Knowing by Perceiving
Epistemological discussions of perception usually focus on something other than knowledge. They consider how beliefs arising from perception can be justified. With the retreat from knowledge to justified belief there is also a retreat from perception to the sensory experiences implicated by perception. On the most widely held approach, perception drops out of the picture other than as the means by which we are furnished with the experiences that are supposed to be the real source of justification-experiences that are conceived to be no different in kind from those we could have had if we had been perfectly hallucinating. In this book a radically different perspective is developed, one that explicates perceptual knowledge in terms of recognitional abilities and perceptual justification in terms of perceptually known truths as to what we perceive to be so. Contrary to mainstream epistemological tradition, justified belief is regarded as belief founded on known truths. The treatment of perceptual knowledge is situated within a broader conception of epistemology and philosophical method. Attention is paid to contested conceptions of perceptual experience, to knowledge from perceived indicators, and to the standing of background presuppositions and knowledge that inform our thinking. Throughout, the discussion is sensitive to ways in which key concepts figure in ordinary thinking while remaining resolutely focused on what knowledge is, and not just on how we think of it.
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Justified Belief Reasons and Evidence
Perception Experience and Direct Realism
Perceptual Knowledge and Recognitional Abilities
Perception and the Justification of Belief
Abilities Competences and Fallibility
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ability to recognize account of perceptual acquired adequate reason assumption aware barns Chapter character claim cleverly disguised mule clinching evidence competence conceived concerning considerations constituted Direct Realism discussion distinctive enquiry environment episodes epistemology Ernest Sosa evidence-based exercising the ability experiential explain fact fallibility favourable fieldfares Fred Dretske hologram idea implicated instance issue J. L. Austin John McDowell judge just-as-if justified belief kind lemon look magpie manifest matter McDowell Millar mind-independent things non-relationalist conception normative reasons notion object omelette one's orchids perceptual experiences perceptual knowledge philosophical plausible present proposition question raining rational reason to believe recognitional abilities reflection relation relationalist relevant robin role rose routinely scepticism sensations sense sensory experiences sheep simply someone sort Sosa sound specified spider suppose tell thought true belief truth understanding vehicle has skidded virtue epistemology visual appearance visual experience visual perception well-founded well-foundedness zebra