Similarly, the elaborate machinery for export control administered by the Department of Commerce under the Export Control Act of 1949 is also concerned solely with regulating exports of materials deemed to be strategic to the national security of the United States. While the Department of Commerce also provides by regulation for the use of U.S. import certificates covering strategic articles imported into the United States in order to prevent transshipment or reexport of such articles to a destination which would be prohibited under the Battle Act, these procedures impose no restriction on the importation into the United States of strategic goods from Soviet Russia or other Communist-dominated countries. Since the sale of Russian goods in the United States at landed prices which are dramatically below the prevailing U.S. market prices for similar articles has the same or even a greater destructive tendency than conventional "dumping," it may be thought by some that the Antidumping Act of 1921, as amended, provides a means for protecting the domestic producers who are the victims of such a practice. Unfortunately, the Antidumping Act is inoperative against imports from Soviet Russia as a practical matter because the key concepts upon which that act depends for its operation are utterly inapplicable to imports from the Soviet Union.

The basic concept of the Antidumping Act is that whenever a domestic industry is likely to be injured by the importation of foreign merchandise into the United States at prices less than the "foreign market value" (or the "constructed value") of such foreign goods, the customs duties imposed may be increased by an amount equal to the difference between the depressed U.S. selling price of the imported article and its foreign market value (or constructed value). "Foreign market value" is defined in the law as the price at which the foreign merchandise is sold or offered for sale in the principal markets of the country of exportation (or to third countries) under circumstances where the price fairly reflects the market value of the goods. In the case of Soviet Russia, there are no "foreign market prices" as that term is understood. Under the law, where foreign market price cannot be ascertained, the bench mark which is used to determine whether the U.S. offering price of foreign goods involves "dumping" is the "constructed value." That term is defined as the sum of the material and labor costs plus general expenses and profit usually added in the manufacture and sale of such goods in the country of production. Normally, Treasury Department attachés or U.S. consular representatives in foreign countries are able to develop the facts pertaining to "constructed value" by making inquiries at the manufacturing plants in the country of production. In the case of Soviet Russia, however, such inquiries are out of the question; and even if they were made, there are no cost accounting data available which would yield on a basis intelligible by U.S. standards the cost of labor and materials plus the additions for general expenses and profit.

For these reasons the machinery of the Antidumping Act is simply inoperative when applied to U.S. imports of articles from Soviet Russia or other Communistdominated countries.

It has also been suggested that section 303 of the Tariff Act of 1930 might be effective in checking the destructively priced imports of Soviet scientific equipment. That section of the tariff law provides that whenever a country pays or bestows, directly or indirectly, a bounty or grant on the manufacture or exportation of an article, upon the importation of the article into the United States additional duties equal to the amount of the bounty or grant may be imposed as "countervailing duties." But the operation of this law is necessarily dependent upon the ability of the Secretary of the Treasury to determine the amount of the bounty or grant. As in the case of "foreign market value" or "constructed valve" in the Antidumping Act, this determination of the amount of the bounty or grant paid is simply impossible of ascertainment in the case of Soviet Russia.

The totality of the administrative decisions made by the political commissars in the Soviet Union which result in the exportation of an article to the United States at a greatly reduced price would, in effect, constitute the amount of bounty or grant. There is no way of determining what this figure may be; hence, it would appear to be impossible for the Secretary of the Treasury to make any finding which could lead to the imposition of a countervailing duty on the imported scientific apparatus. So, along with the other tariff remedies, the countervailing duties provision of our tariff law is not available as a means of checking the Soviet economic-propaganda offensive in scientific teaching apparatus.

Nor would the "escape clause" provision of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951, as amended, be of help. This remedy is operative only with re

spect to imports of an article which has been the subject of a tariff concession under the President's trade agreements authority. By virtue of the 1951 Extension Act, imports from Soviet Russia and other Communist-dominated countries are not entitled to receive the benefit of the tariff concessions which have been granted on U.S. import classifications in the past; hence, the Russian scientific teaching apparatus pays the full duty upon importation into the United States. Therefore, the escape clause procedure is of no avail in checking the destructive pricing practices applicable to the imports of Soviet scientific apparatus.

It is also obvious from the prices which are quoted by the Ealing Corp. for the sale of Russian scientific appartus in the United States that the customs duties applicable to such imports are also inadequate to provide any significant deterrent to the destructive impact of these imports on the U.S. industry. Duties on scientific apparatus are ad valorem in nature, with the rates averaging about 40 percent. This percentage is applied to the value of the goods being imported which, in the absence of other information, is based upon the invoice price to the importer. Considering that the prices quoted by Ealing, referred to above, are f.o.b. the United States and include the cost of transportation, insurance, and the payment of duties, the enormous differential remaining shows that the duties are virtually useless. The Russian prices are so low that there is no semblance of the standard of fair competition between the Russian and U.S. goods in the United States which duties are intended to provide.

Under Secretary of State Dillon has summed up the reasons why our tariff and trade controls are ineffective against a Soviet trade offensive, as follows: " "*** all aspects of the Soviet economy are under the total control of the Government and the Communist Party, and are directed in accordance with a centrally determined plan. *

"This is a central fact the importance of which cannot be overemphasized. * no frame of reference exists by which internal prices and costs can be measured against those in the outside world. *** Tariffs and trade controls. and such concepts as most-favored nation treatment and dumping, lose their conventional meaning when applied to this type of economy. *** Foreign trade is used as an instrument which is manipulated to serve the purposes of the internal economic plan and the requirements of foreign political strategy."

A unique feature of this, the first major economic offensive of Soviet Russia against a U.S. manufacturing industry, is that the market in question will be sustained principally by Federal grant-in-aid funds. Because of this fact, it is possible for the Congress to provide a counteroffensive to the impending Soviet economic warfare by providing that the Federal grant-in-aid funds cannot be used for the purchase of equipment from Soviet Russia or other Communistdominated countries. And this type of action by the Congress appears to be the only defense which our laws can provide.

VII

The purchase of Russian apparatus by the Nation's secondary schools under the Federal grant-in-aid program will also constitute a propaganda victory for Russia.

(a) By exposing the Nation's youth at an impressionable age to a situation which would incorrectly imply Russian technological superiority over the United States. The type of scientific apparatus being made available by Soviet Russia for sale to our secondary schools under the defense education program consists of nonexpendable articles, substantial in nature, which should be expected to remain in use for many years. While it may prove to be the fact that Russian equipment does not stand up well under the conditions of rough use involved in secondary school education, it is certainly true that the type of apparatus concerned is that which normally gives many years of service. In appraising the propaganda impact of purchases by our high schools and junior colleges of Russian scientific apparatus, it is necessary to keep in mind that the Russian instruments will remain in the classroom year after year as a silent spokesman to succeeding classes of students.

This is an era when we are striving as a nation to maintain and increase our technological superiority over Soviet Russia. Congress in the National Defense

24 Address by the Honorable C. Douglas Dillon, Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, before the American Management Association, New York, N.Y., Nov. 5, 1958.

Education Act recognized that the youth of America are the priceless ingredient in this struggle. Yet this same youth can be adversely affected in that very effort by the action of the Federal Government in standing mutely by while making it possible for the implements of technology of the opponent, Soviet Russia, to be placed in their midst to become a daily reminder of Soviet claims of prowess in science.

25

We may well ponder in this regard the testimony of Dr. Wernher von Braun before the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare last year. He stated: " "Another point which I think should not be overlooked is the following: Our opponents in Soviet Russia adhere to communism, and communism is one of those 'isms' that go after the entire human being and not just for a part of him. All 'isms' including fascism and communism, have always indicated a very great interest in winning over the hearts of the children while they are young. They have always tried to get the children into their organizations while they are little."

In the debate in the Senate on April 28, 1959, on the amendment which Senator Bridges offered to the Second Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1959, to prevent the defense education funds in that bill from being expended for Soviet apparatus, the statement was made that "it is a bit far-fetched to suggest that our children will be subverted by the use of a test tube or mixing pot or stirring rod or, perchance, a microscope, manufactured in Czechoslovakia or Poland." Again, disbelief was expressed that "the children of America are going to be subverted because they use a test tube or a microscope made in a particular foreign country. I do not believe our children are that impressionable. I believe their patriotism, which stems from home, schools, and churches, is sufficiently strong not to be influenced by the use of such instruments." 21 These statements appear not to give sufficient weight to the fact that young people in high school are searching for answers and being molded by the impressions they receive. Unfortunately, the evidence is rather strong that at least some of our young people in the past have received impressions from some quarter during their formative years which made them susceptible to Communist pressure in later life. Witness the acknowledged problem of the conduct of some American prisoners of war during the Korean conflict. The U.S. Navy summarized this situation as follows: 28

"Putting it bluntly, the record of the Korean war showed that an alarming number of American servicemen in that conflict were unreliable. Some of our weaknesses showed up in combat, other inadequacies were seen among Americans who were taken prisoner by Communist forces. An ‘alarming number' does not mean a majority. Far from it. The vast majority of Americans who served in Korea bore up well.

"But there were enough deserters and backsliders among the combat troops to noticeably weaken our fighting efficiency in many instances. And in the POW camps of North Korea, enough American prisoners collaborated with the Communists willfully, knowingly, and to such degree that organized resistance by their more honorable fellow prisoners became extremely difficulty-virtually impossible in some of the camps. So even just a few are an 'alarming number' when their misdeeds have such far-reaching effects."

Young people need guidance in understanding the significance of the events which impinge upon their lives. The presence of Russian scientific apparatus in their high school science classrooms will not be accompanied by the information that the Russian articles happened to be there because the Soviet Union chose to send them to the United States at ridiculously low prices as part of a program of economic and propaganda warfare. They may know that the Soviet equipment is there because the U.S. Government allowed tax revenues to be used to purchase them. When they discuss with their friends, and those friends discuss with their friends in an ever-widening circle of awareness that their school has Soviet science equipment, and that the United States itself supplied the funds for its purchase, those stark facts alone will be present to work their effects upon the impressions which those young people receive of the competence of their fellow Americans in the field of science and technology and the determination of their Government to stand fast against the increasing acts of communism to bury us all.

Op. cit., supra, n. 8. p. 68.

Congressional Record, Apr. 28, 1959, p. 6227.

27 Ibid., p. 6231.

28 U.S. Navy. "Effective Naval Leadership and the Code of Conduct," NavPers 15922. November 1958.

What now may seem to the members of this committee as a small thing, allowSoviet equipment to come into the United States, will actually represent an irretrievable step from which further ramifications will flow. At the very least. a seed of doubt or a disposition to neutrality will be planted in the hearts and minds of many young people which can make them vulnerable in later years to the pressures and claims of superiority in behalf of the Communist ideology, whether this is pressed upon them under duress as in the case of prisoners of war, or whether it is nourished more circumspectly by their daily exposure through the press and other media to the Communist claims of superiority over the American way of life. It can hardly square with the goal of protecting our national security which forms the touchstone of the National Defense Education Act that form the funds called into use by its purposes there will be created a danger from which there can arise a receptiveness, even slight, by our young people to the claims of the Communist ideology.

By failing to restrict the use of the defense education funds which it makes available, the Congress can unwittingly participate in the first step of the process known to the Communists as progressive subjugation. This is simply a process under which by subtle implication, direct appeal, or both, the Communists try to undermine a person's faith in his fellow man, his country, his family, his religion, and in himself.

We are as one in this country as to Soviet Russia's goals of world domination, and the ultimate destruction of the United States and our way of life with its precious regards for freedom and human dignity. Where we sometimes do differ with each other is in the identification of seemingly small matters, the details of the Communist offensive, whether propaganda or economic, by which the Soviet Union pursues its plan of world conquest. It may be useful here to consider the duty which each of us is under to remain eternally vigilant and alert to act in these small matters as well as in the larger ones which more clearly involve Soviet Communist acts against our country. The U.S. Navy puts it this way, in its manual on the "Code of Conduct" (which should apply to each of us and not merely to our fighting men):

"In the past when Americans have had to fight in defense of freedom, the threat has been quite clear. Attacking armies raining death and destruction leave little room for doubt. The greater threat to freedom today-the Communist menace is not always so obvious. For armed assault is only a tactic in the Communist war plan; often a lesser tactic at that.

"World War II was 'total war' in the sense that once the Axis powers launched their attacks, it was an 'all-out' affair. Sink or swim-there would be no turning back. Communist aggression is 'total war' in a much broader and more literal sense. For the Communist war against the rest of the world is constant and continuous. Subversion, infiltration, propaganda-and, of course, 'the breathing spell' with the pleas for 'peaceful coexistence'-all of these and more are parts of the Communists' long-range strategy for world conquest.

"Freedom is an inheritance for Americans of today-provided by the toil and sacrifice of those who founded this Nation, and built it. But freedom is neither gained nor kept by men who leave it for 'somebody else' to take care of such things. In exchange for his birthright of freedom, every American must assume the responsibility for his own actions, in every circumstance" (p. 48). [Italic quoted.]

And so it is in this problem of Russian scientific apparatus that we call your attention to the potential dangers which the use of this equipment in our schools poses in the ultimate formation of the character of the young people who attend those schools. In saying this, we do not impugn the quality or patriotism of the youth of America, but we cannot overlook the fact that many things go into the development of a man's character. As a result of the experiences of U.S. prisoners of war in the Korean conflict, our Armed Services have done serious and constructive thinking about the moral resources of our young people. Again, the Navy has described clearly for us the overwhelming importance of the factors which are brought to bear upon a person in the formative days of his youth:

"The development of character in a man is a never ending process. No man is ever all that he can or will be, until the day he dies. And, of course, character development begins in childhood, from the first moment a youngster becomes aware of things in the world about him. The influence of parents, teachers, play

mates and many others will have much to do with the kind of character a young man has developed by the time he enters military service. * * *" (p. 53).

We have dwelt perhaps overlong on this subject because we believe that this, in the final analysis, is the most important aspect of the threat which is posed by the offering of Russian scientific equipment to our educational market. (b) By exposing the many exchange teachers from foreign countries teaching in our schools to a situation which would incorrectly imply Russian superiority over the United States in the field of science and technology.-The propaganda effect of Russian science teachings equipment in American schools will also be registered upon the many teachers from foreign countries who teach in American primary and secondary schools under the international educational exchange program conducted by the Department of State. During the current academic year, for example, there are 166 foreign teachers from 13 foreign countries conducting classes in primary and secondary schools located in 34 States of the United States. These people contribute to better international understanding through their presence and instruction in American schools; they also take back with them to their native lands impressions about America. Notably, there are no teachers from Soviet Russia in this program.

In the contest between the United States and Russia for the moral and psychological allegiance of the peoples of other nations and to their respective positions of leadership, political philosophies, and ways of life, the consequences of equipping our schools with Russian science teaching apparatus could be detrimental because of the implication which such usage might suggest to many; namely, that Russia is in a position of leadership ahead of the United States in science education. It is not necessary to affirm the proposition that this impact upon exchange teachers in our midst would be clear and direct; it is sufficient to point out that an incongruous or disturbing impression can be generated by the use of such equipment because it is at least suggestive of an inability on the part of American science and industry to supply comparable items in competition with the Russians. The ridiculously low prices with which the Russians forced the entries of such equipment into the United States educational market would very likely not be communicated to these exchange teachers. The presence of such equipment in American schools would surely be a topic of discussion by these teachers when they return to their native lands, and it could be a source of disturbance and concern to them and their American friends during the months of their stay in this country.

These considerations are offered simply to indicate that the initial step of allowing Russian equipment to enter the United States under a U.S. Government subsidy in the form of grant-in-aid funds to State school administrators, would have ever-widening propaganda repercussions which can carry far beyond our own shores. The school administrators could not be blamed for purchasing such equipment for the Federal Government itself, by its example in refusing to deny the Russians access to this sensitive market, would appear to condone or endorse such purchases.

To those who would contend that the importance of maximum efficiency in our national efforts to raise the level of our science education demands the use of Federal funds to purchase science teaching apparatus at the lowest price, regardless of its source, we would answer: Granting the importance of increased emphasis in science education, there are higher values of even greater importance to our Nation's welfare. The Navy's "Code of Conduct," quoted from above, states them well. Let us not lose our perspective in our national drive for continued scientific supremacy. With the editors of "Foundations of National Power" we shall do well to ponder these lines:

29

"Our age is so absorbed by the scientific spirit, with its passion for exact measurements, that we almost come to believe that because the cultural side of human life eludes those measurements, it can be divorced from the search for truth, or at least be shunted to a sidetrack, while the express goes through on the main line. Every contribution of the physical and social sciences to the problems of society is to be welcomed; but to expect those sciences to meet the spiritual hunger for hope and belief and beauty and permanent values is a form of superstition as withering as any which humanity has thus far outlived.*"*

29 "Foundations of National Power." D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc.. revised 1951, p. 446, quoting from "We Are Living in Two Centuries," by R. B. Fosdick, in the New York Times magazine, Nov. 24, 1946.

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