First, I believe that this Nation should commit itself to achieving the goal, before this decade is out, of landing a man on the moon and returning him safely to the earth. No single space project in this period will be more impressive to mankind, or more important for the long-range exploration of space; and none will be so difficult or expensive to accomplish. We propose to accelerate development of the appropriate lunar space craft. We propose to develop alternate liquid and solid fuel boosters, much larger than any now being developed, until certain which is superior. We propose additional funds for other engine development and for unmanned explorations-explorations which are particularly important for one purpose which this Nation will never overlook the survival of the man who first makes this daring flight. But in a very real sense, it will not be one man going to the moon-if we make this judgment affirmatively, it will be an entire nation. For all of us must work to put him there.

Secondly, an additional $23 million, together with $7 million already available, to accelerate development of the Rover nuclear rocket. This gives promise of some day providing a means for even more exciting and ambitious exploration of space, perhaps beyond the moon, perhaps to the very end of the solar system itself.

Third, an additional $50 million will make the most of our present leadership, by accelerating the use of space satellites for worldwide communications. Fourth, an additional $75 million-of which $53 million is for the Weather Bureau will help give us at the earliest possible time a satellite system for worldwide weather observation.

Let it be clear-and this is a judgment which the Members of Congress must finally make let it be clear that I am asking the Congress and the country to accept a firm commitment to a new course of action—a course which will last for many years and carry very heavy costs of $531 million in fiscal 1962—an estimated $7 to $9 billion additional over the next 5 years. If we are to go only half way, or reduce our sights in the face of difficulty, in my judgment it would be better not to go at all.

Now this is a choice which this country must make, and I am confident that under the leadership of the Space Committees of the Congless, and the Appropriation Committees, that you will consider the matter carefully.

It is a most important decision that we make as a Nation. But all of you have lived through the last 4 years and have seen the significance of space and the adventures in space, and no one can predict with certainty what the ultimate meaning will be of mastery of space.

I believe we should go to the moon. But I think every citizen of this country as well as the Members of the Congress should consider the matter carefully in making their judgment, to which we have given attention over many weeks and months, because it is a heavy burden, and there is no sense in agreeing or desiring that the United States take an affirmative position in outer space, unless we are prepared to do the work and bear the burdens to make it successful. If we are not, we should decide today and this year.

This decision demands a major national commitment of scientific and technical manpower, material and facilities, and the possibility of their diversion from other important activities where they are already thinly spread. It means a degree of dedication, organization, and discipline which have not always characterized our research and development efforts. It means we cannot afford undue work stoppages, inflated costs of material or talent, wasteful interagency rivalries, or a high turnover of key personnel.

New objectives and new money cannot solve these problems. They could in fact, aggravate them further-unless every scientist, every engineer, every serviceman, every technician, contractor, and civil servant gives his personal pledge that this Nation will move forward, with the full speed of freedom in the exciting adventure of space.

APPENDIX 8

COMMENTS ON ROVER BY HON. MELVIN PRICE

[Atomic Industrial Forum MEMO, July 1961]

In an article written exclusively for the Memo, the Project Rover nuclear powered rocket program is discussed by Representative Melvin Price, Democrat, of Illinois, chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy's Research, Development and Radiation Subcommittee.

The President in his May 25, 1961, message cleared up a question that certainly needed clearing up from the highest level in our Government: Are we or aren't we in the space race? He said we definitely are and that the marshaling of the Nation's resources is required to win the race. The somber importance of this decision was reflected in the President's message when he said that in many ways the key to our future on earth may be dependent on achieving leadership in space. The race is in effect a contest between nations of basically different ideologies the Soviets and us. The differences in the ideologies are the differences between freedom and tyranny. Nothing more can or need be said to explain the importance of winning this race.

The President's statement provides the required guidance at the top policy. level of our Government. This was an essential action which was previously missing from the nuclear rocket development program. The point is, this action is only the start for attaining our objective of developing a nuclear rocket engine. Many things must now be done to get on with the job. From my past experience with other research and development projects-particularly the difficult ones like nuclear rocket projects-I see pitfalls coming up which we must avoid. In this article, I'd like to mention some of them and give my views on how to get around them.

The need

Nuclear rocket engines are an absolute necessity for any nation engaged in a serious effort for the exploration and use of space.

One of our leading space scientists put it very succinctly. Dr. Krafft Ehricke of Convair, testifying before my Subcommittee on Research and Development on March 24, 1960, laid it on the line in the following way:

“The universe is run by nuclear energy. Space will be conquered only by manned nuclear-powered vehicles. Planning anything else for the late sixties is, in my opinion, flirting with obsolescence almost from the start."

The practically limitless source of energy from nuclear reactions is the foremost reason for its superiority as an energy source. The highly concentrated nature of nuclear fuels dictates their use for the space missions of the future. Chemical engines cannot meet our future requirements.

Project status

We have reached significant landmarks in our work on the development of a useful nuclear rocket engine. Three power experiments have already been conducted. Much useful data has been obtained for the conduct of advanced experiments scheduled for the latter part of this year.

At the moment, we are in poor shape relative to certain work which must be done to develop a nuclear rocket. I am referring to our lack of test facilities. Because planning and funding were inadequate in prior years, we do not now have one test stand which we could use to test a reactor. Construction and modification in progress at the Nevada test site should correct this situation. The point is, any serious development effort has to face up to the leadtime required to provide the complex laboratory and test facilities we need. A test stand of the type required for such work has a leadtime of about 3 years. Funding and effort cannot waver from year to year without seriously hurting progress. Any wavering in support hurts progress in a number of ways-it both increases the time to complete a facility and demoralizes scientists and engineers whose enthusiasm, energy, and talents are vital to the success of the project.

Funding plans

The President stated in his May 25 message that essentially all of the funds requested by NASA and AEC for the next fiscal year are being requested of the Congress. This involves an increase of $23 million in NASA's budget and $7 million in AEC's budget. The added $23 million for NASA is a new request

while the $7 million for the AEC is to be made available by reprograming other reactor development funds. The new total being requested for the next fiscal year is $89.5 million $40.5 million for NASA and $49 million for the AEC. This, it appears, will be sufficient for what can be done during the next fiscal year.

Adequate funding for next year, of course, cannot correct past deficiencies in planning and funding which caused our present deficiency in facilities. Our present situation should make it clear, though, that adequate planning and funding support must be provided in the future. Consistent support is a problem I see coming up in the nuclear rocket program in the future. This problem can well stem from the statement of program objectives which we now have. Objectives

I'm afraid we don't now have the type of statement of objectives which will assure maximum progress in the development of a nuclear rocket engine. The Joint Committee has expressed its concern relative to the establishment of objectives and plans for the nuclear rocket program in the committee report on the AEC's fiscal year 1962 authorization bill as follows:

"The committee is very concerned over the early development of a detailed program to reflect the administration's recent announcement to accelerate the nuclear rocket development program. Foremost, the committee is interested in the establishment of clear-cut objectives, a schedule for flight tests, and the designation of specific space mission for a nuclear rocket engine.”

At present, our objective is something like “* ** such flight testing can be initiated in the 1966–67 period and * * * if all technical aspects of the program proceed without difficulty, flight testing could start in 1965." This objective is better than nothing but probably won't be enough to obtain the funding support which will be needed when our budgeteers start looking for some projects to cut. Rover does not have a specific job to do in the first manned mission to the moon which the Government has established as our first major national objective. Consequently, it may well develop that when our overall space program is reviewed sometime in the future for areas where cuts can be made, the budgeteers may take the attitude that since the Rover nuclear rocket has no specific slot to fill in our moon mission, it is not essential at this time. Such a lack of vision could lead us directly to another prestige disaster. This must not happen and, as stated in the committee's report on next year's AEC authorization bill, the committee intends to review AEC's and NASA's plans to assure that the nuclear rocket program is not vulnerable to budgeteers' attacks. I am presently considering recommending the establishment of a panel of consultants to review thoroughly the plans and objectives for the Rover project to find out if there are any soft spots in them.

Competition with U.S.S.R.

In his May 25 message the President made it quite clear that we are in competition with the Soviet Union in our space efforts. It's axiomatic that our objective is to surpass them. We know of the Soviet Union's superiority in the field of chemical rocket engines. We also have an idea concerning the rate of their progress to maintain this superiority.

Testimony received by the Joint Committee this year during the 202 hearings indicates that previously we underestimated their rate of progress and that we are dropping further behind them in the chemical rocket field instead of closing the gap. Ehricke stated his estimate as follows :

“I have been quite wrong in my estimate of our progress relative to Soviet Russia's progress in space boosters. I stated that within 3 years we will be able with Atlas-Centaur to exceed the Soviet payload capability, then demonstrated, by a factor of 3. Although I did not believe that this ratio would still be valid when we were launching the first Centaur, I nevertheless felt we had a reasonable chance to be equal or somewhat better. However, the Soviet vehicle development appears to have proceeded faster than ours in the last 2 years."

Since we know of the Soviet Union's competence in the chemical engine field and since we foresee the obsolescence of chemical systems for succeeding steps in space explorations, we should take every step to accelerate our efforts in the nuclear rocket program. Although we do not know for certain, I believe that we are now further along than any other nation in the development of nuclear energy for space application. Relative positions are transient in research and development work. It behooves us to carry through for the payoff in this effort without delay.

Nuclear energy provides us with the leapfrog capability. It is the only reasonable way that I can see for becoming first in space exploration.

Project administration

As you know, NASA and AEC have recently selected two industrial firms for the first phase of the job of building a complete nuclear rocket engine system. It has taken us a long time to get to this point. Administrative redtape delayed the issuance of solicitations for a couple of months last year. We can also incur months of delay in the present contract negotiating phase. Time must be cut in these administrative areas. The loss of an hour in this phase of the project is as expensive in money and loss of time in the race as the loss of an hour in the accomplishment of a technical phase of the work.

In the Rover project we have a fertile field for the generation of administrative and management delays. We have the management direction split between the AEC and NASA. The differences in such things as administrative procedures, personnel policies, and communication methods can cause problems. More people are naturally in on the decision circuit, and this interjects more confusion and delay. Personal motivations are clouded by conflicts between parent organization and project loyalties.

Problems in these areas can be solved and the attendant inefficiencies and delays can be kept out if the single AEC-NASA office set up for the direction of the project takes charge and provides the required leadership. This requires the usual leadership qualities to an unusual degree in everyone in the office, particularly the manager who just has to knock heads together now and then, and many times face the world himself to get things done right.

Mr. Harry Finger, the manager of the joint office, appears to be taking hold in this regard. We'll know for sure as the project progresses. The Joint Committee will be watching this phase of the operation closely for any problems that may develop.

Contractors' role

The recent selection of two industrial firms for a team effort in the engine development phase must also be considered as a possible source of trouble and delay. The need to coordinate all of the work with a national laboratory—the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory—is another factor which, in my experience, must be carefully considered.

How the organization is set up to get the job done is very important. The phases of the work each organization is responsible for must be made known and understood. Every effort must be exerted to reduce the cracks between these organizations in order that the number of items which find their way into the cracks and get lost is kept as low as possible.

The eminent success of Admiral Rickover in carrying out the nuclear submarine development program should be looked to for lessons on how to get the job done. The situations which Admiral Rickover had to face relative to the nuclear submarine are as similar to the situations which exist relative to the Rover program as such things can be. Both programs are difficult research and development programs vital to the Nation's welfare and both require the team efforts of a number of industrial organizations, Government agencies, and national laboratories.

Considering the urgency and importance of the nuclear rocket program and the demonstrated effectiveness of Admiral Rickover's methods, we should take advantage of the lessons learned in the nuclear submarine program to help in the rocket program.

The terms and conditions now under negotiation with the two industrial contractors should be thoroughly considered by all parties. Any problems that the participants foresee, including the national laboratory participants, should be brought out in the open and settled now. The prima donna attitude has developed many times in the past after the participants get a foot in the door. The prospective participants should be made clearly aware that the objective is the development of a nuclear rocket-the objective of the program is not the promotion of the welfare of the participants. Disgruntled or disillusioned participants may well be the cause of our losing this important race.

As you know, one of the important functions of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy is the "watchdog" function. You can be assured that Rover will receive the benefits of this Joint Committee function. I am particularly interested in spotting difficulties in the program before they have a serious effect. My objective is to do all I can to promote the progress of this vital national program-developing the nuclear rocket engine and doing it first.

75803 0-61———20

APPENDIX 9

MAN'S ROLE IN THE NATIONAL SPACE PROGRAM

National Academy of Sciences, Space Science Board, Washington, D.C.

With the recent announcement by President Kennedy that manned landing on the moon constituted a national objective of the space program during the present decade, public discussion has been concerned with the values of such an effort. For 3 years the Space Science Board of the National Academy of Sciences has been studying scientific aspects of space, including the role of man. On this topic the Board adopted a formal position at its February 10–11, 1961 meeting, which it submitted to the Government on March 31, 1961.

The Board recommended that scientific exploration of the moon and planets should be clearly stated as the ultimate objective of the U.S. space program for the foreseeable future. This objective should be promptly adopted as the official goal of the U.S. space program and clearly announced, discussed, and supported. In addition, it should be stressed that the United States will continue to press toward a thorough scientific understanding of space, of solving problems of manned space exploration, and of development of applications of space science for man's welfare.

The Board concluded that it is not now possible to decide whether man will be able to accompany early expeditions to the moon and planets: many intermediate problems remain to be solved. However, the Board strongly emphasized that planning for scientific exploration of the moon and planets must at once be developed on the premise that man will be included. Failure to adopt and develop our national program upon this premise will inevitably prevent man's inclusion, and every effort should be made to establish the feasibility of manned space flight at the earliest opportunity.

From a scientific standpoint, there seems little room for dissent that man's participation in the exploration of the moon and planets will be essential, if and when it becomes technologically feasible to include him. Man can contribute critical elements of scientific judgment and discrimination in conducting the scientific exploration of these bodies which can never be fully supplied by his instruments, however complex and sophisticated they may become. Thus, carefully planned and executed manned scientific expeditions will inevitably be the more fruitful. Moreover, the very technical problems of control at very great distances, involving substantial time delays in command signal reception, may make perfection of planetary experiments impossible without manned controls on the vehicles.

There is also another aspect of planning this country's program for scientific exploration of the moon and planets which is not widely appreciated. In the Board's view, the scale of effort and the spacecraft size and complexity required for manned scientific exploration of these bodies is unlikely to be greatly different from that required to carry out the program by instruments alone. In broad terms, the primary scientific goals of this program are immense: a better understanding of the origins of the solar system and the universe, the investigation of the existence of life on other planets and, potentially, an understanding of the origin of life itself. In terms of conducting this program a great variety of very intricate instruments (including large amounts of auxiliary equipment, such as high-powered transmitters, long-lived power supplies, electronics for remote control of instruments and, at least, partial data processing) will be required. It seems obvious that the ultimate investigations will involve spacecraft whether manned or unmanned, ranging to the order of hundreds of tons so that the scale of the vehicle program in either case will differ little in its magnitude. Important supporting considerations are essential to realization of these concepts:

(a) Development of new generations of space vehicles, uniquely designed for use in space research and not adaptations of military rockets, must proceed with sufficient priority to insure that reliable vehicles of adequate thrust are available for lunar and planetary research. This program should also include development of nuclear stages as rapidly as possible.

(b) Broad programs designed to determine man's physiological and psychological ability to adapt to space flight must likewise be pushed as rapidly as possible. However, planning for manned scientific exploration of the moon and the planets should be consummated only as fast as possible consistent with the development of all relevant information. The pro