

An interrelationship of individual items, classified or unclassified, may result in a combined item requiring a higher classification than that of any of the individual items. Compilations of unclassified information are considered unclassified unless some additional significant factor is added in the process of compilation. For example:

(a) The way unclassified information is compiled may be classified;

(b) The fact that the information is complete for its intended purpose may be classified; or

(c) The fact the compilation represents an official evaluation may be

cause

§ 1203.400 Specific classifying guidance. Technological and operational information and material, and in some exceptional cases scientific information falling within any one or more of the following categories, must be classified if its unauthorized disclosure could reasonably be expected to damage to the national security. In cases where it is believed that a contrary course of action would better serve the national interests, the matter should be referred to the Chairperson, NASA Information Security Program Committee, for a determination. It is not intended that this list be exclusive; original classifiers are responsible for initially classifying any other type of information which, in

their judgment, requires protection under "the Order."

(a) Information which provides the United States, in comparison with other nations, with a significant scientific, engineering, technical, operational, intelligence, strategic, tactical or economic advantage related to national security.

(b) Information which, if disclosed, would significantly diminish the technological lead of the United States in any military system, subsystem or component, and would result in damage to such a system, subsystem or component.

(c) Scientific or technological information in an area where an advanced military application that would in itself be classified is foreseen during exploratory development.

(d) Information which, if known, would:

(1) Provide a foreign nation with an insight into the defense application or the war or defense plans or posture of the United States;

(2) Allow a foreign nation to develop, improve or refine a similar item of defense application;

(3) Provide a foreign nation with a base upon which to develop effective countermeasures;

(4) Weaken or nullify the effectiveness of a defense or military plan, operation, project, weapon system or activity which is vital to the national security.

(e) Information or material which is important to the national security of the United States in relation to other nations when there is sound reason to believe that those nations are unaware that the United States has or is capable of obtaining the information or material; i.e., through intelligence activities, sources, or methods.

(f) Information which if disclosed could be exploited in a manner prejudicial to the national security posture of the United States by discrediting its technological power, capability or intentions.

(g) Information which reveals an unusually significant scientific or technological "breakthrough" which there is sound reason to believe is not known to or within the state-of-the-art capability of other nations. If the "break

through” supplies the United States with an important advantage of a technological nature, classification also would be appropriate if the potential application of the information, although not specifically visualized, would afford the United States a significant national security advantage in terms of technological lead time or an economic advantage relating to national security.

(h) Information of such nature that an unfriendly government in possession of it would be expected to use it for purposes prejudicial to U.S. national security and which, if classified, could not be obtained by an unfriendly power without a considerable expenditure of resources.

(i) Information which if disclosed to a foreign government would enhance its military research and development programs to the detriment of U.S. counterpart or competitive programs.

(j) Operational information pertaining to the command and control of space vehicles, the possession of which would facilitate malicious interference with any U.S. space mission, that might result in damage to the national security.

(k) Information which if disclosed could jeopardize the foreign relations or activities of the United States; for example, the premature or unauthorized release of information relating to the subject matter of international negotiations, foreign government information or information regarding the placement or withdrawal of NASA tracking stations on foreign territory.

(1) United States Government programs for safeguarding nuclear materials or facilities.

(m) Other categories of information which are related to national security and which require protection against unauthorized disclosure as may be determined by the Administrator. The Chairperson, NASA Information Security Program Committee, will promptly inform the Director, Information Security Oversight Office, General Services Administration (GSA) of such determinations.

[44 FR 34913, June 18, 1979, as amended at 48 FR 5890, Feb. 9, 1983]

§ 1203.401 Effect of open publication.

of

Public disclosure, regardless source or form, of information currently classified or being considered for classification does not preclude initial or continued classification. However, such disclosure requires an immediate reevaluation to determine whether the information has been compromised to the extent that downgrading or declassification is indicated. Similar consideration must be given to related items of information in all programs, projects, or items incorporating or pertaining to the compromised items of information. In these cases, if a release were made or authorized by an official Government source, classification of clearly identified items may no longer be warranted. Questions as to the propriety of continued classification should be referred to the Chairperson, NASA Information Security Program Committee.

§ 1203.402 Classifying material other than

documentation.

Items of equipment or other physical objects may be classified only where classified information may be derived by visual observation of internal or external appearance, structure, operation, test, application or use. The overall classification assigned to equipment or objects shall be at least as high as the highest classification of any of the items of information which may be revealed by the equipment or objects, but may be higher if the classifying authority determines that the sum of classified or unclassified information warrants such higher classification. In every instance where classification of an item of equipment or object is determined to be warranted, such determination must be based on a finding that there is at least one aspect of the item or object which requires protection. If mere knowledge of the existence of the equipment or object would compromise or nullify the reason or justification for its classification, the fact of its existence should be classified.

§ 1203.403 State-of-the-art and intelligence.

A logical approach to classification requires consideration of the extent to which the same or similar information available from intelligence sources is known or is available to others. It is also important to consider whether it is known publicly, either domestically or internationally, that the United States has the information or even is interested in the subject matter. The known state-of-the-art in other nations is an additional substantive factor requiring consideration.

§ 1203.404 Handling of unprocessed data. It is the usual practice to withhold the release of raw scientific data received from spacecraft until it can be calibrated, correlated and properly interpreted by the experimenter under the monitorship of the cognizant NASA office. During this process, the data are withheld through administrative measures, and it is not necessary to resort to security classification to prevent premature release. However, if at any time during the processing of raw data it becomes apparent that the results require protection under the criteria set forth in this Subpart D, it is the responsibility of the cognizant NASA office to obtain the appropriate security classification.

§ 1203.405 Proprietary information.

Proprietary information made available to NASA is subject to examination for classification purposes under the criteria set forth in this Subpart D. Where the information is in the form of a proposal and accepted by NASA for support, it should be categorized in accordance with the criteria of § 1203.400. If NASA does not support the proposal but believes that security classification would be appropriate under the criteria of § 1203.400 if it were under Government jurisdiction, the contractor should be advised of the reasons why safeguarding would be appropriate, unless security considerations preclude release of the explanation to the contractor. NASA should identify the Government department, agency or activity whose national security interests might be involved and the contractor should be instructed to

protect the proposal as though classified pending further advisory classification opinion by the Government activity whose interests are involved. If such a Government activity cannot be identified, the contractor should be advised that the proposal is not under NASA jurisdiction for classification purposes, and that the information should be sent, under proper safeguards, to the Director, Information Security Oversight Office, General Services Administration, Washington, D.C. 20405, for a determination.

§ 1203.406 Additional classification factors.

In determining the appropriate classification category, the following additional factors should be considered:

(a) Uniformity within government activities. The effect classification will have on technological programs of other Government departments and agencies should be considered. Classification of official information must be reasonably uniform within the Government.

(b) Applicability of classification directives of other Government agencies. It is necessary to determine whether authoritative classification guidance exists elsewhere for the information under consideration which would make it necessary to assign a higher classification than that indicated by the applicable NASA guidance. Generally, the classification by NASA should not be higher than that of equivalent information in other departments or agencies of the Government.

§ 1203.408 Assistance by installation security classification officers.

Installation Security Classification Officers, as the installation point-ofcontact, will assist installation personnel in:

(a) Interpreting security classification guides and classification assignments for the installation.

(b) Answering questions and considering suggestions concerning security classification matters.

(c) Ensuring a continuing review of classified information for the purpose of declassifying or downgrading in accordance with Subpart E of this part.

(d) Reviewing and approving, as the representative of the contracting officer, the DD Form 254, Contract Security Classification Specification, issued to contractors by the installation.

§ 1203.409 Exceptional cases.

(a) In those cases where a person not authorized to classify information orginates or develops information which is believed to require classification, that person should safeguard the material as though it were classified until it has been evaluated and a decision made by an appropriate classifying authority. For NASA employees the classifying authority is normally the Installation Security Classification Officer. Persons other than NASA employees should forward, under appropriate safeguards, material in which NASA has primary interest to the NASA Information Security Program Committee, Security Division, Washington, DC 20546 for a classification determination.

(b) Information in which NASA does not have primary interest shall be returned promptly, under appropriate safeguards, to the sender in accordance with § 1203.405.

(c) Material received from another agency for a NASA security classification determination shall be processed within 30 days. If a classification cannot be determined during that period, the material shall be sent, under appropriate safeguards, to the Director, Information Security Oversight Office, GSA, for a determination.

(a) Classification may not be used to conceal violations of law, inefficiency of administrative error; to prevent embarrassment to a person, organization or agency; or to restrain competition.

(b) Basic scientific research information not clearly related to the national security may not be classified.

(c) A product of non-government research and development that does not incorporate or reveal classified information to which the producer or developer was given prior access may not be classified under this Part 1203 until and unless the Government acquires a proprietary interest in the product. This part does not affect the provisions of the Patent Secrecy Act of 1952 (35 U.S.C. 181-188).

(d) References to classified documents that do not disclose classified information may not be classified or used as a basis for classification.

(e) Classification may not be used to limit dissemination of information that is not classifiable under the provisions of this part or to prevent or delay the public release of such information.

(f) Information may be classified or reclassified after receipt of a request for it under the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. 552) or the Privacy Act of 1974 (5 U.S.C. 552a), or the mandatory review provisions of “the Order" if such classification meets the requirements of "the Order" and is accomplished personally on a documentby-document basis by an official with original Top Secret classification authority.

(g) The Administrator, the Chairperson, NASA Information Security Program Committee, or an official with original Top Secret classification authority may reclassify information previously declassified and disclosed if it is determined in writing that (1) The information requires protection in the interest of national security; and (2) the information may reasonably be recovered. These reclassification actions shall be reported promptly to the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office, GSA.

[44 FR 34913, June 18, 1979, as amended at 48 FR 5890, Feb. 9, 1983]